Plan fulfillment
No dossier plan recorded.
Evidence gaps
fee servicing structuring trust — searched, not found: Agora servicing, Figure structuring, trustee, and liquidation expenses are not separately quantified in public docs; checked help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto — costs may be funded from the gross loan spread but no schedule is published.
fee management — searched, not found: No separate management fee beyond the 50bps Hastra platform fee is disclosed; checked hastra.io/terms.
fee performance — searched, not found: No performance fee is disclosed; checked hastra.io/terms.
audits fund — searched, not found: No fund-level financial audit of the AUTO auto-loan pool or its Delaware statutory trust is published; checked hastra.io, help.hastra.io, figuremarkets.com/disclosures.
min investment — searched, not found: No minimum investment amount for acquiring or staking AUTO itself was found; researchers only located a $2,000 batching minimum on the wYLDS-to-USDC redemption leg (see ts:redemption:redemption_minimum) and a single-certificate minimum for the underlying YLDS security. Checked help.hastra.io, hastra
document auto offering terms — searched, not found: No prospectus, private-placement memorandum, subscription agreement, token terms, or securities-law memorandum specific to AUTO was located. Checked help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto.
document master participation agreement — searched, not found: Referenced by Hastra documentation but no executed or specimen Master Participation Agreement was publicly accessible. Checked help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto.
document trust and mra — searched, not found: The Delaware statutory trust and Master Repurchase Agreement are described in Hastra materials but not linked to any public document. Checked help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto.
document attestation — searched, not found: No AUTO reserve, collateral, or borrowing-base attestation report was published. Checked help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto, agoradata.com press release.
Rejected facts
AuditsA separate audit reviewed Solana vault-mint and vault-stake controls, including freeze functions, administrator lists, PDA derivation, and role-based access.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”
hastra.io ↗“The Hastra programs demonstrate solid engineering practices with well-structured code, comprehensive use of Anchor's constraint system, proper PDA derivation patterns, and robust role-based access control.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source supports the stated Solana audit scope, including freeze/thaw functions, administrator lists, PDA derivation, and role-based access control. However, the value does not answer the | anthropic: confirmed — The claim describes the scope of a separate (smart-contract) audit of the Hastra Solana vault-mint and vault-stake programs, and every listed control element is directly supported by verbatim text in
Monitoring and attestationHastra publishes a Proof of Reserves view, but the corpus does not identify its provider, scope, or update frequency.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources show only a “View Proof of Reserves” link and a “Reserves” navigation item. They do not identify an actual monitoring feed, its provider, the assets or liabilities it attests, or | anthropic: confirmed — The claim has two parts, both borne out by the archived sources. (1) Hastra publishes a Proof of Reserves view: https://hastra.io/auto contains the link text 'View Proof of Reserves' and both pages' f
Key managementHastra states that multisignature security protects AUTO. Anchor role-based controls govern privileged program operations.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“Secured by: Real asset backing • Multi-sig security”
hastra.io ↗“The Hastra programs demonstrate solid engineering practices with well-structured code, comprehensive use of Anchor's constraint system, proper PDA derivation patterns, and robust role-based access control.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support only a general marketing statement that AUTO uses “Multi-sig security” and an auditor’s broad assessment of role-based access control. They do not describe the multisig t | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The SLOT QUESTION demands specifics on multisig thresholds (M-of-N), signer identities and geographic/organizational distribution, key custody arrangements, and timelocks for privileged acti
Admin powersProgram administrators maintain governance lists and can freeze or thaw wYLDS and AUTO token accounts.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source supports administrator lists and freeze/thaw functionality for wYLDS and the vault-stake program’s respective token, identified as PRIME. It does not mention AUTO, identify which | anthropic: unsupported — The source supports that both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance, which covers the wYLDS freeze/thaw and gov
Oracle dependenciesChainlink Data Streams supplies AUTO's exchange rate through Ethereum NAV contracts and Solana price verification. Stale prices can block redemption.DisputedMore
Sources · 3
Remove the phantom 7cea8983 citation; either cite 6eecd9fa/9b5a8918 for the failure-mode claim or soften 'can block redemption' to what the audit findings actually establish.
hastra.io ↗“The Chainlink Data Streams NAV integration , including the feed verifier and NAV engine on the Ethereum side and the corresponding price-verification path on the Solana side.”
help.hastra.io ↗“accepts wYLDS and issues
AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time
of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored
Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — The sources confirm that Chainlink Data Streams maintains the Solana AUTO/wYLDS exchange rate through a price-verification path and that a stale or uninitialized stored price causes the direct AUTO-to | anthropic: confirmed — The claim answers the slot question directly: it names the oracle (Chainlink Data Streams) used for AUTO pricing/settlement and states the failure mode (stale price blocks redemption), so it is goal-f
Bridge providerHastra uses issuer-operated vault programs rather than an identified third-party token bridge on Solana.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗“The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconnected Anchor programs:”
help.hastra.io ↗“accepts USDC and issues
wYLDS at a 1:1 ratio. Shared across all Hastra Solana pools.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token
account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The sources describe Hastra’s Solana vault programs for local USDC-to-wYLDS issuance, but they also explicitly identify Circle’s CCTP as the bridge used in the operator-mediated redemption flow. They | anthropic: confirmed — The slot asks for the bridge operator and mechanism for the Solana token. The cited archived content directly describes an issuer-operated model: 'The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconne
Canonical deploymentSolana hosts the native AUTO issue through vault-stake-auto. The corpus does not identify AUTO's token mint address.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗“The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconnected Anchor programs:”
help.hastra.io ↗“accepts wYLDS and issues
AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”
help.hastra.io ↗“vault-stake-auto ( 5uJgCDrQHfA58fPqLsuU14Srg9quxXNHz91cZ54cq4pK )”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — The issuer guide supports that a Solana Anchor program, vault-stake-auto, mints and burns AUTO share tokens, which supports treating this Solana instance as a native issue rather than a bridged AUTO r | anthropic: confirmed — goal-fit: the claim directly answers the slot question (canonical chain, native vs bridged, mint disclosure). The archived guide confirms all three parts. It describes 'The Hastra Solana protocol cons
NetworksAUTO is deployed on Solana. Hastra plans Ethereum mainnet and additional chains.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗“Yield from Democratized Prime flows through to Hastra and is distributed to AUTO token holders (minus the applicable Hastra Platform fee of 50bps) on Solana, with Ethereum mainnet and additional chains to follow.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Settlement
Continuous (utilization-based)
Continuous (utilization-based)”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: Issuer documentation supports that AUTO currently exists on Solana, including its identification as an SPL token and the table entry “Solana, Ethereum to follow.” However, planned Ethereum m | anthropic: confirmed — The cited source directly supports every item. AUTO is described as currently deployed on Solana ('fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana', 'Connect your Phantom or compatible Solana wallet', an
Operating historyHastra operates on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet; Ethereum mainnet deployment remained pending security review.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 3
hastra.io ↗“Hastra is currently deployed on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet, with mainnet Ethereum deployment pending audit and security review.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The audit supports this deployment status as of its April 2026 review, but the later archived Hastra pages state that PRIME and wYLDS are live on both Solana and Ethereum. “Coming soon to Ethereum” ap | anthropic: contradicted — The claim asserts Ethereum deployment is limited to testnet with mainnet 'pending security review.' The audit PDF (audited April 2026) does contain that exact sentence, but the current hastra.io homep
Service providersSherlock audits Hastra; Figure provides marketplace infrastructure; Agora Data originates the underlying consumer auto loans.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 4
hastra.io ↗“Sherlock performed independent security reviews of the Hastra protocol on behalf of Figure Technologies across two engagements in March and April 2026.”
