Kamino Due Diligence Platform

Overview

Underlying

Auto loans

APY

+7.96%

30d annualized

Collateralization ratio

240%

Sources · 2

breadth-claude/breadth-opencode: ~240% — roughly 2.4x cash-flow overcollateralization (≈20% net loan coupon backing a ≈9% target holder payout).

breadth-codex: 114.94% — derived from the 87-cent loan advance rate (1/0.87).

breadth-api-2: 100% — cited to DefiLlama's RWA asset page without loan-level derivation.

depth-structure-flows: no single ratio — describes a structural cushion composed of the 20%-vs-9% coupon spread, 2.5% reserve account, $25M Figure first-loss commitment, and 87% advance rate (~13% loan-level overcollateralization).

cointelegraph.com ↗

“The auto structuring includes ~2.4x cashflow over-collateralization, with an expected starting interest rate of ~8.6%.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“That is roughly 2.4 times as much cash flow as needed to pay the yield.”

Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=2, disputed) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched Hastra page states only that underlying loans generate cash flow “roughly 2.4 times” that needed to pay AUTO’s approximately 9% target yield, and later calls this “approximately 2.4 times | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — Both cited sources explicitly state the auto loan structuring involves ~2.4x cashflow over-collateralization (Cointelegraph: '~2.4x cashflow over-collateralization'; Hastra help doc: 'roughly 2.4 time | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The retrieved documentation explicitly confirms ~2.4x cash flow over-collateralization ('roughly 2.4 times as much cash flow as needed to pay the yield' / '2.4 times cashflow overcollateralization'),

Proof of reserves

Proof-of-Reserves JSON feed (hastra.io/hastra-pulse/public/API/v1/por) shows vault/supply balances, but has no attestor, auditor, or signature field

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“"auto_card":{..."supply":"4989320.12711"..."vaulted_wylds":"5030500.711475"}”

Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over 5c154c34-2836-44cd-b20c-e335ae692c99: The new claim is more specific and directly addresses both parts of the slot: it identifies the exact publication location and states that the feed identifies no attestor or auditor. Its cited JSON evidence supports the described reserve balances, while the incumbent cites only generic website links and does not identify the publication endpoint.

AUTO price

$1.0094

The underlying

Portfolio overview

Pool-wide metrics

Yield source

Borrower car payments fund AUTO yield. Pool utilization sets the Democratized Prime lending rate.

Unutilized liquidity continues earning wYLDS interest. Hastra retains 50 basis points from distributed yield.

Sources · 4

help.hastra.io ↗

“This is real yield from real borrowers making real car payments, not token emissions or liquidity mining rewards.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The rate is set by the same continuous utilization function that powers PRIME, based on how much of the pool is being borrowed; no one at Figure or Hastra sets it manually .”

hastra.io ↗

“including both the Democratized Prime pool rate (a market rate based on supply and demand within the protocol) and wYLDS interest on unutilized pool liquidity”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Yield from Democratized Prime flows through to Hastra and is distributed to AUTO token holders (minus the applicable Hastra Platform fee of 50bps) on Solana, with Ethereum mainnet and additional chains to follow.”

Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The assigned issuer documentation supports every material element: AUTO yield is derived from interest paid by borrowers on structured consumer auto loans; the Democratized Prime rate is determined co | anthropic-family: confirmed — All four material claims are supported by the fetched issuer-docs sources (a required evidence class). (1) Car payments funding AUTO yield: help.hastra.io states 'This is real yield from real borrower | kimi-family: confirmed — All four material claims are supported by the assigned issuer-docs evidence. (1) 'Borrower car payments fund AUTO yield' matches 'This is real yield from real borrowers making real car payments.' (2)

Structure & quality

Agora Data originates or acquires near-prime consumer auto loans for the pool. Hastra discloses no maturities, credit ratings, or concentration limits.

Sources · 1

help.hastra.io ↗

“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”

Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The cited Hastra page states that Agora Data originates the pool’s consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment and describes Agora as both acquiring and originating such loans. The archived content | anthropic-family: confirmed — The claimed quote appears verbatim in the source: 'The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data, an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the | kimi-family: confirmed — The source directly states 'The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data, an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment,' su

Collateralization

240%Disputed

Sources · 2

breadth-claude/breadth-opencode: ~240% — roughly 2.4x cash-flow overcollateralization (≈20% net loan coupon backing a ≈9% target holder payout).

breadth-codex: 114.94% — derived from the 87-cent loan advance rate (1/0.87).

breadth-api-2: 100% — cited to DefiLlama's RWA asset page without loan-level derivation.

cointelegraph.com ↗

“The auto structuring includes ~2.4x cashflow over-collateralization, with an expected starting interest rate of ~8.6%.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“That is roughly 2.4 times as much cash flow as needed to pay the yield.”

Portfolio composition

3 holdings · sorted by weight

Auto loan participations: The pool holds fungible participation interests representing pro rata cash-flow claims on pooled Agora-originated near-prime auto loans; weights are undisclosed
More
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗
“the Figure Forge smart contract is used to transform these loans into standardized loan participation tokens. Auto loans vary widely in borrower credit, loan size, and terms - Forge pools similar loans together and issues fungible tokens that represent pro rata claims on the underlying cash flows.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The participation tokens enter Figure's Democratized Prime marketplace on Provenance, where lenders (AUTO holders) provide warehouse funding.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The issuer documentation states that Agora-originated near-prime auto loans are pooled into fungible participation tokens representing pro rata cash-flow claims and that those tokens enter the Democra | anthropic-family: confirmed — The cited issuer-docs source (help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto) directly supports each element of the claim. It states Figure Forge 'issues fungible tokens that represent pro rata claims on the underl | kimi-family: confirmed — The archived issuer doc states Forge pools Agora-originated near-prime auto loans and issues fungible participation tokens representing pro rata claims on the underlying cash flows; 'weights are undis

Legal & regulatory structure

Independent layers of protection — the legal wrapper, the asset custodian, and third-party validators.

✓

Legal wrapper

Protects holders if the issuer fails.

