Home equity loans
PRIME is Hastra’s yield-bearing share token for Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending pool. Holders receive exposure through staked wYLDS.
PRIME is Hastra’s yield-bearing share token for Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending pool. Holders receive exposure through staked wYLDS.
“PRIME represents a share-based position in the Democratized Prime pool.”
“PRIME earns wYLDS from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations.”
“The PRIME exchange rate appreciates over time. 1 PRIME becomes redeemable for more wYLDS. The on-chain PRIME/wYLDS exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rewards administrators via verify_price.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The sources support every material element: PRIME is issued when users stake wYLDS; it represents a share-based position or liquid-staking participation in Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC pool; its | anthropic-family: confirmed — Every material claim is supported by the union of the two fetched sources. The terms page states PRIME is a liquid staking token representing participation in Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending | kimi-family: confirmed — All material claims are supported by the cited sources. The integration guide states 'PRIME represents a share-based position in the Democratized Prime pool' and describes wYLDS being staked into PRIM
Underlying
Home equity loans
APY
+6.86%
30d annualized
Collateralization ratio
100%
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.”
“Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%. AUM for reserves is updated daily at the close of the market.”
Verifier note: panel 1/1 confirmed (agreement=4) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The Hastra source explicitly states: “Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve,” and further describes YLDS being held to back issued wYLDS tokens “1:1.” This directly supports a 10
Attestation frequency
Quarterly
Quarterly reserve reporting via FCC's SEC financial statements, plus an annual fund audit (depth-structure-flows)
Monthly SEC reporting and continuous on-chain verification (breadth-api-2)
“reported on a quarterly basis in the financial statements in our public periodic reports filed with the SEC.”
“backed by a portfolio of prime Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=2, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS source says reserves are “reported on a quarterly basis” in SEC-filed financial statements, which supports quarterly reporting/disclosure—not a quarterly attestation. The same page separately | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The YLDS site explicitly states in its FAQ: 'The reserves for YLDS are reported on a quarterly basis in the financial statements in our public periodic reports filed with the SEC.' This directly and p | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The cited source (https://www.ylds.com/) directly confirms under the FAQ section ('How do we see what reserves are backing YLDS?') that reserve backing for YLDS is 'reported on a quarterly basis in th
PRIME price
$1.0526
Custodian
Hastra holds YLDS collateral backing wYLDS; UMB Bank serves as custodian for the underlying Figure certificate issuer
“Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLDS and makes no representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the nature, risk profile, regulatory status, or performance of YLDS or any associated parties.”
“Figure Investment Advisors, LLC serves as investment adviser to FCC pursuant to an advisory agreement.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The Hastra terms expressly state that Hastra holds YLDS as 1:1 collateral backing wYLDS. The SEC prospectus identifies Figure Certificate Company (FCC) as the certificate issuer and states that UMB Ba | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both items in the list are supported by the union of fetched sources. Item 1 (Hastra holds YLDS collateral backing wYLDS): the hastra.io/terms archive states verbatim 'Hastra holds YLDS as collateral | kimi-family: confirmed — Both items are supported by the union of the fetched sources. (1) Hastra's Terms state verbatim: 'Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS' and describe wYLDS as 'backed 1:1 by YLDS.' The Terms' sepa
Growth of $10,000 over 1 month
Growth of $10,000 over 3 months
Growth of $10,000 over 6 months
Growth of $10,000 over year to date
Growth of $10,000 over all history
$10,058.82
+$58.82$10,165.13
+$165.13$10,348.22
+$348.22$10,436.17
+$436.17$10,526.17
+$526.17As of August 7, 2026
1 mo
3 mo
6 mo
YTD
Since inception
PRIME
+0.56%
+0.54%
+0.57%
+0.60%
+0.62%
1 mo
3 mo
6 mo
YTD
Since inception
PRIME
+0.56%
+1.61%
+3.46%
+4.36%
Pool-wide metrics
Yield source
Hastra retains 50 basis points from distributed yield.
Omits the disclosed magnitude and mechanism of the HELOC yield: the ~9% figure attributed to DemoPrime lending (d1dafdd0) and that the Democratized Prime pool rate is 'a market rate based on supply and demand within the protocol' (dd53fef1). These directly characterize the economic yield source and were available.
“wYLDS is derived from interest spreads on real-world home equity lines of credit.”
“wYLDS interest on unutilized pool liquidity, net of the 50 bps Hastra fee”
“net of the 50 bps Hastra fee”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The fetched Terms state that PRIME accrues wYLDS based on Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations and that wYLDS is derived from interest spreads on real-world HELOCs. Both the Terms and | anthropic-family: confirmed — All three material claims are supported by the fetched sources. (1) 'Figure's HELOC operations generate interest spreads for PRIME' is directly supported by the Terms: 'PRIME tokens accrue wYLDS based | kimi-family: confirmed — All three material claims are supported by the union of sources. (1) 'Figure's HELOC operations generate interest spreads for PRIME': the Terms state 'PRIME tokens accrue wYLDS based on the performanc
Collateralization
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.”
“Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%. AUM for reserves is updated daily at the close of the market.”
Verifier note: panel 1/1 confirmed (agreement=4) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The Hastra source explicitly states: “Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve,” and further describes YLDS being held to back issued wYLDS tokens “1:1.” This directly supports a 10
Structure & quality
No PRIME-specific loan-level tape, duration schedule, or geographic concentration breakdown is publicly disclosed.
“WA Coupon 10.76% … WA Credit Score 736 … 2nd Lien 82.68%”
“The HELOC+ loans associated with the pool sit in a bankruptcy-remote trust with an independent trust administrator.”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over 758c9d32-6f29-43d8-8446-630d341558e1: The new claim directly addresses credit quality and lien concentration with specific disclosed metrics—82.68% second lien, weighted-average credit score 736, weighted-average post-origination CLTV 65.62%, and weighted-average coupon 10.76%—and its cited Figure evidence supports the key pool characteristics. The incumbent identifies the broad HELOC and wYLDS exposures but provides no actual maturity, concentration, leverage, or credit-quality profile.
2 holdings · sorted by weight
“Real Assets: Backed by actual home equity lines of credit.”
“Demo Prime (DP): Lends to real estate borrowers using HELOC products.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-02T21:40:32.726Z from rejected status | panel 2/4 confirmed (agreement=4) | trimmed uncited claims (3) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched Hastra page supports that PRIME’s yield comes from Demo Prime lending to real-estate borrowers using HELOC products and that it is backed by home-equity lines of credit. It also refers to | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The fetched page confirms both quoted statements verbatim: 'Real Assets: Backed by actual home equity lines of credit' and 'Demo Prime (DP): Lends to real estate borrowers using HELOC products.' The f | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided text mentions 'Demo Prime (DP)' / 'Democratized Prime' and HELOC lending operations as the yield-generating source for PRIME, but it does not mention 'Figure' or 'HELOC+'. Furthermore, th | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The fetched Hastra documentation expressly identifies “Demo Prime (DP)” as lending to real-estate borrowers through HELOC products, states that PRIME yield comes from those real-world lending operatio
Signum Ltd., d/b/a Hastra
Shared legal identity, ownership, people, incidents, and channels.
Service providers
Custodians
Backers
Official channels
Source documents from the issuer, hosted at the original source.
legal terms: Binding terms of service governing the Hastra protocol
hastra.io
SEC prospectus (Form 497): YLDS prospectus/497 filing establishing the registered security
sec.gov
official product documentation: Institutional disclosures and mechanics for YLDS
ylds.com
Hastra Terms of Service/Terms of Use — governs Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)'s DeFi application, eligibility screening, and PRIME/wYLDS access.
docs.hastra.io
Figure Certificate Company (FCC) SEC Form 497 prospectus -- discloses FCC's registration as a face-amount certificate company under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
sec.gov
Sherlock collaborative security audit report of the Hastra protocol (March-April 2026).
hastra.io
Independent layers of protection — the legal wrapper, the asset custodian, and third-party validators.
Protects holders if the issuer fails.
FCC losses may impair payments. PRIME holders bear Figure HELOC defaults and Figure operational or financial distress. Hastra disclaims control over Figure lending.
“Lock up USDC (a U.S. dollar–backed stablecoin); Receive in return a Solana-based token, wYLDS, representing a claim against fully collateralized assets held by Hastra.”
“The Certificates are unsecured and backed solely by the assets of FCC. Although FCC is required under the Investment Company Act to maintain a minimum level of capital and reserves, and although the assets that FCC may hold as capital and reserves are only those in which a District of Columbia life insurance company is authorized to invest, in the event that there are losses on FCC’s assets, including assets that comprise FCC’s capital and reserves, FCC may not have sufficient resources to meet its obligations, including making interest and/or principal payments on your Certificates.”