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora. Diversified, real-world backed, built for DeFi.”
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: Sherlock is supported as the Hastra protocol’s independent security auditor. The sources also support Figure’s marketplace/capital-markets infrastructure role and Agora Data’s loan-originati | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The SLOT QUESTION asks specifically for named custodians, administrators, auditors, and banks serving the product. Only one of the three listed items fits that slot and is evidence-supported
What the issuer doesHastra operates DeFi yield products backed by real-world assets, including AUTO’s consumer auto-loan exposure.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 4
hastra.io ↗“Elite DeFi Products for the Crypto Savvy,
Backed by Real-World Assets.”
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora. Diversified, real-world backed, built for DeFi.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 97bd591b-6048-4c3a-b0bc-39e1a6d7c11d: The incumbent directly and more specifically identifies who built and operates Hastra, what the protocol provides, and how AUTO fits the product suite after PRIME, including the shift from home-equity to consumer-auto-loan exposure. Its cited evidence expressly supports each point. The new claim is accurate but materially vaguer, and its Signum Ltd. copyright citation does not establish Hastra's operating entity or business role.
CompositionAUTO is backed by Agora-originated consumer auto loans routed through Figure’s marketplace; disclosed evidence provides no instrument weights.DisputedMore
Sources · 4
Hastra’s main pages identify consumer auto loans as backing.
Hastra’s AUTO page instead describes real estate-backed lending exposure.
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora. Diversified, real-world backed, built for DeFi.”
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora.”
hastra.io ↗“AUTO yield is generated through Demo Prime's Auto lending operations, providing exposure to real estate-backed lending.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support that AUTO provides exposure to a structured pool of Agora-originated consumer auto loans routed through Figure Connect/Forge and Democratized Prime. However, they disclos | anthropic: confirmed — The claim answers the SLOT QUESTION by stating what backs AUTO (Agora-originated consumer auto loans routed through Figure's marketplace) and correctly noting no instrument weights are disclosed. Ever
Yield sourceAUTO yield comes from interest paid by consumer auto-loan borrowers through Figure’s Democratized Prime marketplace.DisputedMore
Sources · 5
Hastra’s main pages attribute yield to Agora-originated consumer auto loans.
Hastra’s AUTO page instead attributes yield to Demo Prime real estate-backed lending.
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora. Diversified, real-world backed, built for DeFi.”
hastra.io ↗“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora.”
help.hastra.io ↗“You earn exposure to the yield from the interest those borrowers pay on their loans in the form of rewards.”
help.hastra.io ↗“This is real yield from real borrowers making real car payments, not token emissions or liquidity mining rewards.”
hastra.io ↗“AUTO yield is generated through Demo Prime's Auto lending operations, providing exposure to real estate-backed lending.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support consumer auto-loan interest as a principal economic source, routed through Agora-originated loans, Figure Forge, Democratized Prime, and Hastra. But the claim does not an | anthropic: confirmed — goal-fit: the claim answers the SLOT QUESTION by identifying where AUTO yield economically originates — interest paid by consumer auto-loan borrowers, routed through Figure's Democratized Prime market
Legal entitySignum Ltd.DisputedMore
Sources · 3
Signum Ltd.
Scope: the synthesis leaves issuer_entity resolved to Signum Ltd. but never accounts for Hastra, which the evidence names as the operator/brand of the AUTO product. Hastra should at minimum appear as a competing position rather than being silently dropped.
Verifier note: WARNING: evidence class mismatch; trusted tier 1 evidence requires substance and goal-fit review | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — The pages state “Signum Ltd.” only in a copyright footer. That supports a copyright or website attribution, but does not identify Signum Ltd. as the legal issuer. No registry record, legal terms, or r | anthropic: unsupported — All three archived pages do render 'Signum Ltd. Copyright© 2026' verbatim in the footer, so the CLAIMED QUOTES themselves match. However, the only appearance of 'Signum Ltd.' anywhere in the cited con
Source documentsCross-chain security audit: https://hastra.io/sherlock-hastra-audit.pdfDisputedMore
Sources · 2
asOfDate 2026-04-12 is unsupported — no present evidence provides any date for the Sherlock audit, and the second cited evidenceId e6387f5c is ABSENT. Date is fabricated relative to the corpus.
hastra.io ↗“Users deposit a base asset (USDC) into the Yield Vault and receive wYLDS — a liquid, transferable yield-bearing token redeemable 1:1 for the underlying asset.”
hastra.io ↗“Across two collaborative engagements in March and April 2026, Sherlock audited the Hastra protocol — Figure Technologies' institutional-grade tokenized vault system (USDC → wYLDS yield vault → PRIME staking vault) — covering both its Ethereum (Solidity) and Solana (Anchor/Rust) implementations.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent c3e509d5-80ce-4f55-bf8b-23b959977564: The incumbent directly supplies the key document's type (security audit), specific engagement dates (2026-03-04 through 2026-04-12), and original-source URL. Its own evidence supports the audit scope, both dated engagements, and the document's redacted status. The new claim gives no document date and describes it only as a cross-chain security audit, making it less complete and specific for the slot.