Transfer restrictions: Hastra excludes sanctioned jurisdictions and listed persons. Administrators can freeze accounts, and withdrawals require whitelisting.Disputed
More
Sources · 3
Understates restrictions. Omits e3feadd0 (assets recoverable/seizable via smart contract), 4f778751 (transfer agent can reverse unauthorized transfers via permissioned system), and 8f60f3f4 (Figure Transferable Certificates trade only on a registered ATS or peer-to-peer on approved blockchains; no public market).
hastra.io ↗
“Located in, incorporated or otherwise established in, or resident of, any country or territory that is the subject of sanctions or embargoes imposed by the office of Foreign Assets Control ("OFAC") of the U.S. Treasury Department or the Office of Financial Sanctions ("OFSI") of HM Treasury of the United Kingdom”
hastra.io ↗
“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”
hastra.io ↗
“The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: confirmed — The legal terms prohibit users in OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned jurisdictions and persons on applicable sanctions lists. The audits expressly document token-account freeze/thaw functionality and whitelisted wi | anthropic: confirmed — All three claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources and each component of the claim answers the slot question (restricted jurisdictions, freezable, whitelisting). Terms §6.2 states users
Regime: YLDS is described as an SEC-registered, yield-bearing stablecoin. Figure Certificate Company is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940.
More
Sources · 3
hastra.io ↗
“wYLDS token is backed by reserves of YLDS - the first SEC-registered, yield-bearing stablecoin backed by real world assets.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“wYLDS is the base-layer wrapped token on Solana, acting as a custodial wrapper for YLDS, the underlying SEC-registered stablecoin.”
sec.gov ↗
“is a face-amount certificate company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt-family: confirmed — The cited Hastra sources explicitly describe YLDS as the first SEC-registered, yield-bearing stablecoin and as the underlying SEC-registered stablecoin for wYLDS. The SEC filing explicitly states that | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both atomic components are directly supported by the cited sources. hastra.io/auto describes YLDS as 'the first SEC-registered, yield-bearing stablecoin backed by real world assets,' and the integrati
Bankruptcy remote: ✓
Yes
More
Sources · 1
help.hastra.io ↗
“AUTO represents exposure to direct loan participation claims on cash flows from the underlying auto loan pool, structured through a bankruptcy-remote trust.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The archived source expressly states that the auto loans sit in a Delaware statutory trust described as bankruptcy-remote and that the structure is designed to isolate the loan assets from the credit | anthropic-family: confirmed — The archived source directly supports bankruptcy_remote = true. The cited quote appears verbatim in the FAQ: 'AUTO represents exposure to direct loan participation claims on cash flows from the underl
Tax treatment: No entity-level or pass-through tax structure is disclosed for AUTO/wYLDS; holders are solely responsible for determining and satisfying their own tax obligations, and Hastra provides no tax advice.
More
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗
“Acquiring, staking, earning wYLDS on, and disposing of digital assets may have tax consequences in your jurisdiction. You are solely responsible for determining and satisfying your tax obligations. We do not provide tax advice.”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over d061ca2c-b43f-4f61-9f47-a8ea0d37170f: The claims are substantively similar, but the new claim is better supported by its own cited evidence: the quotation expressly states that holders are solely responsible for determining and satisfying tax obligations and that Hastra provides no tax advice. The incumbent’s excerpt mentions only possible tax consequences and does not support those additional assertions.
Vehicle: Signum Ltd. (BVI, d/b/a Hastra), a wholly owned subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation, operates the AUTO/wYLDS protocol; the auto-loan collateral itself sits in a Delaware statutory trust pledged under a Master Repurchase Agreement between Agora Data and the trust.
More
Sources · 2
hastra.io ↗
“Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands...a wholly owned subsidiary of Provenance Cayman Foundation.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The auto loans sit in a Delaware statutory trust pledged under a Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA) between the originator and the bankruptcy remote-trust.”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:35:34.207Z from rejected status | panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The sources identify Signum Ltd. as a BVI company doing business as Hastra and wholly owned by Provenance Cayman Foundation; describe Hastra as providing the protocol, including wYLDS and AUTO; identi | anthropic: confirmed — Both components of the claim are directly supported by the archived sources. The terms page states verbatim that 'Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ("Hastra | kimi: confirmed — All atomic elements are stated in the archived sources. The Terms of Use state the Protocol is provided by 'Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ("Hastra")...
If the issuer fails: If the auto-loan originator (Agora) defaults under the Master Repurchase Agreement, the loans undergo a true sale into a Delaware statutory trust, whose independent administrator liquidates the collateral and remits proceeds to Democratized Prime lenders (the AUTO vault).
More
Sources · 4
help.hastra.io ↗
“remit the proceeds back”
hastra.io ↗
“The Site and Protocol are provided on an 'AS IS' and 'AS AVAILABLE' basis WITHOUT WARRANTIES … liability is capped at '$100.'”
ylds.com ↗
“FCC is not a bank … nor are they insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) … If there are losses on FCC's assets, FCC may not have sufficient resources to meet its obligations.”
federalregister.gov ↗
“If the Applicant were to default on any obligation under a Certificate, the Custodian would be authorized to cure such default by liquidating so much of the assets held by it as necessary to discharge Applicant's obligations.”
Verifier note: panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=4) | trimmed uncited claims (12) and re-confirmed | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The AUTO help page supports the core MRA/default structure: loans are pledged in a Delaware statutory trust; an originator default under the MRA results in a true sale to the trust; and an independent | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The two sources that were actually re-fetched (help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto and hastra.io/terms) substantiate the core mechanics of the AUTO vault: the Delaware statutory trust structure pledged u | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — While the fetched source 'What is AUTO?' supports the claim regarding Agora defaulting under the Master Repurchase Agreement, true sale into a Delaware statutory trust, and independent administrator l | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: confirmed — The Hastra AUTO page directly supports the material mechanism: it identifies Agora Data as the auto-loan originator; states that loans sit in a Delaware statutory trust pledged under a Master Repurcha

✓

Custodian

Holds the underlying, independent of the issuer.