“Counterparty and Credit Risk: PRIME wYLDS depends on the performance of Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. Risks include: Borrower defaults on HELOC loans Deterioration in collateral value (home equity) Figure's operational or financial difficulties”
“Hastra does not control Figure's lending operations and makes no representations regarding Figure's creditworthiness, loan underwriting standards, or ability to generate wYLDS.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt-family: confirmed — The fetched Hastra terms state that wYLDS represents a claim against fully collateralized assets held by Hastra and is backed 1:1 by YLDS held as collateral. The SEC filing identifies the underlying F | anthropic-family: confirmed — Every material claim is supported by the union of the two fetched sources. Hastra terms confirm wYLDS 'representing a claim against fully collateralized assets held by Hastra.' The SEC 497 filing conf
“Permissionless on-chain; sanctions-based freezing only”
“wYLDS and PRIME mints have program-controlled freeze authorities. TRM sanctions rules can auto-freeze addresses violating ToS.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived guide directly states that Solana access is “Permissionless on-chain; sanctions-based freezing only.” It also states that the wYLDS and PRIME mints have program-controlled freeze authorit | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived source. The Key Differences table lists the Solana (hastra-sol-vault) allowlist/KYC row as 'Permissionless on-chain; sanctions-based freezing only', | kimi-family: confirmed — The archived source explicitly states 'Permissionless on-chain; sanctions-based freezing only' in the ETH-vs-Solana comparison table, and the troubleshooting section states 'wYLDS and PRIME mints have
“Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (“Hastra”, “we”, “our” or “us”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation, a Cayman foundation.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived Terms of Use expressly state that the Hastra application and related services are provided by Signum Ltd., organized under British Virgin Islands law, and that Signum Ltd. is a wholly own | anthropic-family: confirmed — The archived Terms of Use at https://hastra.io/terms states verbatim: 'Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ("Hastra", "we", "our" or "us"), a wholly owned sub | kimi-family: confirmed — The terms state verbatim that Signum Ltd. is organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands, is referred to as 'Hastra', and is a wholly owned subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation, a Cay
“debt instruments”
“Interest is paid in kind on the first business day of the month. Customers may also elect to receive interest in U.S. dollars.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-02T21:39:42.725Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | trimmed uncited claims (6) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited YLDS homepage confirms that interest is paid in kind on the first business day of each month and that customers may elect U.S.-dollar interest. The SEC prospectus excerpt characterizes the C | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched prospectus text does refer to Figure Certificates as "interest-bearing debt securities" (not verbatim "debt instruments" as quoted), but this characterization appears in the general descri | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The SEC prospectus expressly states for Figure Transferable Certificates that accrued interest “is paid monthly in U.S. dollars” (automatically reinvested unless the investor opts out), and for Figure
false — YLDS holders are unsecured creditors of FCC, backed solely by FCC's assets, with no bankruptcy-remote segregation, FDIC, or SIPC protection (breadth-claude, breadth-opencode, depth-issuer-legal).
true — FCC is a SEC-registered face-amount certificate company holding assets separate from Signum Ltd.'s balance sheet, implying bankruptcy-remoteness (breadth-api-2).
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
“FCC is not a bank, and the face-amount certificates … are not … insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:03:12.886Z from rejected status | panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=3, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched pages state that YLDS are unsecured debt/face-amount certificates backed solely by FCC’s assets, and that FCC is a subsidiary within the Figure corporate group. Those facts do not establis | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived source content from ylds.com and ylds.com/legal. The disclosures explicitly state that YLDS certificates are 'unsecured face-amount certificates and | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The provided sources confirm that YLDS certificates are unsecured debt obligations solely backed by the general assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC), and that investors bear the credit and insol
“YLDS represents a blockchain-based face-amount certificate officially registered with the US SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.”
“users must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
“YLDS are registered under Section 5 of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933 and Figure Certificate Company is registered as an investment company under the U.S. Investment Company Act of 1940.”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over 46828119-2abb-4087-a325-5a1c87f3ae63: The new claim more directly and specifically identifies YLDS’s regulatory regime, issuer, governing statutes, and offshore access restriction. Its cited evidence supports SEC registration under the Securities Act and Investment Company Act and exclusion of U.S. persons. Although some details such as the CIK, BVI issuer, and sanctions exclusions are not established by the quoted evidence, the incumbent’s evidence supports only YLDS’s SEC registration and does not substantiate its assertion that PRIME’s regime and exemptions are undisclosed.
Holds the underlying, independent of the issuer.
“Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLDS and makes no representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the nature, risk profile, regulatory status, or performance of YLDS or any associated parties.”
“Figure Investment Advisors, LLC serves as investment adviser to FCC pursuant to an advisory agreement.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The Hastra terms expressly state that Hastra holds YLDS as 1:1 collateral backing wYLDS. The SEC prospectus identifies Figure Certificate Company (FCC) as the certificate issuer and states that UMB Ba | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both items in the list are supported by the union of fetched sources. Item 1 (Hastra holds YLDS collateral backing wYLDS): the hastra.io/terms archive states verbatim 'Hastra holds YLDS as collateral | kimi-family: confirmed — Both items are supported by the union of the fetched sources. (1) Hastra's Terms state verbatim: 'Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS' and describe wYLDS as 'backed 1:1 by YLDS.' The Terms' sepa
Third-party checks on the operation.
“Annual audit: Big Four Audited.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The homepage expressly states “Annual Audits,” “Big Four Audited,” and “Audits from a Big Four firm,” which supports an annual Big Four audit representation for YLDS/FCC. However, the fetched text doe | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The source explicitly states 'Annual audit: Big Four Audited' and elsewhere 'Audits from a Big Four firm' regarding YLDS/Figure Certificate Company (FCC), the issuer. This matches the claim that FCC's | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The cited webpage confirms that YLDS, issued by Figure Certificate Company (FCC), undergoes annual audits performed by a 'Big Four' firm without naming the specific firm ('Annual audit: Big Four Audit
Current onchain authority configuration first, followed by documented operational controls.
The transfer agent may mint replacements in qualifying cases.
“Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems.”
“Yes. YLDS holders can notify FCC and the transfer agent can - under certain situations - mint replacement tokens.”
“Yes. YLDS holders can notify FCC and the transfer agent can - under certain situations - mint replacement tokens.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: confirmed — The issuer documentation expressly states that the program authority can pause both vault-mint and vault-stake, blocking deposits and redemptions. It also states that holders may notify FCC about stol | anthropic: confirmed — All three components of the claim are directly supported and goal-fit the slot question on incident-response procedures (pause, notification, recovery). (1) Pause: the Hastra integration guide states
“We may require you to provide additional information or documentation to verify or confirm your eligibility, including on a periodic or ongoing basis.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The terms expressly state that Hastra may require additional eligibility information or documentation periodically or continuously, has sole discretion to determine user eligibility, and may block Sit | anthropic-family: confirmed — Section 1 (Eligibility) states verbatim: 'We may require you to provide additional information or documentation to verify or confirm your eligibility, including on a periodic or ongoing basis.' This s | kimi-family: confirmed — Both parts of the claim are directly supported by the archived terms. The documentation part matches the cited quote verbatim: 'We may require you to provide additional information or documentation to
“Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived integration guide explicitly states that both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority and that pausing blocks deposits and redeems. It also directs integrators t | anthropic-family: confirmed — The archived source contains the verbatim quote in its troubleshooting table (Deposit/Stake Fails row): 'Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and r | kimi-family: confirmed — The cited Hastra integration guide's troubleshooting table states verbatim: 'Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems,' with the programmat
Fee
Rate
Charged by
0.50% annual platform fee deducted from the HELOC+ utilization rate before it reaches PRIME holders (depth-issuer-legal, breadth-claude, breadth-codex, breadth-opencode, depth-structure-flows)
0% — no management fee charged directly by the Hastra protocol on PRIME staking (breadth-api-2)
“PRIME Rate = HELOC+ Utilization Rate − 0.50%”
“the Democratized Prime HELOC+ utilization rate, minus a 0.50 percent Hastra platform fee.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (agreement=5, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The fetched Hastra PRIME documentation explicitly states that PRIME earns the HELOC+ utilization rate minus a “0.50 percent Hastra platform fee.” It further defines “0.50%” as “the annual Hastra platf | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The re-fetched source explicitly states the value multiple times: 'PRIME Rate = HELOC+ Utilization Rate − 0.50%' and 'minus a 0.50 percent Hastra platform fee', with an FAQ titled 'What is the 0.50 pe | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The source explicitly states multiple times that the annual Hastra platform fee is 0.50% (0.50 percent), which is deducted from the Democratized Prime HELOC+ utilization rate to calculate the PRIME ra
0.50%
—
“Performance Fees 0 %”
Verifier note: confirmed — The live RWA.xyz asset page for PRIME explicitly lists “Performance Fees 0 %.” This directly supports that PRIME has a 0% performance fee. The page separately discloses a 50 bps Hastra platform fee deducted from yield, but does not characterize it as a performance or carry fee, so it does not contradict the specific performance-fee claim. | quote: "Management Fees 0 % Performance Fees 0 % Other Fees Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield."
0%
—
Subject to change. Any update is shown in the buy form before you confirm a transaction.
The settlement ladder for exiting your position.
Batching requires $2,000. Fees remain undisclosed.
“To convert wYLDS back to USDC, the vault-mint program uses an admin-mediated two-step request_redeem / complete_redeem flow.”
“This leg is operator-managed and includes a batching minimum (currently $2k) and may be subject to banking-hours delays during the YLDS → USDC conversion via Circle's CCTP.”
“// Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA.”
“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”
“complete_redeem (vault-mint): Confirmation that USDC has been bridged back via CCTP and delivered to the user.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source confirms that request_redeem burns the user's wYLDS and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA, and that an operator later completes redemption after CCTP bridging, transferring USDC to the user. | anthropic-family: confirmed — Each atomic element is directly supported by the fetched guide. 'Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA' confirms the burn + redemption request. 'The operator calls complete_red | kimi-family: confirmed — The source directly supports each element: the request_redeem step 'Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA'; the operator calls complete_redeem 'once USDC has been bridged via C
“Atomically burn PRIME and receive wYLDS in a single call”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived guide explicitly describes the redemption lifecycle as PRIME → wYLDS → USDC. It states that vault-stake atomically burns PRIME and transfers wYLDS in a single redeem call, followed by an | anthropic-family: confirmed — The source's Section 3 confirms both legs of the claimed redemption path. Phase 1 states vault-stake's redeem 'atomically burns the specified PRIME and transfers the proportional wYLDS' with 'no unbon
“PRIME can also be traded on secondary markets”
“trade back to USDC through Raydium and Kamino protocols.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:09:10.720Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | trimmed uncited claims (7) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The archived wYLDS page supports that wYLDS may be traded on Solana DEXs and explicitly says users can “trade back to USDC through Raydium and Kamino protocols.” It does not support the full bundled c | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The wYLDS source confirms redemption via secondary market trading, but only names Raydium and Kamino ('Trade back to USDC through Raydium and Kamino protocols'); it never mentions Orca. The PRIME sour | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The archived Hastra wYLDS page expressly states under “Getting Started”: “USE OR REDEEM → Trade back to USDC through Raydium and Kamino protocols.” It also identifies wYLDS as available on Solana. Thi
“you're able to unstake your funds at any given time … Interest is realized upon redemption/unstaking.”
“Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”
“When you unstake PRIME, you receive more wYLDS than you originally deposited.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:13:33.643Z from rejected status | panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=3) | trimmed uncited claims (8) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched help article supports only a user-facing statement that users can “unstake [their] funds at any given time,” and says interest is realized upon redemption/unstaking. The Terms independentl | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The help.hastra.io page confirms users can 'unstake your funds at any given time' with 'Interest is realized upon redemption/unstaking,' and hastra.io/terms confirms the ToS caveat that 'Unstaking wYL | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided sources confirm that users can unstake PRIME for wYLDS at any time, and that the Terms of Use warn unstaking may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions. However, the | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The PRIME help article expressly states that users can “Unstake anytime” and are “able to unstake your funds at any given time,” while stating that interest is realized on redemption/unstaking. Separa
Underlying / economic
PRIME yield depends on Figure's off-chain HELOC lending operations, which may suffer defaults or operational difficulties
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side (via the Demo Prime HELOC pool) and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
“Counterparty and Credit Risk: PRIME wYLDS depends on the performance of Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. Risks include: Borrower defaults on HELOC loans Deterioration in collateral value (home equity) Figure's operational or financial difficulties”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The issuer’s integration guide states that PRIME yield is generated off-chain through the Prime HELOC pool, while Hastra’s terms state that PRIME accrues wYLDS based on Figure’s Democratized Prime HEL | anthropic: confirmed — Both quotes are found verbatim in the archived sources. The Hastra terms page (Section 4A) states: 'Counterparty and Credit Risk: PRIME wYLDS depends on the performance of Figure's Democratized Prime
Concentration
PRIME concentrates yield exposure in Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC pools
“PRIME earns wYLDS from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations.”
“vault-stake requires a live Chainlink price. The call fails if the stored price is uninitialised ( price_timestamp == 0) or stale ( now - price_timestamp > price_max_staleness ). Rewards admins must call verify_price to refresh it.”
“The off-ramp vault may not yet hold sufficient USDC; the operator controls funding timing.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The sources support both material components. Hastra’s terms state that PRIME represents participation in Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending pools and accrues wYLDS based on those lending opera | anthropic-family: confirmed — The claim's two assertions and all three quotes are supported verbatim by the fetched sources. The Terms of Use page contains verbatim: 'PRIME earns wYLDS from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lendin | kimi-family: confirmed — Both material claims are supported. Concentration in Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC pools: the terms state PRIME is 'a liquid staking token representing participation in Democratized Prime HELOC le
Regulatory
Hastra excludes U.S
Regulators could impair underlying certificate transfers by imposing unheld licenses.
“You must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
“YOU EXPRESSLY AGREE THAT YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF OR LOCATED IN Belarus, the Central African Republic, The Democratic Republic of Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, the Crimea, Donetsk People’s Republic, and Luhansk People’s Republic regions of Ukraine, Cuba, Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Yemen, or Zimbabwe.”
“The entities that support the ability of Figure Transferable Certificate holders to engage in peer-to-peer and ATS transfers, including the Transfer Agent, the Provenance Blockchain Foundation, and the Provenance Blockchain, are not licensed under the virtual currency or money transmission regulations of any state in the United States or registered with the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T22:55:20.400Z from rejected status | panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt-family: confirmed — Hastra’s terms expressly exclude U.S. residents, citizens, and persons located in the United States or its territories, and separately identify the listed sanctioned or restricted jurisdictions. The S | anthropic-family: confirmed — The Hastra terms confirm the exclusion of U.S. persons/territories ('You must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory') and the enumerated s
Issuer failure
Hastra holds YLDS collateral but disclaims responsibility for YLDS risks and performance
Ground risk_issuer in the BVI/Cayman corporate structure (3cf45853) and the 1:1 YLDS collateral claim that survives (c3e94c4f, c431933f).
“Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLDS and makes no representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the nature, risk profile, regulatory status, or performance of YLDS or any associated parties.”
“The off-ramp vault may not yet hold sufficient USDC; the operator controls funding timing.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The Terms expressly state that Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS while making no representations or warranties about YLDS’s risk profile, regulatory status, performance, or associated parties. | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources. The Hastra terms page contains the exact collateral/disclaimer language ('Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLD | kimi-family: confirmed — Both material components are directly supported. (1) 'Hastra holds YLDS collateral but disclaims responsibility for YLDS risks and performance' is near-verbatim from hastra.io/terms: 'Hastra holds YLD
Custodian
WYLDS wraps YLDS 1:1
Serves as the SEC-registered transfer agent of record.
“an OCC-regulated digital asset trust bank … maintained in qualified custody through BitGo Bank & Trust, with institutional-grade controls and offline key management.”
“integrated YLDS into the latter's institutional custody services.”
“Figure Equity Solutions, Inc. manages issuances and transfers as the registered transfer agent.”
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve … Hastra uses these funds to purchase YLDS from Figure Markets.”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over a1090dec-a973-41ca-94f0-b07492873427: The new claim more directly identifies named key operational providers and concentration points: Figure Equity Solutions as registered transfer agent, Hastra as holder of the 1:1 YLDS reserve, and BitGo/Copper as custody providers. Its cited evidence supports those roles. The incumbent’s central assertion that UMB Bank custodies FCC assets is not supported by its own cited evidence, which instead identifies Figure Investment Advisors and supports only Hastra’s reserve-holding and non-custodial-wallet roles.
Credit / counterparty
PRIME holders carry indirect credit exposure to the individual homeowner-borrowers who must keep paying interest for yield to flow through
“PRIME yield flows from actual loan interest paid by real estate borrowers.”
“The borrower is obligated to remove collateral that becomes non-performing (e.g., loans that become 60+ days delinquent).”
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over e150437d-d547-4b6a-982f-4352f0341b24: The new claim more directly identifies whose failure affects holders: homeowner-borrowers whose interest payments generate PRIME yield and FCC as the unsecured YLDS issuer. Its own evidence supports both links and names FCC specifically, whereas the incumbent describes general HELOC-pool exposure and FCC asset-loss risk without identifying the borrowers as counterparties.
Bridge & oracle
Bridge failures can lose funds or interrupt PRIME yield transfers from Provenance to Solana
Manipulated or inaccurate oracle prices can cause incorrect redemption pricing and financial loss.
Well-grounded overall; recommend attributing yield-transfer disruption as an inference and keeping oracle-pricing language as general 'incorrect pricing' unless tied explicitly to redemption.
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side (via the Demo Prime HELOC pool) and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
“Bridge protocols carry risks including: Smart contract vulnerabilities in bridge infrastructure Loss of funds during cross-chain transfers Delays or failures in cross-chain messaging”
Hack / smart contract
Smart-contract bugs can cause fund losses
Stale Chainlink prices block transactions.
“Smart contracts may contain vulnerabilities, bugs, or security flaws that could result in loss of funds. While smart contracts may be audited, no audit guarantees security or functionality.”
“Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems.”
“wYLDS and PRIME mints have program-controlled freeze authorities. TRM sanctions rules can auto-freeze addresses violating ToS.”
“vault-stake requires a live Chainlink price. The call fails if the stored price is uninitialised ( price_timestamp == 0) or stale ( now - price_timestamp > price_max_staleness ). Rewards admins must call verify_price to refresh it.”
Exit risk
Authority pauses can block redemptions
Operators control USDC funding timing.
“Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems.”
“Only one pending redemption request per user is allowed. Complete or wait for the existing one before opening another.”
“The off-ramp vault may not yet hold sufficient USDC; the operator controls funding timing.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived Hastra Solana integration guide directly supports all three material assertions: both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking redeems; the per-user Red | anthropic-family: confirmed — All three claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived source's Troubleshooting section. The pause claim matches 'Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking dep | kimi-family: confirmed — All three material claims map directly onto the cited Hastra integration guide: (1) 'Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems' supports aut
Depeg / liquidity
PRIME's secondary-market price can diverge from its underlying wYLDS-per-share redemption value because Hastra's Terms of Use state there is no guarantee of a liquid secondary market, and holders may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME at their desired price or at all
Underlying wYLDS is only a claim on YLDS, an unsecured Figure Certificate Company obligation, adding a further potential source of value divergence if FCC's creditworthiness deteriorates.
“There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME.”
“price represents wYLDS per 1 share (PRIME), scaled by price_scale … decouples redemption rate from pool balance.”
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Supply and mint authority
Networks
“Live on Solana and Ethereum”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The archived issuer documentation explicitly identifies wYLDS as “Live on Solana and Ethereum,” supporting both listed chains. No fetched source disagrees with either deployment. | anthropic: confirmed — The cited source https://www.hastra.io explicitly labels the wYLDS product 'Live on Solana and Ethereum', directly answering the slot question of which chains the asset is deployed on. Both listed cha
Oracle dependencies
Rewards administrators refresh prices through verify_price.
“Automatic via Chainlink-tracked PRIME/wYLDS exchange rate (CPI mint into stake vault + verify_price ); merkle epochs are supplemental wYLDS rewards”
“vault-stake requires a live Chainlink price. The call fails if the stored price is uninitialised ( price_timestamp == 0) or stale ( now - price_timestamp > price_max_staleness ). Rewards admins must call verify_price to refresh it.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The issuer documentation identifies Chainlink Data Streams as the source of the PRIME/wYLDS exchange rate, states that vault-stake deposits and redemptions fail when the stored price is uninitialised | anthropic: confirmed — The slot question asks to identify the pricing oracle and what fails if its data is stale/unavailable. The claim states Chainlink supplies the PRIME/wYLDS exchange rate, that stale/uninitialized price
Bridge custody
The operator controls redemption-vault funding timing.
“Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLDS and makes no representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the nature, risk profile, regulatory status, or performance of YLDS or any associated parties.”
“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”
“The off-ramp vault may not yet hold sufficient USDC; the operator controls funding timing.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The issuer documentation supports every material statement and answers the slot question: Hastra is the entity holding the YLDS collateral backing wYLDS; deposited USDC sits in the Solana vault-mint p | anthropic: confirmed — All three material claims are supported by the fetched sources and directly answer the slot question about where collateral sits and who controls it. (1) 'Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS' is
Networks — searched, not found: Evidence confirms wYLDS on Solana and Ethereum but does not establish every PRIME deployment.
Canonical deployment — searched, not found: Evidence shows native Solana program issuance but provides no canonical PRIME mint address or definitive canonical-chain designation.
Upgradeability — searched, not found: The corpus does not disclose contract upgradeability, upgrade authority, or upgrade delay.
Unilateral changes — searched, not found: The corpus does not establish which fees, limits, or eligibility terms Hastra may change without holder consent.
Key management — searched, not found: The corpus does not disclose multisig thresholds, signer identities, key custody arrangements, or timelocks.
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side (via the Demo Prime HELOC pool) and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
“Counterparty and Credit Risk: PRIME wYLDS depends on the performance of Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. Risks include: Borrower defaults on HELOC loans Deterioration in collateral value (home equity) Figure's operational or financial difficulties”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 6c94a039-424e-4687-88c0-6445b177d179: The incumbent more directly identifies the counterparties whose failure affects holders: individual homeowner-borrowers and Figure Certificate Company (FCC), the unsecured YLDS issuer. Its cited evidence separately supports borrower-funded yield and FCC issuer credit exposure, making it more specific than the new claim’s broader references to HELOC defaults, collateral deterioration, and Figure’s operations.
“Bridge protocols carry risks including: Smart contract vulnerabilities in bridge infrastructure Loss of funds during cross-chain transfers Delays or failures in cross-chain messaging”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent a0fadd21-cc70-4e25-a0c8-76e6d3b64a4b: The incumbent directly covers more of the specified attack surface—smart-contract bugs, authority-controlled pause and freeze keys, and the Chainlink oracle—and its evidence gives specific Hastra components and failure conditions. The new claim addresses only generic bridge vulnerabilities and cross-chain fund loss.
The canonical mint address is undisclosed.
“wYLDS is the base-layer wrapped token on Solana, acting as a custodial wrapper for YLDS, the underlying SEC-registered stablecoin. It acts as a 1:1 receipt for the USDC deposited into the vault token account.”
“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”
“YLDS ( Figure Markets ) ↓ Bridge to other chains wYLDS ( Hastra ) ↓ Stake for PRIME PRIME ( Hastra )”
“Hastra is a Solana-based distribution layer for Figure’s credit infrastructure, built on Provenance Blockchain with yield-bearing tokens issued as SPL assets.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — The sources document a Solana deployment where Hastra’s vault-mint program natively mints wYLDS as an SPL token and describe wYLDS economically as a cross-chain wrapper backed by YLDS. However, they d | anthropic: contradicted — The claim mixes one supportable point with a mischaracterization of the canonical/native question the slot asks. Supportable: the wYLDS mint address is indeed undisclosed — the SOL integration guide g
“Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%. AUM for reserves is updated daily at the close of the market.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The issuer page states 100% required-reserve coverage, a 0.5% excess reserve, and daily AUM updates at market close, but it does not identify a real-time monitoring or proof-of-reserves feed | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The quoted text appears verbatim in the archived source, so the literal figures (100% required-reserve coverage, 0.5% excess, AUM updated daily at market close) are accurate. However, the SL
Program-controlled freeze authorities can freeze sanctioned addresses.
Only the pause power is supported by evidence; the freeze/sanctioned-address portion lacks any valid evidence ID.
“Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems.”
“wYLDS and PRIME mints have program-controlled freeze authorities. TRM sanctions rules can auto-freeze addresses violating ToS.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source confirms that a program authority can pause vault-mint and vault-stake, that pauses block deposits and redemptions, and that program-controlled freeze authorities can freeze accou | anthropic: confirmed — The claim's three material assertions are all directly supported by the archived source. (1) 'Both vault-mint and vault-stake can be paused by the program authority, blocking deposits and redeems' app
CCTP bridges USDC on the redemption leg; the wYLDS cross-chain bridge is Hastra-operated (ev:ef506578) and is omitted.
“complete_redeem (vault-mint): Confirmation that USDC has been bridged back via CCTP and delivered to the user.”
Verifier note: Quarantine adjudication: Circle CCTP applies to the underlying USDC redemption leg, not PRIME. Archived issuer evidence says PRIME's independently deployed Solana and Ethereum tokens do not bridge.
“On February 20, 2025, FCC launched its first interest-bearing debt securities called YLDS, which are native to a public blockchain.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent a91020f6-bcda-4bc9-9174-a143d6f89a0c: The incumbent directly and specifically explains the yield mechanism, frequency, and required action: PRIME is non-rebasing, accrues through an increasing wYLDS redemption rate, and realizes yield upon unstaking, while raw wYLDS provides a monthly claimable distribution. Its cited evidence expressly supports these details. The new claim only characterizes YLDS as interest-bearing debt securities and does not explain how or when holders receive yield or whether claiming or staking is required.
“On February 20, 2025, FCC launched its first interest-bearing debt securities called YLDS, which are native to a public blockchain.”
“FCC was incorporated on April 13, 2023 as a Delaware corporation and has been, since its inception, wholly owned by Figure Technologies, LLC (f/k/a Figure Technologies, Inc.) (“FT”).”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent b561bf2e-9669-4a16-be89-3079fd1ba190: The new claim more directly explains the company’s business model, products, blockchain distribution role, and PRIME’s connection to Figure’s HELOC lending operations. Its cited evidence supports those relationships. The incumbent is more precise about FCC’s incorporation and ownership, but only establishes that FCC issues YLDS and does not explain the broader business or how the token fits the model.
Figure Technologies, LLC has wholly owned FCC since its April 13, 2023 incorporation.
Figure Markets Holdings, Inc. is FCC's parent company.
Figure Technology Solutions, Inc. wholly owns FCC.
“FCC was incorporated on April 13, 2023 as a Delaware corporation and has been, since its inception, wholly owned by Figure Technologies, LLC (f/k/a Figure Technologies, Inc.) (“FT”).”
“As a subsidiary of Figure Markets Holdings, Inc., FCC is (absent exclusion or exemption) required to comply with certain limits on its activity, including investment and/or trading limitations on its portfolio and other limitations under applicable banking and securities laws.”
“Figure Certificate Company, Figure Investment Advisors, LLC, Figure Markets Holdings, Inc, Figure Payments Corporation, and Figure Equity Solutions, Inc. are each wholly owned subsidiaries of Figure Technology Solutions, Inc.”
“Figure Certificate Company, Figure Investment Advisors, LLC, Figure Markets Holdings, Inc, Figure Payments Corporation, and Figure Equity Solutions, Inc. are each wholly owned subsidiaries of Figure Technology Solutions, Inc.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt: contradicted — The disclosures describe a consistent ownership chain, not a dispute: FCC is directly wholly owned by Figure Technologies, LLC, which is wholly owned by Figure Markets Holding, Inc., which became whol | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: the SLOT asks for a DATED ownership, acquisition, or parent CHANGE of the issuer (e.g., an acquisition of the issuing brand). The claim value instead asserts a meta-characterization — that F
Either drop this candidate or move to unknowns; a88e1bff does not establish an underlying issuer.
“Figure Certificate Co (Filer) CIK : 0001974395 (see all company filings) EIN. : 923576834 | State of Incorp.: DE | Fiscal Year End: 1231”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — The SEC filing identifies the filer as “Figure Certificate Co,” not “Figure Certificate Company,” and the archived content does not expressly label that entity as the underlying issuer. The claimed le | anthropic: confirmed — The cited SEC EDGAR filing index (CIK 0001974395, 10-K for period 2025-12-31, DE incorporation) lists the filer as 'Figure Certificate Co (Filer)'. 'Co' is the standard abbreviation for 'Company', and
“Hastra is a Solana-based distribution layer for Figure’s credit infrastructure, built on Provenance Blockchain with yield-bearing tokens issued as SPL assets.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 53269c24-2ba0-4eaf-b1cb-43b17208fe09: The incumbent directly identifies a named backer/owner, Provenance Cayman Foundation, and specifies the issuer entity, Signum Ltd., its BVI jurisdiction, and the wholly owned relationship. Its cited terms explicitly support those facts. The new claim describes a distribution and infrastructure relationship, not an investor or backer.
“PRIME's market value may deviate from its underlying net asset value. You may lose some or all of your invested capital.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 29c13ed9-f31b-4301-af0a-e80f688076a0: The new claim more directly and specifically explains mechanisms that could push PRIME’s secondary price away from redemption value: illiquidity, oracle-based redemption decoupled from pool balance, and FCC credit risk. Its cited evidence supports each mechanism. Neither claim provides historical episodes, but the incumbent merely states that deviation and loss are possible without explaining why.
“Figure Investment Advisors, LLC serves as investment adviser to FCC pursuant to an advisory agreement.”
“While Hastra facilitates the exchange of USDC for wYLDS through its interfaces and smart contracts, Hastra does not act as a custodian of user funds.”
“Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS, but does not issue YLDS and makes no representations or warranties whatsoever regarding the nature, risk profile, regulatory status, or performance of YLDS or any associated parties.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:18:23.394Z from rejected status | panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support that UMB Bank is custodian of FCC’s assets, that Hastra does not custody users’ wallets/funds, and that Hastra holds YLDS as collateral for wYLDS. However, the narrative | anthropic: confirmed — All material claims are supported by the union of the fetched sources. The SEC 497 archived content explicitly lists under Custodian: 'UMB Bank n.a. member FDIC, is custodian of FCC's assets pursuant
“First SEC-registered yield-bearing stablecoin”
“The wYLDS token is backed 1:1 by YLDS, a yield-bearing stablecoin issued by Figure and registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 4f7a114e-68ce-4aef-a71a-f417900feff5: The new claim more directly and specifically identifies YLDS’s regulatory regime, issuer, governing statutes, and offshore access restriction. Its cited evidence supports SEC registration under the Securities Act and Investment Company Act and exclusion of U.S. persons. Although some details such as the CIK, BVI issuer, and sanctions exclusions are not established by the quoted evidence, the incumbent’s evidence supports only YLDS’s SEC registration and does not substantiate its assertion that PRIME’s regime and exemptions are undisclosed.
Large redemptions can fail temporarily when the stake vault lacks funds. Stale Chainlink prices block deposits and redemptions. Version 0.0.5 removed PRIME’s unbonding period.
“PRIME's market value may deviate from its underlying net asset value. You may lose some or all of your invested capital.”
“If the stake vault is briefly under-funded (large redemption), the call will fail until the next yield CPI ( publish_rewards ) lands.”
“vault-stake requires a live Chainlink price. The call fails if the stored price is uninitialised ( price_timestamp == 0) or stale ( now - price_timestamp > price_max_staleness ). Rewards admins must call verify_price to refresh it.”
“Removed in v0.0.5; redeem is immediate”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 46b60fdf-8dd1-4d38-9310-cdfc6391a60e: The new claim directly identifies a notable, dated security incident: a Critical vulnerability in named Hastra Solana programs, with cited evidence that all findings were resolved. The incumbent mainly describes prospective operational failure conditions and product changes, not realized incidents or a sourced statement that none are known.
The candidate contains no actual operating-history facts — it merely restates the YLDS→wYLDS→PRIME token flow (ef506578) and calls it an 'ecosystem.' No milestones, years, or scale are asserted or available, so this reads as filler; it belongs in unknowns rather than as a positive candidate.
“YLDS ( Figure Markets ) ↓ Bridge to other chains wYLDS ( Hastra ) ↓ Stake for PRIME PRIME ( Hastra )”
“Hastra is a Solana-based distribution layer for Figure’s credit infrastructure, built on Provenance Blockchain with yield-bearing tokens issued as SPL assets.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt-family: contradicted — The sources support the described token flow: YLDS is bridged into Hastra’s wYLDS, and wYLDS is staked 1:1 to obtain PRIME. They provide no dated founding milestone. However, the Solana source does pr | anthropic-family: contradicted — The token-flow portion of the claim is confirmed: the Hastra help page verbatim shows 'YLDS (Figure Markets) ↓ Bridge to other chains, wYLDS (Hastra) ↓ Stake for PRIME, PRIME (Hastra),' and the Solana | kimi-family: contradicted — The first part of the claim is supported: both cited sources confirm the YLDS -> wYLDS bridge and wYLDS -> PRIME staking flow. However, the claim's second assertion — that the evidence 'provides no da
TRM supplies sanctions-screening rules.
Omits service providers present in the evidence: Provenance Blockchain / Provenance Blockchain Foundation as infrastructure and gas-fee layer (fbd13a8a, af0405d9), and Circle/CCTP as the USDC redemption bridge (e394cd54). It also does not name Figure Technologies, Inc. as the specific pool-operating entity (2131b9ca) despite citing 'Figure' generically.
“Users may stake wYLDS on the Platform to receive PRIME, a liquid staking token representing participation in Democratized Prime HELOC lending pools operated by Figure Technologies, Inc.”
“The PRIME exchange rate appreciates over time. 1 PRIME becomes redeemable for more wYLDS. The on-chain PRIME/wYLDS exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rewards administrators via verify_price.”
“wYLDS and PRIME mints have program-controlled freeze authorities. TRM sanctions rules can auto-freeze addresses violating ToS.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 0cb3887b-acd9-4326-ac34-27c6bf845d6b: The new claim directly identifies named entities serving product-related administrative, reserve-management, transfer-agent, custody, and audit functions, with cited evidence supporting Figure Equity Solutions, Figure Investment Advisors, Copper, and Informal Systems. The incumbent instead names a pool operator and technology/compliance-data suppliers, which do not directly answer the requested custodian, administrator, auditor, or bank roles.
“Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands (“Hastra”, “we”, “our” or “us”), a wholly owned subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation, a Cayman foundation.”
Verifier note: reshaped: entity-name policy
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side (via the Demo Prime HELOC pool) and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
“wYLDS interest on unutilized pool liquidity, net of the 50 bps Hastra fee”
“wYLDS is derived from interest spreads on real-world home equity lines of credit.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 84ca1dc4-fc1f-44c4-8b9e-4755f04ecbe9: The new claim directly addresses credit quality and lien concentration with specific disclosed metrics—82.68% second lien, weighted-average credit score 736, weighted-average post-origination CLTV 65.62%, and weighted-average coupon 10.76%—and its cited Figure evidence supports the key pool characteristics. The incumbent identifies the broad HELOC and wYLDS exposures but provides no actual maturity, concentration, leverage, or credit-quality profile.
Presents 'liquid staking token' at 0.98 confidence while omitting that Hastra's own materials also label PRIME a 'yield-bearing receipt token' (40e22f7a) and that the 'LST' framing is issuer marketing for a lending-pool share rather than a PoS staking derivative. The confidence overstates how settled the category label is.
“PRIME earns wYLDS from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations.”
“Users may stake wYLDS on the Platform to receive PRIME, a liquid staking token representing participation in Democratized Prime HELOC lending pools operated by Figure Technologies, Inc.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived Hastra Terms expressly call PRIME “a liquid staking token” received by staking wYLDS and state that PRIME accrues or earns wYLDS based on Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending operati | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived Terms of Use. The source explicitly labels PRIME 'a liquid staking token' (Section 2 bullet, Section 2B: 'PRIME, a liquid staking token representing | kimi-family: confirmed — The source explicitly calls PRIME "a liquid staking token for HELOC lending pools" and states it "accrue[s] wYLDS based on the performance of Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations," wit | operator: category must reflect underlying nature (RWA), not the staking wrapper
“Earns interest automatically just by holding wYLDS in your wallet - no staking or KYC required.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source supports that holding wYLDS and earning its yield require no KYC. It does not establish that anyone can hold PRIME without KYC, nor does it state the KYC requirements or investor eligibilit | anthropic-family: unsupported — The cited source supports only one narrow piece of the claim: that holding wYLDS requires no KYC ('Earns interest automatically just by holding wYLDS in your wallet - no staking or KYC required'). It | gpt-family: unsupported — The source states that earning interest by holding wYLDS requires no KYC, but it does not state that anyone is legally or operationally eligible to acquire or hold wYLDS. The claim broadens a no-KYC y
Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.
“Atomically burn PRIME and receive wYLDS in a single call”
“PRIME is obtained by staking wYLDS at a 1:1 ratio”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: contradicted — The atomic unstaking mechanism is supported: the integration guide says redeem burns PRIME and transfers proportional wYLDS in one call. However, the claim that staking always issues PRIME at a 1:1 ra | anthropic-family: contradicted — Two of the three sub-claims are supported: the atomic burn-PRIME-receive-wYLDS single call is directly quoted in the Hastra SOL integration guide ('Atomically burn PRIME and receive wYLDS in a single
“Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The refetched SEC content is predominantly XBRL metadata and does not contain the quoted text “Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)” or any readable disclosure establishing that Signum is the Hastra protocol oper | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC URL consists entirely of raw XBRL context/tag metadata (dei: and us-gaap: taxonomy elements, dates, member tags) from the document's header/instance data. It | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided text snippet from Figure Technology Solutions Form 10-Q for Q1 2026 does not contain the quoted text 'Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)' nor any mention of Signum Ltd., Hastra protocol, or YLDS ho
“Total ... $600,824”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The fetched SEC filing is Figure Certificate Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026. Its embedded filing data expressly identifies the relevant reserve instruments as “Goldm | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content only shows the XBRL context tags and the table of contents/cover page of the 10-Q; the actual Note 3 Fair Value of Financial Instruments table (pages 11-13) where the reserve po | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched source text for the FCC Form 10-Q does not contain the claimed quote 'Total ... $600,824' nor does it explicitly mention 'YLDS'. Although the XBRL metadata lists Goldman Sachs Financial
“users must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
“HASTRA'S TOTAL LIABILITY ARISING OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THESE TERMS … EXCEED ONE HUNDRED U.S. DOLLARS ($100).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:18:37.783Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source confirms a Terms of Use document dated December 3, 2025 at https://hastra.io/terms, but the atomic value adds governance details outside the requested type/date/URL shape. It also | anthropic: unsupported — The core slot facts are supported: the document is a Terms of Use ('terms'), 'Last updated: December 3, 2025' matches 2025-12-03, and it is at the original source https://hastra.io/terms. The eligibil | kimi: unsupported — The archived snapshot confirms the document is Hastra's Terms of Use at https://hastra.io/terms, dated 'Last updated: December 3, 2025', and confirms the US-persons eligibility restriction and extensi
“All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC. Eligibility may vary by jurisdiction.”
“If Hastra determines that you are ineligible or have breached any of your representations or warranties under this section, we may block your access to the Site.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:14:28.194Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=3) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — Hastra’s Terms impose age, jurisdiction, legal-compliance, and sanctions-related representations for Site/Protocol use, and state that Hastra may require additional information or documentation to ver | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The YLDS portion is confirmed: ylds.com FAQ states 'All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC' and that 'KYC'ed holders of YLDS can redeem for fiat,' supporting the claim that the underly | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The claim states that users must complete KYC identity verification before accessing Hastra's site or protocol. However, Hastra's Terms of Use describe the protocol as a set of 'permissionless smart-c
The base collateral wrapper is also concentrated in a single stablecoin pairing, wYLDS/YLDS, so PRIME has no exposure diversification away from Figure/Hastra-related counterparties.