ConcentrationAUTO concentrates credit exposure in consumer auto loans.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗“Credit risk. The underlying loans are near-prime and subprime consumer auto credit. The structural protections described above are designed to absorb those losses, but they do not eliminate credit risk entirely.”
sec.gov ↗“stpr:CA us-gaap:GeographicConcentrationRiskMember 2026-03-31 0002064124”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 40fce2c5-b363-42b9-8c23-0158def35ea0: The incumbent directly addresses concentration across the underlying and key dependencies and is substantially more specific, naming Agora, Democratized Prime, Provenance, Chainlink, and Solana. Each named concentration is supported by its own cited evidence. The new claim identifies only broad consumer-auto credit exposure, while its SEC geographic-concentration snippet does not substantiate that claim.
Depeg / liquidityAUTO uses a periodically updated Chainlink exchange rate. Stale or uninitialized prices block redemption and can separate market price from NAV.DisputedMore
Sources · 2
Both cited evidenceIds (47f205ad, 7cea8983) are ABSENT from the corpus. The claim that 'stale or uninitialized prices block redemption' has no support in present evidence; d04dbfa1 only states AUTO shares use a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate and says nothing about staleness blocking redemption or NAV separation. Unsupported.
help.hastra.io ↗“The on-chain AUTO/wYLDS
exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rewards
administrators via verify_price .”
help.hastra.io ↗“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time
of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored
Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
Verifier note: panel 0/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — The fetched issuer-docs page (help.hastra.io AUTO integration guide) does textually contain both claimed quotes verbatim — the AUTO/wYLDS rate is 'maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated peri | kimi-family: unsupported — The core mechanism is well supported by the issuer's integration guide (a required evidence class): the AUTO/wYLDS exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rew | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch
Exit riskUSDC redemption requires operator completion after users burn wYLDS. Heavy withdrawals can create delays because settlement is not autonomous.DisputedMore
Sources · 3
Supported by 022875e6/d5b00b45, but cited evidenceId 638c19b5 is ABSENT from the corpus.
hastra.io ↗“Users can redeem their wYLDS tokens back to USDC through an admin-mediated two-step process.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA.”
help.hastra.io ↗“// Operator-only: transfers USDC from the redeem vault to the user's wallet.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 2dfd7190-f05d-46df-8765-aa19e2e1b0f7: The incumbent directly addresses exit timing and simultaneous-withdrawal mechanics: AUTO redemption has no queue or unbonding period, while final USDC settlement requires operator completion after Circle CCTP bridging. Its own evidence explicitly supports each dependency. The new claim’s assertion that heavy withdrawals can create delays is plausible but not directly established by its cited evidence.
Hack / smart contractAUTO depends on two Solana programs, administrator privileges, and Chainlink pricing. Contract, key, or oracle failures can block redemptions.DisputedMore
Sources · 4
Supported by f54b24d8/d04dbfa1/97146395, but the oracle limb cites evidenceId 7cea8983 which is ABSENT from the corpus.
help.hastra.io ↗“The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconnected Anchor programs:”
help.hastra.io ↗“accepts wYLDS and issues
AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”
hastra.io ↗“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time
of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored
Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 2c52fb2d-f819-4852-a614-b30305d6b0f7: The new claim more specifically maps the on-chain attack surface by naming the two Solana programs, Chainlink Data Streams, reward administrators, multisignature controls, and operator-privileged configuration paths, with each element supported by its own cited evidence.
CustodianHastra uses a custodial wrapper and operator-mediated USDC redemptions. Operational failure can delay access to backing assets.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“The vault-mint program serves as the base layer, operating as a custodial wrapper that accepts USDC deposits and issues wYLDS (wrapped YLDS) tokens at a 1:1 ratio.”
hastra.io ↗“Users can redeem their wYLDS tokens back to USDC through an admin-mediated two-step process.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 9489282a-0f79-45aa-afd8-fe3a14b80178: The incumbent more directly identifies the relevant operational dependencies and concentration points: program-controlled USDC custody, Provenance-based off-chain yield bridging, Circle CCTP, and an operator-controlled redemption-completion step. Its own evidence supports each dependency. The new claim establishes custodial wrapping and admin-mediated redemption but is less specific about the key providers and concentration exposure.
Credit / counterpartyAUTO exposes holders to a structured consumer auto-loan pool after Figure credit enhancements. Those protections do not eliminate borrower losses.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗“You are not buying individual auto loans. You are staking wYLDS, which leads to programmatic lending into a structured pool where Figure has already applied credit enhancements and risk management. Your exposure is to the pool's performance after those protections, not to any individual borrower.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Credit risk. The underlying loans are near-prime and subprime consumer auto credit. The structural protections described above are designed to absorb those losses, but they do not eliminate credit risk entirely.”
help.hastra.io ↗“At approximately 2.4 times cashflow overcollateralization, the pool can absorb roughly 55 percent delinquency before your yield is impaired. Expected losses are approximately 10 percent.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent a47c96f2-6ef4-41f0-92da-7810d009a583: The incumbent more directly identifies the credit exposure and names the relevant counterparties and lending channel: near-prime auto loans originated by Agora Data through Democratized Prime. Its own evidence supports those details. The new claim better describes structural protections and residual borrower-loss risk, but is less specific about the counterparties whose failure would affect holders.
Caps / gatesAUTO has no current unbonding queue. Final USDC settlement remains operator-mediated, creating an operational gate without a disclosed numeric cap.DisputedMore
Sources · 4
Current integration evidence says AUTO converts to wYLDS atomically without queuing.
The November 2025 audit described a configured unbonding period before completion.