Attestations: Proof-of-Reserves JSON feed (hastra.io/hastra-pulse/public/API/v1/por) shows vault/supply balances, but has no attestor, auditor, or signature field.
More
Sources · 1
hastra.io ↗
“"auto_card":{..."supply":"4989320.12711"..."vaulted_wylds":"5030500.711475"}”
Verifier note: restored by head-to-head over 5c154c34-2836-44cd-b20c-e335ae692c99: The new claim is more specific and directly addresses both parts of the slot: it identifies the exact publication location and states that the feed identifies no attestor or auditor. Its cited JSON evidence supports the described reserve balances, while the incumbent cites only generic website links and does not identify the publication endpoint.

✓

Independent validators

Third-party checks on the operation.

Audits: Sherlock reviewed Ethereum and Solana vaults plus Chainlink NAV integration during March and April 2026.Disputed
More
Sources · 3
Drop e6387f5c; remove the unsupported 'March' portion of the date and confine the claim to the April 9-12, 2026 window that 114ac1c2 supports (and the Ethereum/Solana scope from c81ad757/61eef940).
hastra.io ↗
“Across two collaborative engagements in March and April 2026, Sherlock audited the Hastra protocol — Figure Technologies' institutional-grade tokenized vault system (USDC → wYLDS yield vault → PRIME staking vault) — covering both its Ethereum (Solidity) and Solana (Anchor/Rust) implementations.”
hastra.io ↗
“The Chainlink Data Streams NAV integration , including the feed verifier and NAV engine on the Ethereum side and the corresponding price-verification path on the Solana side.”
hastra.io ↗
“2 Chainlink NAV integration April 9–12, 2026”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: confirmed — The cited audit report explicitly states that Sherlock reviewed Hastra’s Ethereum and Solana vault implementations across two engagements, dated March 4–13 and April 9–12, 2026. It also states that th | anthropic: confirmed — The archived PDF directly supports every element of the claim. The executive summary states Sherlock 'audited the Hastra protocol ... covering both its Ethereum (Solidity) and Solana (Anchor/Rust) imp

Opsec

Current onchain authority configuration first, followed by documented operational controls.

Freeze authority

GWceuiUg…RLBWp8

Mint authority

F8WN35KH…jkTsrA

Token extensions

None

Sources · 1

GNE6oDS6jHrfaV3GQVVCCp37fDnT7PiPuewMKBj2bqNm

Bridge configuration

None

Sources · 3

GNE6oDS6jHrfaV3GQVVCCp37fDnT7PiPuewMKBj2bqNm

f8WN35KHUPFRRhTJgFn8PsHRJdus3RREewqcujkTsrA

GWceuiUgB8aXgFetRkUg9hpYe2aadhqUeSaXHsRLBWp8

Authority multisig

None

Sources · 3

GNE6oDS6jHrfaV3GQVVCCp37fDnT7PiPuewMKBj2bqNm

f8WN35KHUPFRRhTJgFn8PsHRJdus3RREewqcujkTsrA

GWceuiUgB8aXgFetRkUg9hpYe2aadhqUeSaXHsRLBWp8

Admin powers

Protocol operators exclusively complete wYLDS-to-USDC redemptions. Vault administrators can freeze or thaw accounts and enforce whitelisted withdrawals.

FCC can enforce underlying YLDS transfer restrictions. Disclosures do not identify signers, thresholds, or timelocks.

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“// Operator-only: transfers USDC from the redeem vault to the user's wallet.”

hastra.io ↗

“The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows.”

sec.gov ↗

“The digital asset standard used on the Provenance Blockchain enables FCC to enforce transfer restrictions in connection with the Certificates.”

Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt-family: confirmed — The issuer integration guide establishes that wYLDS-to-USDC redemption uses an operator-mediated request/complete flow and labels completeRedeem as operator-only. The Sherlock audit establishes vault | anthropic-family: confirmed — Every material claim is supported by the union of fetched sources, including sources of required evidence classes. (1) 'Protocol operators exclusively complete wYLDS-to-USDC redemptions' — the hastra.

Unilateral changes

Claim-related protocol fees are disclosed only at the time of claim.

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“We reserve the right to modify these Terms, in whole or in part, at any time and at our sole discretion … suspend or terminate your access … at any time and without notice.”

hastra.io ↗

“Any claim may be subject to fees, including network gas fees and a Protocol fee, which will be disclosed at the time of claim.”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T12:51:22.222Z from rejected status | panel 1/4 confirmed (agreement=4) | trimmed uncited claims (11) and re-confirmed | gpt-family: unsupported — The archived content confirms that claim-related network gas and Protocol fees are disclosed at the time of claim. It also gives Hastra sole discretion over user eligibility and permits blocking acces | anthropic-family: unsupported — The second quote is verbatim in Section 2A of the archived content: "Any claim may be subject to fees, including network gas fees and a Protocol fee, which will be disclosed at the time of claim." Tha | kimi-family: unsupported — The claim-fee quote ('Any claim may be subject to fees... disclosed at the time of claim') appears verbatim in Section 2A, so that portion is supported. However, the first quoted sentence ('We reserve | gpt-family: confirmed — Section 2A expressly states that any claim may incur network gas fees and a Protocol fee and that these fees "will be disclosed at the time of claim." This directly supports the atomic value. The sepa

Redemption

The settlement ladder for exiting your position.