“PRIME yield is generated through Demo Prime's HELOC lending operations, providing exposure to real estate-backed lending.”
“2nd Lien 82.68%”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The Hastra page supports that PRIME staking uses wYLDS, that wYLDS is backed by YLDS reserves, and that PRIME yield comes from Figure/Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. The cited Figure disc | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — Only hastra.io/prime was actually re-fetched and its content supports the general claims that PRIME's yield derives solely from Figure's Democratized Prime HELOC lending pool, that the base collateral | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — Hastra supports that PRIME has HELOC exposure and that its yield is generated through Figure’s Democratized Prime HELOC lending operations. However, it does not support the absolute characterization t
The underlying YLDS security is SEC-registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 as a face-amount certificate, so any adverse SEC action, rule change, or loss of that registration at the FCC layer could disrupt or devalue the YLDS backing wYLDS/PRIME. Because PRIME's own legal status is not established by any registration statement or disclosed exemption, its treatment under U.S. or other securities laws remains uncertain.
“users must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
“YLDS represents a blockchain-based face-amount certificate officially registered with the US SEC under the Investment Company Act of 1940.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:23:22.657Z from rejected status | panel 0/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — The Terms support the BVI operator, exclusion of U.S. persons, OFAC/OFSI restrictions, YLDS’s stated SEC registration, 1:1 YLDS collateralization of wYLDS, PRIME’s relationship to staked wYLDS, and th | anthropic: unsupported — Most of the claim is supported by the archived Hastra Terms: Signum Ltd. is a BVI entity issuing the wYLDS/PRIME wrappers; the Terms exclude U.S. persons/territories and OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned jurisdict | kimi: unsupported — Most elements check out against the archived Terms: Signum Ltd. is a BVI entity, U.S. persons and OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned jurisdictions are excluded, YLDS is described as SEC-registered, and the Terms' R | gpt: unsupported — The Terms support the BVI organization of Signum Ltd., the exclusion of U.S. persons and sanctioned jurisdictions/persons, YLDS’s SEC registration, direct 1:1 backing of wYLDS by YLDS, broad regulator
“As fast as same day. Credit-line-backed liquidity … redeem via figuremarkets.com or the Figure Markets app.”
“redemption at face value plus accrued and unpaid interest, subject to the issuer's and platform's operating rules … access is limited to approved accounts.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS homepage confirms that KYC-completed holders can redeem for fiat through Figure Markets’ website or app, and describes redemption as “as fast as same day” with “Credit-line-backed liquidity.” | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched ylds.com content confirms several elements: KYC'd holders can redeem directly via Figure Markets (FAQ: 'KYC'ed holders of YLDS can redeem for fiat through figuremarkets.com or the Figur | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The retrieved text supports that KYC'd holders can redeem YLDS via figuremarkets.com or the Figure Markets mobile app, settled as fast as same day via credit-line-backed liquidity, with a minimum of o
“Yield is paid out as additional wYLDS”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched page states that unstaked wYLDS yield is paid as additional wYLDS, but it does not disclose any fee, state that fees are zero, or otherwise substantiate `fee_wylds = 0`. | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The cited page explains how wYLDS yield accrues and is claimed monthly, and how PRIME differs, but it never mentions any fee (or absence of fee) associated with holding or claiming wYLDS. The quote 'Y | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source text explains how wYLDS and PRIME accrue and payout yield, but it contains no mention of fees or a zero-fee structure for wYLDS. Per the verdict guidelines, assuming an undisclosed
Informal Systems audited Hastra's vault-mint/vault-stake Solana programs (Sept–Nov 2025); all findings resolved (breadth-opencode, breadth-codex, citing hastra.io PDF audit report).
No third-party smart-contract audit was found for PRIME/wYLDS (breadth-claude, depth-structure-flows).
“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit … All findings were thoroughly resolved”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:03:28.931Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The report supports that Figure engaged Informal Systems for an audit of Hastra’s vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, conducted in two phases from September 24 to November 18, 2025. It also ex | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The audit report confirms the dates, phases, program names, and the initial-phase severity breakdown (1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, 2 Informational) exactly as claimed. However, the claim conflates thi | google/gemini-3.6-flash: contradicted — While Informal Systems did audit Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs between Sept 24 and Nov 18, 2025, and all findings were resolved prior to production deployment, the audit identifi
“Freeze Authority still enabled … Tokens can be frozen and prevented from trading.”
“You are not a citizen, resident, or organized in... the United States of America... Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Syria, or the Crimea, Donetsk, or Luhansk regions”
“All holders must successfully onboard and complete KYC, with eligibility varying by jurisdiction … not located in … any country or territory subject to OFAC or OFSI sanctions.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=5) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched Hastra Terms support that U.S. persons are ineligible and expressly list Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and the Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk regions among prohibited locations. However, they do not es | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The only source actually re-fetched (hastra.io/terms) no longer contains the quoted KYC language at all — there is no mention of 'KYC' anywhere in the current Eligibility section, contradicting the cl | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided live content supports the exclusion of US persons and specific sanctioned jurisdictions (such as Cuba, Iran, North Korea, and Crimea/Donetsk/Luhansk regions). However, the live source doe
“Goldman Sachs Financial Square ... 2,362”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched 10-Q supports that Figure Certificate Company reported an investment labeled “Goldman Sachs Financial Square” with a reported amount of 2,362 (apparently presented in thousands) at March 3 | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched page content is only the XBRL header/context definitions and the table of contents for the 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 Fair Value table (page 11) where the Goldman Sachs Fi | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited filing text contains a reference to 'Goldman Sachs Financial Square' in its XBRL tags, but it does not contain the claimed value/percentage of 0.39% (or the quoted figure '2,362'), nor does
“United States Treasury Bill”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched filing identifies eight holdings labeled “United States Treasury Bill” as of March 31, 2026, which supports that FCC held Treasury bills at that date. However, the supplied source content | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched page content only shows the XBRL context/tag metadata (e.g., 'United States Treasury Bill 1' through 'United States Treasury Bill 8', 'UMB Bank N.A. | Repurchase Agreements', 'Goldman S | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided SEC Form 10-Q filing excerpt for Figure Certificate Company (FCC) does not contain details confirming that U.S. Treasury bills constituted 34.77% of FCC's reserve portfolio backing YLDS,
“UMB Bank N.A. ... 389,556”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched filing identifies “UMB Bank N.A. | Repurchase Agreements” at March 31, 2026 and the claimed quoted amount of 389,556 (presumably $389.556 million if the relevant table is in thousands). Ho | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched page content only shows the XBRL context/header block and the table of contents for the 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 (Fair Value of Financial Instruments) table text wher | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source snippet does not contain the claimed percentage (64.84%), total reserve portfolio amount (~$600.8M), token ticker (YLDS), or the value of 389,556 cited in the claimed quotes.
“Stake wYLDS on Hastra to receive PRIME, your liquid staking token for HELOC lending pools”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 1e7e6e96-14ca-4807-b3fb-55d5b6ec83c5: Neither claim provides a holding weight or as-of date, but the incumbent more directly describes the disclosed holding wYLDS and its backing, while its own evidence specifically supports the 1:1 reserve-backed relationship. The new claim instead explains how PRIME is obtained and does not describe a holding weight or dated holding.
Treasury bills and Treasury repurchase agreements (formerly prime-money-market-fund-style securities). As of 2026-03-31, FCC's approximately $600.8 million portfolio was about 64.84% UMB Bank overnight Treasury repo, 34.77% Treasury bills, and 0.39% Goldman Sachs Financial Square Treasury money-market fund. PRIME's own yield, distinct from this reserve backing, is generated separately by deploying staked wYLDS into Figure's 'Democratized Prime' HELOC+ lending pool.
breadth-api-2 (docs.hastra.io/architecture/underlying-assets): claims YLDS itself 'is backed by a portfolio of prime Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)' — conflicting with the majority view that YLDS/FCC reserves are Treasury bills and repo, with HELOC exposure sitting only in the separate Democratized Prime yield pool.
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve”
“Total ... $600,824”
“UMB Bank N.A. ... 389,556”
“United States Treasury Bill”
“Goldman Sachs Financial Square ... 2,362”
breadth-claude / depth-issuer-legal: the claim ultimately traces down the stack to an unsecured claim against Figure Certificate Company (FCC), since YLDS is 'unsecured face-amount certificates … solely backed by the assets of FCC.'
breadth-codex: any enforceable off-chain claim against Signum, YLDS reserves, or HELOC collateral is UNKNOWN/unestablished by public PRIME materials — the only clear right is the on-chain vault redemption.
“PRIME is fully transferable. Yield continues to accrue to whichever address holds the tokens.”
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:21:57.801Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources do not establish what a PRIME holder legally owns. Hastra describes depositing wYLDS, receiving PRIME, and unstaking, but does not state that the holder has a legally enforceable | anthropic: confirmed — The claim answers the slot question directly: the holder owns a redemption right (unstake PRIME/wYLDS from Hastra's vault), not a fund share, with enforceability against FCC left open. Each component | kimi: unsupported — The sources do not state the claim as written. The Hastra PRIME page supports only that PRIME can be unstaked at any time to recover wYLDS ('Unstake anytime') and that PRIME is transferable; it never
(Dba Hastra) and its relationship to Figure/YLDS.
“Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra)”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched SEC filing content is consistent with a Figure filing for the period ending 2026-03-31 (CIK 0002064124 and dates shown), but the supplied fetched text does not contain the claimed quotatio | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched content from the cited SEC URL consists solely of XBRL context/tag definitions (dates, entity IDs, member tags) and contains no narrative text at all. Nowhere in the retrieved content does | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched text from the cited SEC Form 10-Q filing (figr-20260331.htm) does not contain any reference to 'Signum Ltd.' or 'Hastra'.
“Total ... $600,824”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The SEC filing identifies itself as Figure Certificate Company’s Form 10-Q for the quarterly period ended March 31, 2026. Its extracted filing content specifically identifies Goldman Sachs Financial S | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content only contains the XBRL context definitions and the cover page/table of contents of the FCC 10-Q; it does not include the actual Note 3 (Fair Value of Financial Instruments) tabl | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched document from the provided URL does not contain the quoted text 'Total ... $600,824' or any mention of the amount $600,824.
“Hastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technologies, a fintech company focused on blockchain-based financial products and is operated by the Provenance Blockchain Foundation.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched URL returns raw PDF object/image data only; it does not expose readable report text, title, auditor attribution, protocol name, audit scope, or March–April 2026 dates. The supplied exce | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched content from the cited URL is raw, uninterpretable PDF binary/stream data (object definitions, FlateDecode compressed streams, image XObjects). No actual extractable text matching the clai | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched PDF stream from https://hastra.io/sherlock-hastra-audit.pdf contains only raw PDF structure and image data without extractable text supporting the claimed quote.
“Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”
“the off-ramp vault may not yet hold sufficient USDC”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The available Solana integration guide directly states that PRIME redemption is a “single-step direct redemption” with “no unbonding period or queuing,” and that the on-chain unbonding period is perma | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The hastra.io/terms page fetch returned no body text at all (title only, likely JS-rendered content not captured), so the claimed quote 'may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restriction
depth-structure-flows: wYLDS→USDC batching minimum is approximately $2,000; direct YLDS redemption minimum is 1 certificate ($0.01).
breadth-api-2: docs.hastra.io implies no protocol-enforced minimum ('0 USD') for staking/unstaking PRIME.
breadth-api-1: no redemption minimum disclosed; the $250 figure on hastra.io/prime-roots pertains to a rewards program, not redemption.
“$2k”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched guide describes the PRIME→wYLDS redemption and begins describing the wYLDS→USDC process, but the provided live content does not state any redemption minimum, including $2,000. The claimed | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The claimed quote '$2k' does not appear anywhere in the live re-fetched content from the cited URL. The fetched page content covers the mint, stake, and redemption lifecycle explanations but cuts off | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited document does not mention a minimum redemption amount of 2000 or $2k anywhere in the text.
“Yield is paid out as additional wYLDS”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched page states that unstaked wYLDS yield is paid as additional wYLDS and that PRIME redemption yields additional wYLDS. It does not state that there is no fee, no passthrough fee, no claim fe | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The cited quote merely describes the mechanism by which wYLDS yield is distributed ('paid out as additional wYLDS'); it says nothing about whether any fee is deducted from that pass-through yield. The | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited source explains how yield is accrued and claimed for wYLDS and PRIME, but it contains no mention of any passthrough fees or that fee_wylds_passthrough equals 0. Assuming an undisclosed fee i
“Hastra is currently deployed on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet, with mainnet Ethereum deployment pending audit and security review.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched PDF content is not text-extractable in the provided material and does not visibly identify Sherlock, Hastra, an audit engagement, or a March–April 2026 audit period. The quoted sentence | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited PDF URL is raw, undecoded PDF binary/stream data (compressed image and form XObject data) rather than extracted, human-readable text. None of the claimed quote te | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source is a PDF file containing compressed binary streams and image objects without parseable text. Consequently, the re-fetched content does not verify the claimed quote or the assertion
breadth-api-1 and breadth-codex: no single PRIME-level collateralization ratio is disclosed; only sub-layer ratios are published (wYLDS:YLDS 1:1, HELOC+ standard/maximum LTV of 95%/98%, FCC qualified assets ~100.3% of certificate reserve as of 2026-03-31), so the figure should be treated as UNKNOWN rather than a single confirmed PRIME ratio.
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.”
“Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%.”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=4, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — Hastra’s live wYLDS documentation explicitly states: “Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra’s reserve,” and describes the reserve as backing issued wYLDS tokens “1:1.” This directly suppor | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The claim asserts a 100% collateralization ratio for the underlying, supported by two quotes. The first (Hastra help page) does confirm wYLDS is 'backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve' — but t | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The claimed quote from ylds.com ('Percentage of required reserve covered: 100%; Excess / (deficit) reserve: 0.5%.') is completely absent from the cited source. While Hastra states that wYLDS is backed
PRIME's value accrues from interest earned in Figure's 'Democratized Prime' HELOC home-equity lending pools, not from a direct claim on any Treasury reserve or fund share. A holder's enforceable right is an on-chain redemption of PRIME for wYLDS from the smart-contract vault rather than a direct claim against Figure, HELOC borrowers, or Figure Certificate Company.
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
“Stake wYLDS on Hastra to receive PRIME, your liquid staking token for HELOC lending pools … Yield comes from real HELOC lending operations”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T10:46:57.368Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=5) | gpt-family: contradicted — The sources support that users deposit wYLDS to receive transferable PRIME and that PRIME yield involves Democratized Prime HELOC lending. However, the narrative incorrectly attributes all value accru | anthropic-family: unsupported — Most of the claim is supported by the union of sources: YLDS being an SEC-registered face-amount certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company (ylds.com), wYLDS as a third-party wrapped version of | kimi-family: unsupported — Core mechanics are supported: ylds.com confirms YLDS is an SEC-registered face-amount certificate issued by Figure Certificate Company, backed solely by FCC assets (not a Treasury/fund claim); help.ha
“Understanding wYLDS and PRIME: Hastra's Ecosystem ... What is PRIME (Staked wYLDS)? ... How Is the PRIME Rate Determined? ... Hastra ETH Programmatic Integration Guide ... Hastra SOL Programmatic Integration Guide ... Understanding DeFi Lending ... Risks Article”
Verifier note: unsupported — The fetched help.hastra.io page confirms that Hastra operates a public help center and lists the specified PRIME, integration, and risk articles. However, it does not establish that this is the issuer’s “primary” user-facing documentation set, nor does it state that the materials are provided “rather than a formal legal prospectus.” Those comparative/characterization elements are unsupported by the supplied content. | quote: "❔ What is PRIME (Staked wYLDS)? ... 🔣 How Is the PRIME Rate Determined? ... 🛠️ Integration Guides ... 📘 Hastra ETH Programmatic Integration Guide ... 📗 Hastra SOL Programmatic Integration Guide ... 📚 DeFi Guides ... 📃 Risks Article"
“Figure Certificate Company Prospectus Dated February 20, 2025... Figure Certificates (as defined below) are unsecured and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The cited SEC prospectus directly supports the prospectus date, the Certificates’ unsecured status and sole backing by FCC assets, the non-bank/non-deposit/non-FDIC-insured disclosures, and the exchange/ATS/peer-to-peer trading statements. However, the provided source does not establish the claim’s linkage that these Certificates are specifically the YLDS/wYLDS instruments “underlying PRIME’s Democratized Prime structure.” The source refers to Figure Transferable and Figure Installment Certificates, but does not mention PRIME, Democratized Prime, YLDS, or wYLDS. Thus the compound claim as stated is not fully supported by the provided content. | quote: "“Figure Certificates (as defined below) are unsecured and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company.”"
“Use or redeem for USDC Easily redeem your wYLDS through Hastra, or swap for USDC in Raydium or Uniswap”
“Hastra PRIME (PRIME) trades on Uniswap V3, Orca, and Raydium (CLMM).”
Verifier note: unsupported — The live Hastra page supports only that wYLDS—not PRIME—may be redeemed through Hastra or swapped for USDC on Raydium or Uniswap. It does not establish PRIME liquidity, Orca, Uniswap V3 or a PRIME/USDC Ethereum pair, nor the asserted instant settlement, prevailing-pool-price mechanics, absence of protocol minimums/caps, slippage/liquidity exposure, or fee comparison. No live content from the holder.io citation is provided. | quote: "Easily redeem your wYLDS through Hastra, or swap for USDC in Raydium or Uniswap"
“The Fund shall, from time to time, deliver to and maintain with Custodian (and, in the Fund's sole discretion, one or more additional custodians) qualified investments having at all times an aggregate value at least equal to the amount the Fund is required to maintain as reserves pursuant to Section 28(a) of the 1940 Act”
Verifier note: unsupported — The filing supports that Figure Certificate Company is the “Fund,” is a face-amount certificate company under Section 4(1) of the 1940 Act, must maintain Section 28(a) required reserves with its Custodian (and potentially additional custodians), and that the Custodian is not responsible for ensuring compliance with required reserves. It also defines Assets as securities, underlying shares, monies, and other property held for the Fund’s benefit. However, the agreement leaves the Custodian unidentified as “[CUSTODIAN]” and does not establish that FCC itself is a custodian. Nor does the provided content establish that FCC issues YLDS/wYLDS, that those certificates underlie Democratized Prime, or that PRIME deposits into them. “Qualified bank/trust custodian” is also not stated verbatim, though the agreement says the Custodian has qualifications prescribed by Section 26(a)(1). | quote: "“The Fund shall, from time to time, deliver to and maintain with Custodian (and, in the Fund's sole discretion, one or more additional custodians) qualified investments having at all times an aggregate value at least equal to the amount the Fund is required to maintain as reserves pursuant to Sectio"
(FTS) following an August 2025 corporate recombination and FTS's IPO on September 12, 2025.