Present evidence indicates an unbonding-period gate exists on the vault-stake path.
help.hastra.io ↗“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding
period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the
proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The
on-chain unbonding_period field is permanently set to 0 and the unbond instruction no longer
exists.”
hastra.io ↗“Users can redeem their wYLDS tokens back to USDC through an admin-mediated two-step process.”
hastra.io ↗“Users must first request to unbond their position, wait for the configured unbonding period to elapse, and then complete their redemption.”
Verifier note: panel 1/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — The slot requires evidence of class legal-terms or issuer-docs, but the only assigned evidence for this value (022875e6, d6bb2fe3) is the Informal Systems audit report, which is class 'audit' — outsid | kimi-family: confirmed — The AUTO-specific integration guide states the vault-stake-auto program has no unbonding period or queue, with the on-chain unbonding_period permanently set to 0 and the unbond instruction removed; re | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch
Exit pathsHastra burns AUTO and atomically transfers proportional wYLDS using the live Chainlink price. Current contracts impose no unbonding period.DisputedMore
Sources · 4
Current integration documentation describes single-step AUTO redemption without queuing.
The November 2025 audit described a two-step redemption after a configured unbonding period.
On present evidence, AUTO/vault-stake redemption requires an unbonding wait (d6bb2fe3); the atomic-no-queue claim is unsupported.
help.hastra.io ↗“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding
period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the
proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time
of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored
Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The
on-chain unbonding_period field is permanently set to 0 and the unbond instruction no longer
exists.”
hastra.io ↗“Users must first request to unbond their position, wait for the configured unbonding period to elapse, and then complete their redemption.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 20728044-b06a-43ce-97eb-eaa5bdca60d4: The incumbent more directly answers the required redemption-path fields: method, settlement timing, minimums, caps/gates, and fees. Its evidence supports atomic burning, proportional wYLDS transfer at the live Chainlink rate, and no unbonding or queue. Although its cited evidence does not substantiate the absence of disclosed minimums, caps, or fees, the new claim omits those slot fields entirely; its additional audit evidence also describes a conflicting historical unbonding process.
Unilateral changesFCC controls certificate transferee eligibility; vault administrators control withdrawal whitelists and account freezes without disclosed holder consent.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
sec.gov ↗“The digital asset standard used on the
Provenance Blockchain enables FCC to enforce transfer restrictions in connection with the Certificates.”
hastra.io ↗“The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:39:38.264Z from rejected status | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The SEC filing confirms that FCC and its transfer agent control certificate-transfer conditions and transferee eligibility, but it does not state that FCC may change those eligibility rules | anthropic: unsupported — Both claimed quotes are verbatim-accurate in the archived content, and the SEC S-1/A does support that FCC controls transferee eligibility — beyond the quoted sentence it states the standard 'enables
If the issuer failsOriginator default triggers a true sale of loans to the trust. An independent administrator liquidates assets and remits proceeds to lenders.DisputedMore
A reserve account absorbs realized losses before token holders. Figure seed capital provides first-loss protection. Agora owes repurchase obligations for ineligible loans. Recoveries ultimately depend on vehicle values and available credit protections.
Sources · 5
Incorporate ev:a5aa673a recourse/parent guarantee.
help.hastra.io ↗“If the originator defaults under the MRA, the loans are sold in a true sale to the trust, which has an independent trust administator and liquidiaton, whose only non-discretionary powers are to sell the assets and remit the proceeds back to the Democratized Prime lenders in a default scenario.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Reserve account. A sinking fund that builds to 2.5 percent of outstanding principal over time. It absorbs realized credit losses before any loss reaches token holders.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Figure’s $25M commitment. Figure commits seed capital to the auto loan trust as first-loss protection. Figure’s money is at risk alongside yours.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Originator buyback. Agora must repurchase any loan that breaches its representations or eligibility criteria, at full principal plus accrued interest.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Vehicle depreciation. Unlike real estate, cars lose value over time. In a default scenario, recovery depends on the vehicle's residual value. The advance rate cap (87 percent), insurance requirements, first-priority lien position, and the 60/90-day buyout mechanism are designed to limit this exposure.”
VehicleA Delaware statutory trust holds pledged auto loans under an MRA with the originator. AUTO represents direct loan-participation claims through that trust.DisputedMore
wYLDS separately wraps SEC-registered YLDS.
Sources · 3
Scope the vehicle to the AUTO trust; treat the wYLDS wrapper separately or note its jurisdiction is undisclosed.
help.hastra.io ↗“AUTO represents exposure to direct loan participation claims on cash flows from the underlying auto loan pool, structured through a bankruptcy-remote trust. There is no fund manager sitting between you and the collateral.”
help.hastra.io ↗“wYLDS is the base-layer wrapped token on Solana, acting as a custodial wrapper for YLDS, the
underlying SEC-registered stablecoin.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Bankruptcy remoteness. The auto loans sit in a Delaware statutory trust pledged under a Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA) between the originator and the bankruptcy remote-trust. This structure is designed to isolate the loan assets from the credit risk of any single party, including Figure.”
Verifier note: panel 0/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch. The required evidence classes for ts:legal/legal_vehicle are legal-terms or registry. The only fetched sources are Hastra help/support pages (help.hastra.io), which are issuer | kimi-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch. The claim's components are textually corroborated (Delaware statutory trust pledged under an MRA between originator and bankruptcy-remote trust; AUTO as direct loan-participat | gpt-family: unsupported — The legal_vehicle value is blank. The cited issuer-help content describes a Delaware statutory trust, an MRA, loan participation interests, and custodial token wrappers, but it does not establish any
Key peopleMichael S. Cagney leads Figure Certificate Company, an entity tied to the backing layer; no direct AUTO role is disclosed.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“Michael S. Cagney
Chief Executive Officer
Figure Certificate Company”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | kimi-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch
Incidents & track recordSherlock found no Critical or High issues across its March and April 2026 reviews. Figure accepted residual reward-distribution risks affecting staker economics.DisputedMore
Sherlock also identified operator-privileged paths dependent on off-chain controls.