Wylds to USDC
Users burn wYLDS…
Users burn wYLDS and create a redemption request. An operator later transfers USDC through the admin-mediated completion step.Disputed
More
Sources · 4
Core claim is supported (022875e6, d5b00b45), but cited evidenceIds 7fc95866 and 638c19b5 are ABSENT from the corpus — evidence padding.
help.hastra.io ↗
“Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“// Operator-only: transfers USDC from the redeem vault to the user's wallet.”
hastra.io ↗
“Users can redeem their wYLDS tokens back to USDC through an admin-mediated two-step process.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — Assigned issuer documentation expressly describes the wYLDS-to-USDC leg as an admin-mediated two-step request_redeem/complete_redeem flow. It states that request_redeem burns the user's wYLDS and crea | anthropic-family: confirmed — All four claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources. The integration guide states requestRedeem "Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA," and Phase 2b describes the | kimi-family: confirmed — All three claimed quotes from the issuer integration guide appear verbatim in the archived snapshot: requestRedeem 'Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA' (Phase 2a), and the o
Minimum2000
Auto to wylds
Holders burn…
Holders burn AUTO atomically for proportional wYLDS at the live Chainlink rate, without unbonding, queues, disclosed minimums, caps, or fees.
More
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗
“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source confirms single-call AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption, atomic burning and transfer, proportional calculation using the stored Chainlink-sourced price, and no unbonding period or queue. However, it | anthropic-family: confirmed — The archived AUTO integration guide directly supports every element of the AUTO→wYLDS redemption path as scoped. Phase 1 states verbatim that vault-stake-auto 'supports a single-step direct redemption | kimi-family: confirmed — The archived guide directly supports each element of the claim scoped to the AUTO→wYLDS leg: 'redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vaul
Secondary market
AUTO can also be…
AUTO can also be exited by transfer or sale on Solana secondary venues rather than through direct protocol redemption; researchers disagree on which venue is the exclusive or primary listing as of their review dates.Disputed
More
Sources · 3
claude: Hastra states 'AUTO is now live exclusively on Kamino,' making Kamino the sole listed secondary venue, subject to Kamino's US/UK/OFAC jurisdiction blocks.
opencode: On-chain data shows an AUTO/PRIME liquidity pool on Orca (live since 2026-07-01, per Dexscreener), with wYLDS separately swappable for USDC on Raydium, Uniswap, and Kamino.
codex/structure-flows: AUTO is described only as 'fully transferable' as an SPL token on Solana, without naming an exclusive venue; liquidity, caps, and market-maker obligations are undisclosed.
hastra.io ↗
“AUTO is now live exclusively on Kamino.”
api.dexscreener.com ↗
“Hastra AUTO ... pairCreatedAt: 1782946165000”
help.hastra.io ↗
“fully transferable”
Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-03T12:42:34.024Z from rejected status | panel 2/3 confirmed (agreement=4, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The archived Hastra sources support the core proposition that AUTO can be transferred or sold instead of directly unstaked: AUTO is described as a fully transferable Solana SPL token, and the product | anthropic-family: confirmed — The core value — that AUTO can be exited via transfer or sale on Solana secondary venues rather than only through direct protocol redemption — is directly supported. help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto s | kimi-family: confirmed — The core atomic value — that AUTO can be exited via secondary-market transfer or sale on Solana — is directly supported: help.hastra.io states 'AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana. Yi