“FMHI indirectly, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, owns all of the equity of FCC... In August 2025, FTS and FMHI recombined their businesses... FMHI became a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTS. Subsequently, on September 12, 2025, FTS completed its initial public offering.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The filing supports FCC’s ownership chain and the August 2025 recombination / September 12, 2025 IPO chronology. However, it does not mention wYLDS, YLDS, PRIME, or a “Democratized Prime” structure, nor does it establish that any wYLDS/YLDS leg is issued as Figure Certificates. Therefore the full claim is not established by the provided source. | quote: "“FMHI indirectly, through its wholly-owned subsidiary, owns all of the equity of FCC, comprised of 1,000 shares of common stock. In August 2025, FTS and FMHI recombined their businesses through a series of transactions. As a result of this recombination, FMHI became a wholly-owned subsidiary of FTS."
“PRIME can be unstaked back to wYLDS at any time with no permanent lock-up, the vault burning PRIME and returning wYLDS. No minimum redemption amounts apply.”
“Subscription Time Instant Min. Investment — Subscription Fees 0 % Subscription Description — Redemption Time Instant Minimum Redemption Amount — Redemption Fees 0 % ”
Verifier note: unsupported — The re-fetched RWA.xyz page supports only that redemption time is listed as “Instant,” the minimum redemption amount is shown as “—,” and redemption fees are 0%. It does not establish that holders unstake PRIME at any time, that a vault burns PRIME and returns wYLDS 1:1, that there is no redemption cap, or that continuously accrued yield is realized upon unstaking. The alleged Token Terminal excerpt was not included in the live re-fetched content, so those additional mechanics cannot be verified from the provided material. | quote: "Redemption Time Instant Minimum Redemption Amount — Redemption Fees 0 %"
“wYLDS pending redemption: 339,294.36”
Verifier note: unsupported — The live Proof of Reserves page does show a Provenance-line item labeled “wYLDS pending redemption” with a balance of 339,294.36. This supports the narrow observation that a pending-redemption balance existed. However, the source does not state that PRIME-to-wYLDS redemption is instant, does not identify the pending amount as final settlement into USDC or underlying cash, and does not explain that this balance represents a queue or establish a non-instantaneous settlement process “at every layer.” The stated July 2026 observation date is also not evidenced by the page content provided. | quote: "**wYLDS pending redemption:** 339,294.36"
“Redemption Time Instant Minimum Redemption Amount — Redemption Fees 0 %”
Verifier note: unsupported — The source explicitly lists PRIME's Redemption Time as “Instant” and Redemption Fees as “0 %,” supporting those portions. However, it does not establish that the fee is charged by neither the issuer nor the protocol. Moreover, it discloses a separate “Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield,” so the broad characterization of no issuer/protocol charge is not supported by the cited content. | quote: "Redemption Time Instant Minimum Redemption Amount — Redemption Fees 0 %"
“Subscription Time Instant Min. Investment — Subscription Fees 0 %”
Verifier note: unsupported — The fetched RWA.xyz page explicitly supports that PRIME has a 0% subscription fee and an instant subscription time. However, it does not establish the stronger attribution that the fee is charged by “neither issuer nor protocol.” Moreover, the page lists a separate “Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield,” so the broad no-fee attribution is not supported by the cited content. | quote: "Subscription Time Instant Min. Investment — Subscription Fees 0 %"
“Other Fees Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield.”
Verifier note: unsupported — The live RWA.xyz page expressly supports that Hastra charges a 50 bps platform fee and that it is deducted from yield. However, it does not establish that 50 bps means “0.50% annualized,” nor does it specify the claimed mechanics that the fee is taken before distribution to PRIME holders from the spread between the Democratized Prime pool clearing rate/wYLDS interest and the holder rate. Those additional details make the full claim more specific than the cited source supports. | quote: "Other Fees Hastra platform fee of 50 bps deducted from yield."
“## Proof of Reserves As of 10:11:06 PM ... Figure Markets Democratized Prime 1. Sweep Address: ... 4. 24 hr Earnings: 73,798.57 5. Total Earnings: 14,099,594.93”
Verifier note: unsupported — The fetched page does support that Hastra has a public page titled “Proof of Reserves” and shows fields for wYLDS, Provenance, and Figure Markets Democratized Prime, including a Provenance vault-address label and a Figure Markets sweep-address label. However, the actual addresses are absent from the fetched content, and the source does not establish that the page is continuously updated, that the displayed items are on-chain addresses/balances, or that it constitutes an ongoing self-published reserve attestation rather than a periodic third-party audit. Those characterizations exceed the evidence provided. | quote: "## Proof of Reserves As of 10:11:06 PM ### ... Provenance 1. **Vault Address:** 2. **YLDS Balance:** 848,919.65 3. **USDC Balance:** 0.05 ### ... Democratized Prime 1. **Sweep Address:** 4. **24 hr Earnings:** 73,798.57"
Issuer entity 6a26afc5-a511-480c-ac79-011328bae75f · last updated 2026-08-07T11:45:56.011Z
1 source channels auto-trusted this run (revocable in Autoresearch)
resolve · resolve-light · ok · 9 links
ingest · ingest · weak
plan · plan · ok
synthesize · synthesize · ok
39 of 43 fields verified · 0 unverified · 5 not found
Run 2026-08-05T12:00:17.321Z · done · cost $0.00
Automated research, human-reviewed. Verify against source documents before credit decisions.
+5.26%
“Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve”
Verifier note: panel 1/1 confirmed (agreement=5) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The fetched Hastra documentation expressly states: “Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve.” It further says that YLDS is held in reserve to back issued wYLDS tokens “1:1.” This d
“Annual audit: Big Four Audited.”
“SEC-registered face-amount certificate company”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T07:11:48.952Z from rejected status | panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | trimmed uncited claims (1) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS homepage expressly states that reserves are reported quarterly in financial statements in public periodic reports filed with the SEC, and it markets YLDS as subject to an annual audit / “Big | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The ylds.com content directly supports the core factual assertions: it states 'Annual audit: Big Four Audited' (matching the claim of an unnamed 'Big Four' firm doing an annual audit) and explicitly s | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The YLDS homepage states that “reserves for YLDS are reported on a quarterly basis” in public periodic reports filed with the SEC. It also states “Annual audit — Big Four Audited,” describes “Audited
Quarterly reserve reporting via FCC's SEC financial statements, plus an annual fund audit (depth-structure-flows)
Monthly SEC reporting and continuous on-chain verification (breadth-api-2)
“reported on a quarterly basis in the financial statements in our public periodic reports filed with the SEC.”
“backed by a portfolio of prime Home Equity Lines of Credit (HELOCs)”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=2, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The YLDS source says reserves are “reported on a quarterly basis” in SEC-filed financial statements, which supports quarterly reporting/disclosure—not a quarterly attestation. The same page separately | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The YLDS site explicitly states in its FAQ: 'The reserves for YLDS are reported on a quarterly basis in the financial statements in our public periodic reports filed with the SEC.' This directly and p | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The cited source (https://www.ylds.com/) directly confirms under the FAQ section ('How do we see what reserves are backing YLDS?') that reserve backing for YLDS is 'reported on a quarterly basis in th
“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit”
“Our initial assessment identified 9 findings across various severity levels: 1 Critical, 4 Medium, 2 Low, and 2 Informational. … All findings were thoroughly resolved”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T00:15:39.467Z from rejected status | panel 2/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The cited audit summary explicitly states that Figure engaged Informal Systems in September 2025 to audit the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs; that the engagement ran in two phases f | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The audit report confirms all elements of the claim: Informal Systems audited the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, engaged by Figure in September 2025, conducted in two phases from S
“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time of the call: wYLDS_returned = prime_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale ( past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
“Oracle failures, manipulation, or inaccuracies could result in incorrect pricing and financial loss.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: confirmed — The issuer documentation supports every material element. It states that PRIME yield is generated on Provenance and bridged to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS, while the terms identify loss of funds and delayed | anthropic: confirmed — All material claims are supported by the union of the two fetched sources, and the narrative directly answers the slot question about holder losses/service failures from bridge compromise and oracle d
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived sources support every material element. Hastra’s Terms expressly state that smart-contract vulnerabilities, bugs, or security flaws can cause loss of funds and that audits do not guarante | anthropic-family: confirmed — All four claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources. The smart-contract vulnerability/loss-of-funds quote matches hastra.io/terms section 4A (Smart Contract Risk). The pause quote ('Both v | kimi-family: confirmed — All three material claims are directly supported. The terms of use state smart contracts may contain bugs or vulnerabilities that could result in loss of funds. The integration guide confirms both vau
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over 38cf31d3-ede9-451f-827f-23c2a40d5efa: The new claim more directly and specifically explains mechanisms that could push PRIME’s secondary price away from redemption value: illiquidity, oracle-based redemption decoupled from pool balance, and FCC credit risk. Its cited evidence supports each mechanism. Neither claim provides historical episodes, but the incumbent merely states that deviation and loss are possible without explaining why.
“YLDS are unsecured face-amount certificates and solely backed by the assets of Figure Certificate Company (FCC).”
“economics tied to securities similar to those held by prime money market funds and later to short-term Treasury securities and repo involving Treasuries.”
“Real Assets: Backed by actual home equity lines of credit.”
Verifier note: panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=5, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched Hastra materials support that users stake/deposit wYLDS to receive PRIME, and that PRIME’s stated yield source is Demo/“Democratized Prime” HELOC lending. They also support Hastra’s stated | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — Several sub-claims are corroborated by the union of fetched sources: wYLDS being backed 1:1 by YLDS (Hastra help page verbatim), YLDS being an SEC-registered face-amount certificate issued by FCC and | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — All material claims in the narrative are supported by the provided sources: 1) Hastra's documentation confirms that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS in Hastra's reserve, and PRIME represents staked wYLDS. | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra page supports the stated mechanism as a Hastra representation: each wYLDS is said to be backed 1:1 by YLDS in Hastra’s reserve. YLDS’s site supports that YLDS is an unsecured face-amount ce