Sources · 4
Note that the audit scope names the PRIME staking vault and AUTO coverage is inferred from shared infra; add an explicit 'no depegs/enforcement/lawsuits disclosed' statement or mark that dimension unknown.
hastra.io ↗“No Critical or High-severity findings were identified across either engagement. All Medium-severity findings were either resolved by the team or formally acknowledged with a documented rationale for accepting the residual risk. All Low/Informational findings were resolved.”
hastra.io ↗“The staking vault's reward distribution mechanism produces a discrete, single-block change in share price on both chains — surfacing as a sandwich/MEV vector on the Ethereum side and as a virtual-shares dilution effect on the Solana side.”
hastra.io ↗“Both findings were formally acknowledged by Figure as accepted residual risk under the current operational model.”
hastra.io ↗“Several findings involved operator-privileged configuration paths that defer fail-safety to off-chain operational discipline rather than enforcing it on-chain.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 539b9ff5-298d-415c-abbd-0e0a0f05019c: The incumbent more directly answers the incident slot by explicitly stating that no depeg, enforcement action, or litigation appears in the supplied evidence. It is also more specific and better supported by its own citations, providing exact finding counts and the sourced conclusion that the accepted economic risks do not threaten principal or solvency. The new claim omits the no-known-incidents statement and exact counts.
BackersNo issuer equity investors are disclosed. Capital One provides Agora Data a $100 million warehouse facility.DisputedMore
Sources · 1
Either move the Capital One fact to underlying/originator context and mark issuer backers as undisclosed, or explicitly label it as Agora's (not the issuer's) financing.
help.hastra.io ↗“Agora has an existing $100M warehouse facility with Capital One and a track record of public securitizations.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: contradicted — The assigned issuer-docs source supports the $100 million Capital One warehouse facility, but it actively contradicts the statement that no issuer equity investors are disclosed: it says Agora is back | anthropic-family: contradicted — The claim has two components. Component two — that Capital One provides Agora Data a $100M warehouse facility — is directly supported: the Hastra issuer-docs page states 'Agora has an existing $100M w | kimi-family: contradicted — The second item is supported: the source states Agora has an existing $100M warehouse facility with Capital One. But the first item, 'No issuer equity investors are disclosed,' is actively contradicte
Structure & qualityAgora originates, underwrites, and services near-prime auto loans. Figure pools tokenized whole loans into fungible participation interests under a Master Participation Agreement.UnverifiedMore
Disclosed evidence provides no maturity, credit-grade, concentration, or enhancement breakdown.
Sources · 4
help.hastra.io ↗“Origination: Agora Data originates near-prime auto loans through its AI-powered underwriting framework, serving car dealerships across the U.S.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Agora handles origination, underwriting, and servicing. Figure handles structuring, credit enhancement, and capital markets infrastructure. Hastra handles DeFi distribution.”
help.hastra.io ↗“This structuring layer is called Figure Forge, which includes the smart contract that creates composible Participation Interest tokens (via a Master Participation Agreement) from the underlying tokenized whole loans.”
help.hastra.io ↗“AUTO targets a higher yield than PRIME because auto loans carry higher credit risk than home equity. The structural protections are correspondingly more layered.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: contradicted — The source supports Agora’s origination, underwriting, and servicing roles and Figure Forge’s creation of fungible participation-interest tokens from tokenized whole loans under a Master Participation | anthropic-family: contradicted — The origination/underwriting/servicing-by-Agora and the Figure Forge pooling of tokenized whole loans into fungible Participation Interest tokens under a Master Participation Agreement are all directl | kimi-family: contradicted — The first two sentences are well supported: the source states Agora handles origination, underwriting, and servicing of near-prime auto loans, and that Figure Forge creates fungible Participation Inte
Holder's claimA share-based AUTO-pool position providing exposure to pro rata cash flows; direct ownership of individual loans is not disclosed.DisputedMore
Sources · 3
State the on-chain redemption right explicitly and note the lender-into-pool characterization; flag that no off-chain legal fund-share/participation right is disclosed to the holder.
help.hastra.io ↗“the Figure Forge smart contract is used to transform these loans into standardized loan participation tokens. Auto loans vary widely in borrower credit, loan size, and terms - Forge pools similar loans together and issues fungible tokens that represent pro rata claims on the underlying cash flows.”
help.hastra.io ↗“This structuring layer is called Figure Forge, which includes the smart contract that creates composible Participation Interest tokens (via a Master Participation Agreement) from the underlying tokenized whole loans.”
Verifier note: panel 0/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | kimi-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch
How it worksUsers purchase wYLDS with Solana USDC and stake wYLDS to mint AUTO. Yield increases AUTO's wYLDS redemption value automatically.UnverifiedMore
Users burn AUTO for wYLDS without queuing. USDC settlement requires a separate operator-mediated redemption.
Sources · 4
hastra.io ↗“Stake wYLDS on Hastra to receive AUTO, your liquid staking token for Auto lending pools.”
help.hastra.io ↗“Unlike the ETH flow, on Solana yield does
not require a manual claim — it accrues through an appreciating Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”
help.hastra.io ↗“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding
period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the
proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗“To convert wYLDS back to USDC, the vault-mint program uses an admin-mediated two-step
request_redeem / complete_redeem flow.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 513de3f7-67ae-4c6c-8059-227549c9ee5b: The incumbent more completely and specifically answers the holder lifecycle: USDC-to-wYLDS acquisition, wYLDS staking to mint AUTO, automatic exchange-rate appreciation, and both exit routes—DEX sales or direct AUTO redemption—followed by operator-completed USDC conversion. Each element is supported by its own cited evidence, while the new claim omits the evidenced DEX exit route and its purchase wording is less precise than the incumbent's cited 1:1 issuance mechanics.
Who can hold/mintHastra permits compatible Solana-wallet users accepting its terms to acquire wYLDS and stake into AUTO; investor classifications and exclusions remain undisclosed.DisputedMore
Sources · 3
'Investor classifications and exclusions remain undisclosed' conflicts with 7b35e0db (whitelisted withdrawals) and f097c8a1 (Provenance-enforced transfer restrictions), which show a whitelist/transfer-control mechanism gating exits even if the eligible classes are unnamed.
help.hastra.io ↗“Get wYLDS first: You need wYLDS to participate. You can read how to acquire wYLDS here .”
help.hastra.io ↗“A Solana wallet (such as Phantom, Solflare, or Backpack)
Sufficient USDC on the Solana network to cover your purchase
A small amount of SOL for transaction fees”
help.hastra.io ↗“Agree on the Terms and Conditions and then select the wallet you want to use.”