Risks & protections

Underlying / economic
AUTO yield varies with lender supply and borrower demand
⌄
AUTO yield varies with lender supply and borrower demand. Near-prime and subprime auto-loan losses can impair pool yield.
More
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗
“Yield variability. The target yield of approximately ~9%* is not fixed. It is determined continuously by the utilization function and will move based on the balance of lender supply and borrower demand.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“Credit risk. The underlying loans are near-prime and subprime consumer auto credit. The structural protections described above are designed to absorb those losses, but they do not eliminate credit risk entirely.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“At approximately 2.4 times cashflow overcollateralization, the pool can absorb roughly 55 percent delinquency before your yield is impaired. Expected losses are approximately 10 percent.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — Issuer documentation supports every material claim: AUTO’s rate is continuously set by utilization and varies with lender supply and borrower demand; the underlying pool contains near-prime and subpri | anthropic-family: confirmed — All three claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived Hastra help page (help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto), which is issuer-docs — a required evidence class. The 'Yield variability' quote supports t | kimi-family: confirmed — Both material claims are supported by the archived issuer source. Yield variability: the source states the ~9% target 'is not fixed. It is determined continuously by the utilization function and will
Concentration
AUTO concentrates exposure in Agora-originated near-prime auto loans, Democratized Prime, Provenance bridging, Chainlink pricing, and Solana infrastructure
⌄
AUTO concentrates exposure in Agora-originated near-prime auto loans, Democratized Prime, Provenance bridging, Chainlink pricing, and Solana infrastructure.
More
Sources · 5
help.hastra.io ↗
“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“When you stake wYLDS into the Hastra AUTO protocol, AUTO is minted, and simultaneously a programmatic instruction allows capital to be lent to a pool of consumer auto loans through Democratized Prime.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The on-chain AUTO/wYLDS exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rewards administrators via verify_price .”
Issuer failure
FCC certificates are unsecured obligations backed solely by FCC assets
⌄
FCC certificates are unsecured obligations backed solely by FCC assets. FCC asset losses can prevent principal or interest payments.Disputed
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Sources · 1
Entire claim ('FCC certificates are unsecured obligations backed solely by FCC assets') rests on evidenceId 73c4923e, which is ABSENT from the corpus. No provided evidence supports 'unsecured' or 'backed solely by FCC assets.' Unsupported scope.
sec.gov ↗
“The Certificates are unsecured and backed solely by the assets of FCC.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: confirmed — The assigned issuer document expressly states that the Certificates are unsecured and backed solely by FCC’s assets. Its Risk Factors section further states that losses on FCC’s assets, including capi | anthropic-family: confirmed — The cited SEC S-1/A prospectus (FCC's own issuer document, a required evidence class) contains a Risk Factors heading 'Certificates Are Unsecured and Backed Only By FCC Assets' with the exact text: 'T | kimi-family: confirmed — The SEC S-1A filing (an assigned evidence source qualifying as both regulator and issuer-docs class) directly supports every material element. The Risk Factors section states verbatim: 'The Certificat
Regulatory
Vault administrators can freeze accounts and restrict withdrawals; regulatory enforcement could therefore block transfers or exits
⌄
Vault administrators can freeze accounts and restrict withdrawals; regulatory enforcement could therefore block transfers or exits.Disputed
More
Sources · 1
Partial reading. The slot explicitly asks for registration status, yet the value omits that wYLDS is backed by YLDS, the 'first SEC-registered yield-bearing stablecoin' (f1324ae6, 46efa6c3), and omits Provenance's enforced transfer restrictions (f097c8a1). asOfDate is 2026-04-12 (audit) while stronger 2026-06-02 regulatory-relevant evidence exists.
hastra.io ↗
“The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source confirms that the vaults have account freeze/thaw controls and whitelisted withdrawals, supporting administrator control over account access and some withdrawal restrictions. However, it do | anthropic-family: confirmed — The claimed quote is reproduced verbatim in the source: 'The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step | kimi-family: confirmed — The cited audit states vaults include 'account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows,' designed 'with regulatory compliance in mind.' This directly supports the
Credit / counterparty
AUTO concentrates origination and recourse exposure in Agora, whose repurchase and servicing obligations may fail during financial distress
⌄
AUTO concentrates origination and recourse exposure in Agora, whose repurchase and servicing obligations may fail during financial distress.
More
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗
“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“Originator buyback. Agora must repurchase any loan that breaches its representations or eligibility criteria, at full principal plus accrued interest.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“Full recourse and guarantee. The pool retains full recourse to Agora, and Agora’s parent company provides a limited guarantee covering bad acts, servicing, and purchase obligations.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The source directly identifies Agora as the pool’s third-party originator and servicer and states that Agora bears loan-repurchase and full-recourse obligations. It also describes only a limited paren | anthropic: confirmed — The claim identifies Agora as the concentrated counterparty whose failure would hit holders — directly answering the slot question about credit/counterparty exposure inside the backing. Every material
Custodian
WYLDS depends on program-controlled USDC custody and off-chain Provenance yield bridging, creating operational and bridge-provider exposure
⌄
WYLDS depends on program-controlled USDC custody and off-chain Provenance yield bridging, creating operational and bridge-provider exposure.
More
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗
“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“Yield is generated off-chain on the Provenance side and bridged back to Solana as YLDS/wYLDS.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”
Verifier note: panel 3/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The cited guide supports every material element: USDC is deposited into a PDA-owned, program-controlled vault and wYLDS is minted as a receipt; yield is generated off-chain on Provenance and bridged b | anthropic-family: confirmed — All three claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived source. The source confirms USDC is held in a program-controlled (PDA-owned) vault token account, that yield is generated off-chain on Provenan | kimi-family: confirmed — The source directly supports the program-controlled USDC custody claim ('Deposit moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS') and the off-chain P
Hack / smart contract
Sherlock found no Critical or High issues, but Figure accepted residual reward-distribution risks affecting allocations among stakers
⌄
Sherlock found no Critical or High issues, but Figure accepted residual reward-distribution risks affecting allocations among stakers.
More
Sources · 3
hastra.io ↗
“No Critical or High-severity findings were identified across either engagement. All Medium-severity findings were either resolved by the team or formally acknowledged with a documented rationale for accepting the residual risk. All Low/Informational findings were resolved.”
hastra.io ↗
“Both findings were formally acknowledged by Figure as accepted residual risk under the current operational model.”
hastra.io ↗
“The accepted vectors are economic rather than safety-critical: they affect the distribution of rewards among stakers under specific conditions, but do not threaten user principal or protocol solvency.”
Verifier note: panel 2/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: confirmed — The audit directly supports every material element: Sherlock identified no Critical or High-severity findings, while Figure formally accepted two residual risks arising from staking-vault reward distr | anthropic: confirmed — The audit PDF directly supports every material claim: 'No Critical or High-severity findings were identified across either engagement'; the two accepted Mediums concern the staking vault's reward dist
Depeg / liquidity
Stale Chainlink pricing can halt direct redemption, while decentralized-exchange liquidity can separate AUTO's market price from redeemable NAV
⌄
Stale Chainlink pricing can halt direct redemption, while decentralized-exchange liquidity can separate AUTO's market price from redeemable NAV.
More
Sources · 2
help.hastra.io ↗
“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”
hastra.io ↗
“Trade AUTO on DEXs or use in leverage strategies. No lock-up periods, full flexibility.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: confirmed — The integration guide explicitly states that direct AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption fails when the stored Chainlink price is stale or uninitialized, and it defines redemption value using the Chainlink-source | anthropic-family: confirmed — Both claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived sources. The integration guide confirms that direct redemption (redeem) uses the live Chainlink price and that 'the call will fail if the stored Cha | kimi-family: unsupported — The first clause is directly supported: the integration guide states the redeem call 'will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness) or uninitialised,' confirming stale Ch
Exit risk
AUTO exits lack queues, but USDC settlement requires operator completion and Circle CCTP liquidity after holders burn wYLDS
⌄
AUTO exits lack queues, but USDC settlement requires operator completion and Circle CCTP liquidity after holders burn wYLDS.
More
Sources · 3
help.hastra.io ↗
“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“To convert wYLDS back to USDC, the vault-mint program uses an admin-mediated two-step request_redeem / complete_redeem flow.”
help.hastra.io ↗
“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”
Verifier note: panel 2/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The source confirms that AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption is atomic and has no queue or unbonding period. It also confirms that wYLDS is burned when a user creates a redemption request and that an operator la | anthropic-family: confirmed — All three claimed quotes appear verbatim in the archived source. The narrative's characterization matches: Phase 1 redeem is atomic with 'no unbonding period or queuing' (AUTO exits lack queues); Phas | kimi-family: confirmed — All material claims are supported by the archived source. (1) 'AUTO exits lack queues' matches the source's statement that vault-stake-auto redemption has 'no unbonding period or queuing' and atomical

Research appendix

Plan fulfillment

SlotStatusClasses covered

CompositionFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, aggregator, legal-terms

Structure & qualityFilled-verifiedLegal-terms

Credit / counterpartyFilled-verifiedRegulator, issuer-docs

Caps / gatesFilled-verifiedLegal-terms, regulator

Exit riskFilled-verifiedLegal-terms, issuer-docs

NetworksFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs, audit

Canonical deploymentRejected-retryAggregator

Bridge providerRejected-retryIssuer-docs

Bridge custodyFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs

Oracle dependenciesRejected-retryIssuer-docs, audit

Supply and mint authorityFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs

Key managementRejected-retryIssuer-docs, audit

Incident responseEmptyAudit, onchain

Monitoring and attestationRejected-retryAudit, attestation, issuer-docs

Bridge & oracleEmptyIssuer-docs, audit

What it isFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs

How it worksFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs

CategoryFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs

Holder's claimFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, legal-terms

Underlying issuerEmptyAggregator, issuer-docs, legal-terms

Yield sourceFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs, legal-terms

Yield mechanicsFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, aggregator, onchain, audit, legal-terms

Legal entityFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs

What the issuer doesFilled-verifiedAudit, issuer-docs

LaunchedEmptyAggregator

Operating historyFilled-verifiedAudit, issuer-docs

Service providersFilled-verifiedAudit, onchain

RegimeFilled-verifiedRegulator, legal-terms

VehicleFilled-verifiedAggregator, issuer-docs, audit

Bankruptcy remoteFilled-verifiedAggregator

If the issuer failsFilled-verifiedLegal-terms

Transfer restrictionsFilled-verifiedLegal-terms, audit, onchain

CustodiansRejected-retryLegal-terms

AttestationsFilled-verifiedAttestation, issuer-docs

Attestation frequencyEmptyNone

AuditsFilled-verifiedAudit

Admin powersFilled-verifiedAudit, onchain, issuer-docs

UpgradeabilityRejected-retryNone

Mint authorityFilled-verifiedNone

Freeze authorityFilled-verifiedNone

Fee scheduleFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, legal-terms, regulator

Exit pathsFilled-verifiedLegal-terms, audit, issuer-docs, onchain, regulator

Underlying / economicFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, regulator

Issuer failureFilled-verifiedRegulator, issuer-docs

CustodianFilled-verifiedIssuer-docs, regulator

Hack / smart contractFilled-verifiedAudit

RegulatoryFilled-verifiedRegulator, issuer-docs

Who can hold/mintFilled-verifiedAggregator, regulator

Source documentsFilled-verifiedAttestation, issuer-docs, legal-terms, audit

Evidence gaps

Underlying issuer — searched, not found: Evidence names Agora Data as loan originator but does not establish its legal entity name.

Attestation frequency — searched, not found: No attestation evidence establishes an independent reserve-attestation cadence or latest attestation date.

Upgradeability — searched, not found: No anchored evidence states contract immutability, upgrade authority, or upgrade delay.

Rejected facts

Yield source

AUTO earns borrower interest from near-prime consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data through Figure’s Democratized Prime marketplace. Hastra retains 50 basis points from distributed yield.Disputed

Unutilized pool liquidity also earns wYLDS interest.

Sources · 8

Current Hastra materials describe consumer auto-loan interest as AUTO’s yield source.

The AUTO product page separately describes Demo Prime auto lending as real-estate-backed lending exposure.

The auto-loan origination claim is genuinely supported by ev:81e34b54 and ev:ae295cb6; only the citation list is defective.

'near-prime' is not stated anywhere in the evidence. All sources say only 'consumer auto loans' (ev:81e34b54, ev:92eb94a8). Unsupported qualifier.

'Agora Data' adds a surname/entity form not in the evidence; the corpus says only 'Agora' (ev:81e34b54, ev:ae295cb6). Unsupported scope on the entity name.

'Democratized Prime marketplace' conflates two distinct evidenced items: the 'Democratized Prime pool rate' (ev:20a27502, ev:8b981449) and 'Figure's marketplace' (ev:81e34b54). No source calls it a 'Democratized Prime marketplace'; this is a synthesized construct.

The disputed real-estate-backed position (ev:73d6c7ba) is correctly surfaced, but it is a direct internal contradiction with the auto-loan framing that materially undermines confidence 0.93; treating it as a mere 'position' while asserting high confidence understates the conflict.

help.hastra.io ↗

“You earn exposure to the yield from the interest those borrowers pay on their loans in the form of rewards.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“This is real yield from real borrowers making real car payments, not token emissions or liquidity mining rewards.”

help.hastra.io ↗

Service providers

Agora Data — consumer auto-loan originator; Figure Technologies — marketplace and capital-markets infrastructure; Chainlink — AUTO/wYLDS exchange-rate data; Sherlock — security auditor; Circle — CCTP bridging.Unverified

Sources · 5

hastra.io ↗

“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora. Diversified, real-world backed, built for DeFi.”

hastra.io ↗

“The first third-party originated asset on Hastra. Auto loans flow through Figure's capital markets infrastructure and into Hastra's DeFi credit layer, expanding yield sources beyond home equity.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The on-chain AUTO/wYLDS exchange rate is maintained by Chainlink Data Streams and updated periodically by rewards administrators via verify_price .”

hastra.io ↗

“Sherlock performed independent security reviews of the Hastra protocol on behalf of Figure Technologies across two engagements in March and April 2026.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”

Verifier note: WARNING: evidence class mismatch; substance and goal-fit review required | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources substantiate the described operational roles, but the slot asks specifically for custodians, administrators, auditors, or banks. Sherlock fits as the named independent security a | anthropic: unsupported — Four of the five provider/role pairs are directly supported by the cited sources: Figure Technologies as marketplace/capital-markets infrastructure (hastra.io: "Auto loans flow through Figure's capita

How it works

Holders deposit Solana USDC to mint wYLDS one-for-one, then stake wYLDS for AUTO shares. Yield increases AUTO’s Chainlink-sourced redemption value without manual claims.Unverified

Holders can redeem AUTO for wYLDS without queuing. Converting wYLDS to USDC requires an operator-mediated redemption process.

Sources · 5

help.hastra.io ↗

“accepts USDC and issues wYLDS at a 1:1 ratio. Shared across all Hastra Solana pools.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“accepts wYLDS and issues AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Unlike the ETH flow, on Solana yield does not require a manual claim — it accrues through an appreciating Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“To convert wYLDS back to USDC, the vault-mint program uses an admin-mediated two-step request_redeem / complete_redeem flow.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 513de3f7-67ae-4c6c-8059-227549c9ee5b: Both claims directly and specifically describe acquisition, automatic value accrual, and redemption. The incumbent is better supported and more complete because its own evidence additionally substantiates a DEX-sale exit route, while retaining the evidenced no-unbonding AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption and operator-completed wYLDS-to-USDC conversion. Any minor wording advantage in the new claim does not outweigh this broader supported lifecycle coverage.