Verifier note: panel 1/4 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The sources confirm the operational prerequisites and flow: a user needs a supported/compatible Solana wallet, Solana USDC and SOL, must agree to Terms and Conditions, can acquire wYLDS, and can stake | anthropic-family: unsupported — The mechanical parts of the claim are well supported: the buying-wYLDS page shows any compatible Solana wallet (Phantom, Solflare, Backpack) plus USDC/SOL and agreeing to the Terms and Conditions is t | kimi-family: confirmed — The archived pages state the prerequisites for wYLDS (a compatible Solana wallet, USDC, SOL for fees) and instruct users to 'Agree on the Terms and Conditions' before connecting a wallet; the AUTO pag | gpt-family: unsupported — The sources describe the operational steps for acquiring wYLDS and staking it into AUTO, including connecting a compatible Solana wallet and accepting terms. They do not establish that every user who
AttestationsHastra provides a Proof of Reserves view. The evidence does not identify an independent attestation provider.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent a336d706-48df-41a0-9063-279c954470ad: The new claim is more specific and directly addresses both parts of the slot: it identifies the exact publication location and states that the feed identifies no attestor or auditor. Its cited JSON evidence supports the described reserve balances, while the incumbent cites only generic website links and does not identify the publication endpoint.
CustodiansThe vault-mint program places deposited USDC in a PDA-owned program-controlled token account. The evidence identifies no regulated custodian.DisputedMore
Sources · 1
The PDA vault holds deposited USDC, but the underlying yield-generating assets are custodied off-chain on Provenance and wYLDS is a custodial wrapper over the SEC-registered YLDS.
help.hastra.io ↗“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token
account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 9ea769a2-7001-4f48-b13c-d3f411a469b6: The new claim more directly and specifically identifies the underlying asset custodian as UMB Bank, N.A., states its FDIC-member status, and distinguishes the wrapped-token layer. Its SEC filing evidence directly supports UMB Bank’s custodial role and chartered-bank identity. The incumbent only describes USDC held in a PDA-owned program-controlled account and expressly lacks a regulated custodian, so it answers less of the slot.
UpgradeabilityUpgradeable Solana programs controlled by a program upgrade authority; no on-chain timelock or multisig disclosedUnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“missing program update authority validation in the initialize instruction (creating a race condition where any account could front-run deployment)”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The report confirms that the audited code had an initialize-instruction flaw involving missing validation of the program update authority, but it does not establish the deployed programs' upgradeabili | anthropic-family: confirmed — The claimed quote appears verbatim in the archived audit report as a Medium-severity finding: 'missing program update authority validation in the initialize instruction (creating a race condition wher | gpt-family: unsupported — The claimed atomic value for upgradeability is blank. The source discusses missing validation of the program update authority during initialization and says the issue was later resolved, but it does n
Source documentsHastra Terms of Use (hastra.io/terms).UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“The Terms of Use for Hastra's DeFi application are governed by Signum Ltd.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:29:00.779Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited page is clearly a Terms of Use document at the original-source URL and states a last-updated date of August 3, 2026, but the atomic value supplies neither the required document typ | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The document identity is well-supported — the fetched page is titled "Terms of Use" at https://hastra.io/terms, last updated August 3, 2026, and confirms it is a Hastra document (Signum Ltd. | kimi: confirmed — The archived page at https://hastra.io/terms is titled 'Terms of Use', states 'Last updated: August 3, 2026', and governs use of Hastra's DeFi application provided by Signum Ltd. The claimed value (a
Exit pathsMulti-step, operator-mediated wYLDS→USDC redemption across the vault-mint and vault-stake programs; not instant.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗“Returning to USDC is a multi-step process across both programs.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The source confirms that an AUTO→USDC exit is multi-step across both programs: AUTO is redeemed to wYLDS in vault-stake-auto, then wYLDS is converted to USDC through vault-mint’s operator-mediated req | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The source explicitly states 'Returning to USDC is a multi-step process across both programs' and details Phase 1 (redeem AUTO for wYLDS, single-step/atomic) and Phase 2 (wYLDS→USDC via vault-mint's a
Transfer restrictionsFreely transferable SPL token; program retains freeze/thaw authority via up to 5 administrators for compliance (account freeze/thaw, whitelisted withdrawals, two-step redemption); Terms bar U.S. persons and OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned persons/jurisdictions.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
github.com ↗“Designated administrators can freeze/thaw specific token accounts...Maximum 5 freeze administrators.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched AUTO help page supports that AUTO is transferable (“Yes, AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on So[...lana]”). However, the supplied live content does not substantiate the asserted | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The live fetch of help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto confirms the transferability quote verbatim: 'Yes, AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana.' However, the second cited source (github.co | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra help page states that AUTO is “fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana,” supporting the general characterization. However, the cited vault/staking repository states that designated adm
Tax treatmentNo entity-level or pass-through tax structure disclosed; holders solely responsible for their own tax treatment; Hastra provides no tax advice.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“acquiring, staking, earning wYLDS on, and disposing of digital assets may have tax consequences in your jurisdiction”
Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent b05c80d5-d6ab-4ccf-b5c3-ec18f8c5d46f: The claims are substantively similar, but the new claim is better supported by its own cited evidence: the quotation expressly states that holders are solely responsible for determining and satisfying tax obligations and that Hastra provides no tax advice. The incumbent’s excerpt mentions only possible tax consequences and does not support those additional assertions.