Source documents

WYLDS buying guide, updated June 2, 2026: https://help.hastra.io/wylds/buying-wylds.Unverified

Sources · 1

help.hastra.io ↗

“This guide was last updated for the Hastra Protocol interface as of 6/2/2026.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited issuer guide and archived content support the title, URL, and the stated June 2, 2026 interface-update date, but the claim does not classify the document as one of the slot’s permi | anthropic: confirmed — The archived page at https://help.hastra.io/wylds/buying-wylds is titled 'Buying wYLDS' and contains the verbatim line 'This guide was last updated for the Hastra Protocol interface as of 6/2/2026.',

Source documents

Redacted Sherlock audit covering March and April 2026 engagements: https://hastra.io/sherlock-hastra-audit.pdf.Unverified

Sources · 3

hastra.io ↗

“## Appendix A — Engagement 1: Core Vault Implementation (March 4–13, 2026)”

hastra.io ↗

“## Appendix B — Engagement 2: Chainlink NAV Integration (April 9–12, 2026)”

hastra.io ↗

“This document is a redacted version of the full technical reports prepared for Figure Technologies.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent c3e509d5-80ce-4f55-bf8b-23b959977564: Both identify the same redacted audit and original-source URL, but the incumbent more directly supplies the document date as a precise engagement range (2026-03-04 through 2026-04-12), fully supported by its cited appendix dates. The new claim gives only March and April 2026 in its claim text, so it is less specific.

Onboarding

Users must accept Hastra's terms and hold a compatible Solana wallet, USDC, and SOL for transaction fees.Unverified

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“Agree on the Terms and Conditions and then select the wallet you want to use.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“A Solana wallet (such as Phantom, Solflare, or Backpack) Sufficient USDC on the Solana network to cover your purchase A small amount of SOL for transaction fees”

help.hastra.io ↗

“This guide was last updated for the Hastra Protocol interface as of 6/2/2026.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited buying guide supports accepting Hastra’s terms and having a Solana wallet, Solana-network USDC, and SOL for fees when purchasing wYLDS, but it does not answer the slot question. It | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The claim (accept terms, hold a compatible Solana wallet, USDC, and SOL for fees) is well-supported by the buying-wylds page, which lists exactly these prerequisites and the terms-acceptance

Who can hold/mint

AUTO is reported available to United States and global retail investors; direct eligibility restrictions and excluded jurisdictions remain undisclosed.Unverified

Sources · 1

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“U.S. and Global Retail”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The aggregator labels AUTO’s primary-market eligible investors as “U.S. and Global Retail,” but no qualifying legal terms, regulator source, or issuer documentation establishes direct mint/r | anthropic: confirmed — The archived RWA.xyz page for AUTO shows 'Eligible Investors: U.S. and Global Retail' in both the asset header and the Primary Market section, directly supporting the quoted value. The claim also asse

Concentration

AUTO concentrates underlying exposure in Agora-originated near-prime consumer auto loans and depends on Democratized Prime infrastructure.Unverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“The auto loans in the pool are originated by Agora Data , an established auto finance company that acquires and originates consumer auto loans in the near-prime segment.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Platform and smart contract risk. AUTO uses the same Democratized Prime platform and smart contract infrastructure as PRIME, which has been in production since November 2025. Both AUTO and PRIME have been audited.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 40fce2c5-b363-42b9-8c23-0158def35ea0: The incumbent directly addresses concentration and dependencies, names more specific dependencies—Agora Data, Democratized Prime, Provenance, Chainlink Data Streams, and Solana—and supports each with its own cited evidence.

Depeg / liquidity

AUTO can trade below NAV when secondary liquidity disappears, redemption stalls, or Chainlink pricing becomes stale or unavailable.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME or AUTO. You may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME or AUTO at your desired price or at all. Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME or AUTO may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support the proposed mechanisms: AUTO may deviate from NAV; secondary liquidity may disappear; USDC redemption is operator-mediated and may be delayed; and AUTO redemption fails | anthropic: confirmed — The claim's three mechanisms for AUTO trading below NAV are each supported by the union of fetched sources. (1) Secondary liquidity disappearing: the terms state 'There is no guarantee that a liquid s

Exit risk

Mass exits may encounter operator delays, restrictions, or unavailable liquidity; stale Chainlink data can block AUTO redemption entirely.Unverified

Sources · 3

hastra.io ↗

“There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME or AUTO. You may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME or AUTO at your desired price or at all. Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME or AUTO may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“3. The Redemption Lifecycle: AUTO → wYLDS → USDC Phase 1: Redeem AUTO for wYLDS (vault-stake-auto) Phase 2: wYLDS → USDC (Operator-Mediated, vault-mint)”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources establish general liquidity risk, possible unstaking restrictions, operator-mediated wYLDS-to-USDC settlement delays, and failure of AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption when Chainlink data | anthropic: confirmed — The claim answers the redemption-gate slot (what impedes exit / mass exits) and every material element is supported by the union of sources. 'Operator delays' and 'restrictions'/'unavailable liquidity

Regulatory

Federal or state changes governing consumer auto lending, tokenized assets, or cross-chain operations could restrict or disrupt AUTO.Unverified

Sources · 1

help.hastra.io ↗

“Regulatory risk. Consumer auto lending is subject to federal and state regulation. Changes in regulations affecting tokenized RWAs, auto finance, or cross-chain operations could impact the product.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited issuer documentation supports a general regulatory-risk warning, including that changes affecting consumer auto lending, tokenized RWAs, or cross-chain operations could impact AUTO | anthropic: confirmed — The claim mirrors the source verbatim: 'Consumer auto lending is subject to federal and state regulation. Changes in regulations affecting tokenized RWAs, auto finance, or cross-chain operations could

Hack / smart contract

Vault contracts expose holders to configuration, initialization, unbonding, oracle, MEV, and cross-chain implementation vulnerabilities.Unverified

Sources · 3

hastra.io ↗

“Medium severity findings included insufficient space allocation for Config accounts (failing to account for Borsh serialization Vec length prefixes), missing parameter validation for the unbonding period in vault-stake (allowing accidental misconfiguration), missing validation that vault and mint tokens are distinct during initialization, and missing program update authority validation in the initialize instruction (creating a race condition where any account could front-run deployment).”

hastra.io ↗

“The dominant risk surface across both engagements was divergence between the Ethereum and Solana implementations of equivalent protocol primitives. In several cases, a primitive was implemented correctly on one chain and incorrectly on the other — including in the oracle-staleness anchoring logic and in the unbonding flow.”