Bankruptcy remotefalseUnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗“This structure is designed to isolate the loan assets from the credit risk of any single party, including Figure.”
sec.gov ↗“The Certificates are unsecured and backed solely by the assets of FCC.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra AUTO source expressly states that the auto loans sit in a “bankruptcy remote-trust” and labels this protection “Bankruptcy remoteness.” It further says the structure is designed to isolate | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The Hastra source explicitly and repeatedly states that the auto loan structure IS bankruptcy remote: it describes 'Bankruptcy remoteness' as one of the named structural protections, states the loans
RegimeAUTO/wYLDS protocol layer is unregistered, BVI-governed (Signum Ltd.), restricted to non-U.S. persons; underlying YLDS is an SEC-registered face-amount certificate (Figure Certificate Company) under the Investment Company Act of 1940.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
sec.gov ↗“face-amount certificate company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') under the Investment Company Act of 1940”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:38:32.844Z from rejected status | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — The sources confirm that Signum Ltd. is BVI-organized, the Hastra Protocol excludes U.S. residents, citizens, and persons located in the United States or its territories, and Figure Certificate Compan | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit is satisfied (this describes the offering/regulatory regime, which is what the slot asks). However, precision fails on two elements. The quoted phrases themselves match the sources: the S-1/A
Source documentsHastra Terms of Use, governing the AUTO/wYLDS protocol operated by Signum Ltd.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“The Terms of Use for Hastra's DeFi application are governed by Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ('Hastra')...”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:35:57.986Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source confirms that this is Hastra’s Terms of Use, last updated August 3, 2026, at https://hastra.io/terms, and that it governs a DeFi protocol provided by Signum Ltd. that includes wYL | anthropic: unsupported — The document type (Terms of Use) and the source URL (https://hastra.io/terms) are confirmed, and the source does identify Signum Ltd. (a BVI company d/b/a 'Hastra') as the provider and confirms the AU | kimi: confirmed — The archived https://hastra.io/terms page is explicitly titled 'Terms of Use' (type: terms), states 'Last updated: August 3, 2026', and states the Terms govern the DeFi application and Protocol provid
RegulatoryThe Hastra/AUTO/wYLDS wrapper is not SEC-registered and restricts access to non-US persons in non-sanctioned jurisdictions; only the upstream YLDS asset is SEC-registered. Regulatory action against Figure, FCC, or BVI operator Signum Ltd.UnverifiedMore
could disrupt AUTO's operation, transferability, or redemption rights.
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗“You must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”
sec.gov ↗“face-amount certificate company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') under the Investment Company Act of 1940”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:36:55.084Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — The sources support the investor exclusions, identify Signum Ltd. as the BVI operator, describe YLDS as issued by Figure and SEC-registered, and warn that regulatory changes may restrict operations, f | anthropic: confirmed — Every material claim is supported by the union of the two sources. The Hastra terms confirm Signum Ltd. is the BVI-organized operator ('a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support the stated eligibility restrictions, identify Signum Ltd. as the BVI operator, and warn that regulatory action could restrict operations or impair AUTO/wYLDS liquidity, a
Exit pathswYLDS-to-USDC redemption is a two-step, operator-mediated process across Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake programs, not instant.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗“Returning to USDC is a multi-step process across both programs.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The source confirms that conversion of wYLDS to USDC is operator-mediated and follows a two-call `request_redeem` / `complete_redeem` flow, with batching minimums and possible banking-hours delays. Ho | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The source confirms that converting wYLDS to USDC (Phase 2) is indeed a two-step, operator/admin-mediated process (request_redeem/complete_redeem) and not instant — this matches the claim's core asser
AuditsInformal Systems conducted a security audit of Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs between September and November 2025, ahead of the wYLDS/PRIME launch.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit of the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs.”
Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The report directly supports that Figure engaged Informal Systems for a security audit of Hastra’s vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, conducted in two phases from September 24 to November 18, | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The cited PDF explicitly states that Figure engaged Informal Systems in September 2025 to conduct a comprehensive security audit of the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, and details t
Source documentsHastra Pulse proof-of-reserves live API endpoint.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited URL is a live JSON API endpoint and its path ends in `/por`, but the fetched content never expands “por” as “proof-of-reserves” or explicitly identifies the endpoint as a Hastra Pulse proof- | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The document asserts this URL is the 'Hastra Pulse proof-of-reserves live API endpoint' and cites the quote 'por.' However, the live JSON returned by the endpoint never contains the literal string 'po | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The live API endpoint at https://hastra.io/hastra-pulse/public/api/v1/por returns JSON data detailing supply, vault balances, reserve ratios, and holder stats across various cards/tokens, confirming i
Source documentsFigure Certificate Co Form S-1/A registration statement amendment for FY2025.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“Figure Certificate Co - Form S-1/A - FY2025”
Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited SEC filing confirms that it is Figure Certificate Company’s Form S-1 registration statement, Amendment No. 6 (i.e., an S-1/A), filed February 18, 2025. However, the fetched content does not | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The fetched document is an SEC Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 6) filed by Figure Certificate Company on February 18, 2025, matching the claimed document type, issuer, and FY2025 filing date. The registrant | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited text does not contain the quoted string 'Figure Certificate Co - Form S-1/A - FY2025'. The registrant is listed as 'FIGURE CERTIFICATE COMPANY', the document is Amendment No. 6 to Form S-1 f
Source documentsFigure Certificate Co Form S-1 registration statement (YLDS), file 333-275154, initial filing 2023-10-24, amendment no. 6 on 2025-02-18, via SEC EDGAR CIK 1974395.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The fetched SEC EDGAR page does not identify CIK 0001974395 as “Figure Certificate Co” and states “There is no filings data for this organization” and “Please use the Company or Person Lookup to find | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The claim asserts that CIK 1974395 corresponds to 'Figure Certificate Co' and that this entity has an S-1 filing (333-275154) with an amendment no. 6 dated 2025-02-18. The cited quote 'Figure Certific | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched EDGAR page for CIK 0001974395 returned an empty company landing page without entity details and does not contain the quoted text 'Figure Certificate Co'.
Source documentsFigure Technology Solutions SEC filing dated 2026-04-24, disclosing the Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra) software license agreement.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“Disclosures regarding a Software License Agreement entered into with Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra), granting Hastra a license to use proprietary software to support their protocol.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited SEC document is a Figure Technology Solutions, Inc. definitive proxy statement (Schedule 14A) dated April 24, 2026. However, the fetched content contains no disclosure of a Software License | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The cited SEC filing at that URL/accession number is a DEF 14A (Definitive Proxy Statement) for Figure Technology Solutions' 2026 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, dated April 24, 2026. It covers direct | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided SEC filing text (DEF 14A Proxy Statement dated April 24, 2026) does not contain the quoted statement nor any references to Signum Ltd., Hastra, or a Software License Agreement.
Source documentsFigure Technology Solutions SEC Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 2025-12-31; relevant to Figure counterparty diligence.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched SEC content supports that the filing is tagged for FY 2025 and contains a 2025-12-31 reporting period, but the excerpt does not state “ANNUAL REPORT,” identify the issuer by its full legal | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC.gov URL consists entirely of XBRL/inline-XBRL data tags, entity identifiers, and context references (e.g., dei:DocumentFiscalYearFocus, us-gaap:CommonClassAMe | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited source text provided in the prompt does not contain the quoted phrase 'ANNUAL REPORT'.
Source documentsHastra Terms of Use (Signum Ltd., BVI), governing the DeFi application; current as of 2026-07-30.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“These Terms of Use govern access to and use of the decentralized finance (DeFi) application and related services provided by Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ('Hastra').”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:32:36.204Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The source confirms that this is Hastra’s Terms of Use for the DeFi application, provided by Signum Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company, at https://hastra.io/terms. However, it states “Last updated | anthropic: contradicted — The slot question asks for document type, date, and source URL. Type (Terms of Use) and issuer (Signum Ltd., BVI) match, and the URL https://hastra.io/terms is correct. However, the date is wrong: the | kimi: contradicted — The document type (Terms of Use), governing entity (Signum Ltd., BVI), scope (DeFi application), and URL are all supported by the archived page, and the quoted sentence matches the source text. Howeve
Fee schedule0UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:38:13.681Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources do not state that the mint/redeem fee rate is 0 or identify who charges such a fee. A 1:1 USDC-to-wYLDS conversion ratio does not prove zero fees, and the buying guide explicitly | anthropic: unsupported — The value asserts fee_mint_redeem = 0, but neither source states that mint/redeem fees are zero. The buying-wYLDS page says USDC and wYLDS convert at a 1:1 ratio, which describes the exchange rate, no | kimi: unsupported — The sources never state that mint or redeem fees are zero. The '1:1 ratio' describes the USDC↔wYLDS conversion rate, not an explicit zero-fee policy, and the panel's second quote concedes 'No fees or
AuditsFigure performs AI-enabled quality-control review of Agora's auto loans for underwriting-guideline compliance; this is a loan-level QC process, not a financial-statement audit.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗“Loans tokenized on Figure Connect using DART registry; Figure Forge smart contract creates standardized fungible participation tokens”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The fetched page attributes AI-powered underwriting to Agora Data and states that “Agora handles origination, underwriting, and servicing.” It describes Figure’s role as sourcing and diligencing the t | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched page describes Agora as the originator using its own 'AI-powered underwriting framework,' and states Figure's role is limited to structuring, credit enhancement, and capital markets infras | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided text mentions that Agora originates auto loans through an AI-powered underwriting framework and that Figure sources and diligences the originator. However, it does not state that Figure p
AuditsFigure Technology Solutions' consolidated 2025 financial statements were independently audited; this is a corporate audit and not an audit of AUTO, its trust, collateral, or contracts.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
sec.gov ↗“We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched SEC content is an XBRL/metadata extract showing a FY 2025 filing, but it does not include the quoted auditor-report language or otherwise identify an independent auditor, the audited co | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC filing URL consists entirely of raw XBRL context/tag metadata (entity identifiers, date contexts, unit definitions, etc.) and does not contain the claimed quo | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source snippet consists of XBRL data tags and financial line-item identifiers from Figure Technology Solutions' Form 10-K filing. It does not contain the auditor's report text, the quote
AuditsSherlock conducted a collaborative audit of Hastra's Ethereum contracts (YieldVault.sol, StakingVault.sol, Chainlink FeedVerifier.sol, HastraNavEngine.sol) from 2026-04-09 to 2026-04-12: 0 Critical, 0 High, 4 Medium findings (2 resolved, 2 acknowledged), 11 Low/Info resolved.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗“Overall outcome: No Critical or High-severity findings were identified across either engagement. All Medium-severity findings were either resolved by the team or formally accepted.”
Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The PDF supports that Sherlock performed a collaborative engagement dated April 9–12, 2026 and lists the four named Ethereum files in its stated scope. However, the claimed finding totals improperly a | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The claim asserts that the April 9–12, 2026 engagement alone (covering only the four named Ethereum contracts) produced 4 Medium findings (2 resolved, 2 acknowledged) and 11 Low/Info resolved. The sou | google/gemini-3.6-flash: contradicted — The claim misattributes the combined findings of two separate engagements across two blockchains to a single audit timeframe and scope. The 4 Medium (2 resolved, 2 acknowledged) and 11 Low/Info findin
HoldingsThe wYLDS staked to mint AUTO is backed 1:1 by YLDS, Figure Certificate Company's SEC-registered face-amount certificate, whose reserves are short-duration U.S. Treasuries and Treasury repos comparable to prime money-market fund holdings.UnverifiedMore
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗“Each wYLDS maintains a '1:1' backing with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve”
ylds.com ↗“Reserve composition available on demand.”
Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra page supports that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS in Hastra’s reserve. However, it identifies YLDS as an SEC-registered yield-bearing stablecoin “minted by Figure Loans, LLC,” not as a face-am | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The Hastra help-page does confirm the core 1:1 backing claim verbatim ('Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve'), but the rest of the atomic claim is not substantiated by the fetc
Run operations
Issuer entity 6a26afc5-a511-480c-ac79-011328bae75f · last updated 2026-08-05T12:34:45.694Z
0 source channels auto-trusted this run (revocable in Autoresearch)
research · claude · ok · 686s · 92 links
research · codex · ok · 207s · 75 links
research · opencode · ok · 1070s · 68 links
research · openrouter:anthropic/claude-sonnet-5 · ok · 725s · 53 links
research · openrouter:google/gemini-3.6-flash · ok · 208s · 50 links
research · claude · ok · 487s · 27 links
research · claude · ok · 439s · 24 links
research · claude · ok · 345s · 37 links
Coverage
34 of 43 fields verified · 0 unverified · 9 not found
Run 2026-08-02T15:21:49.906Z · done · cost $5.23
Automated research, human-reviewed. Verify against source documents before credit decisions.