hastra.io ↗

“The staking vault's reward distribution mechanism produces a discrete, single-block change in share price on both chains — surfacing as a sandwich/MEV vector on the Ethereum side and as a virtual-shares dilution effect on the Solana side.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The audits substantiate each named attack-surface category historically: configuration and initialization defects, unbonding and oracle logic, MEV/share-price discontinuities, and cross-chain semantic | anthropic: confirmed — The claim enumerates configuration, initialization, unbonding, oracle, MEV, and cross-chain implementation vulnerabilities in the vault contracts — this directly addresses the slot question about the

Custodian

AUTO depends on privileged operators for configuration and USDC redemption; operational failure can delay settlement or misconfigure safeguards.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“Several findings involved operator-privileged configuration paths that defer fail-safety to off-chain operational discipline rather than enforcing it on-chain.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“3. The Redemption Lifecycle: AUTO → wYLDS → USDC Phase 1: Redeem AUTO for wYLDS (vault-stake-auto) Phase 2: wYLDS → USDC (Operator-Mediated, vault-mint)”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 9489282a-0f79-45aa-afd8-fe3a14b80178: The incumbent more directly addresses failure and concentration risk involving named operational providers and infrastructure: program-controlled USDC custody, Provenance yield bridging, and Circle CCTP. Its own evidence specifically supports each dependency and shows redemption completion depends on bridged USDC. The new claim concerns privileged-operator configuration and redemption delays, but it does not identify concentration across custodians or key providers as directly.

Issuer failure

The Delaware trust aims to isolate auto loans from Figure insolvency, but AUTO-holder recovery rights remain undisclosed.Disputed

Sources · 2

Recovery mechanics are partially disclosed; the claim of total non-disclosure is a misreading of the cited evidence.

help.hastra.io ↗

“Bankruptcy remoteness. The auto loans sit in a Delaware statutory trust pledged under a Master Repurchase Agreement (MRA) between the originator and the bankruptcy remote-trust. This structure is designed to isolate the loan assets from the credit risk of any single party, including Figure.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“If the originator defaults under the MRA, the loans are sold in a true sale to the trust, which has an independent trust administator and liquidiaton, whose only non-discretionary powers are to sell the assets and remit the proceeds back to the Democratized Prime lenders in a default scenario.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: contradicted — The issuer document supports the first half: the Delaware statutory trust is designed to isolate auto loans from the credit risk of Figure and other parties. But it actively undercuts the assertion th | anthropic: contradicted — goal-fit: the claim addresses issuer/Figure insolvency and what survives for holders, so it does answer the SLOT QUESTION. On substance, the first material claim — that the Delaware statutory trust ai

Credit / counterparty

Borrower defaults can reduce cash flows, while vehicle depreciation can lower recoveries despite advance-rate, lien, insurance, and buyout protections.Disputed

Sources · 3

Not incorrect, but incompletely grounded against available issuer disclosures.

help.hastra.io ↗

“Credit risk. The underlying loans are near-prime and subprime consumer auto credit. The structural protections described above are designed to absorb those losses, but they do not eliminate credit risk entirely.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Vehicle depreciation. Unlike real estate, cars lose value over time. In a default scenario, recovery depends on the vehicle's residual value. The advance rate cap (87 percent), insurance requirements, first-priority lien position, and the 60/90-day buyout mechanism are designed to limit this exposure.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Current loans are advanced at 87 cents on the dollar. At 61–90 days delinquent, that drops automatically to 43.5 cents. At 91+ days, it goes to zero — effectively removing the loan from the borrowing base.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 2da359b6-78a5-48a8-a9dc-e9953db464bb: The incumbent directly identifies a named counterparty—Figure Certificate Company—whose failure can affect AUTO holders, and specifies the unsecured, asset-only recourse supported by its SEC citation. The new claim describes general borrower-default and collateral-depreciation risks but names no borrowers or counterparties, so it is less specific for this slot.

Underlying / economic

AUTO yield varies continuously with pool utilization, lender supply, borrower demand, delinquencies, and losses on near-prime and subprime auto loans.Disputed

Sources · 3

The auto-loan interpretation is better supported (97daa198, 551e27db, 5afb7ac3), but the conflicting source should be noted, not ignored.

help.hastra.io ↗

“Yield variability. The target yield of approximately ~9%* is not fixed. It is determined continuously by the utilization function and will move based on the balance of lender supply and borrower demand.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The rate is set by the same continuous utilization function that powers PRIME, based on how much of the pool is being borrowed; no one at Figure or Hastra sets it manually .”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Credit risk. The underlying loans are near-prime and subprime consumer auto credit. The structural protections described above are designed to absorb those losses, but they do not eliminate credit risk entirely.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 6ae31986-6220-49ed-a0fe-98cc05a15686: The incumbent is better supported by its own evidence: it directly links auto-loan delinquency and losses to impaired pool yield, including the specific 55% delinquency threshold and approximately 10% expected losses. The new claim adds delinquencies as a continuous yield driver, but its cited evidence only establishes utilization-driven rate variability and residual credit risk, not that delinquencies continuously determine yield.

Caps / gates

Hastra discloses possible delays, lock-ups, or restrictions but specifies no quantitative redemption cap or notice period.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME or AUTO. You may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME or AUTO at your desired price or at all. Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME or AUTO may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The on-chain unbonding_period field is permanently set to 0 and the unbond instruction no longer exists.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent d935fe18-43aa-4818-a051-33365a72e9bb: The incumbent directly addresses AUTO-to-wYLDS redemption mechanics: no cap or queue, atomic redemption, and failure when the Chainlink price is stale or uninitialized. Its cited evidence specifically supports each point, whereas the new claim relies partly on general risk language about possible restrictions and is less precise.

Exit paths

Holders may sell AUTO, but Hastra does not guarantee market liquidity, execution, or the desired sale price.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME or AUTO. You may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME or AUTO at your desired price or at all. Unstaking wYLDS from PRIME or AUTO may be subject to delays, lock-up periods, or other restrictions.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The terms disclose secondary-market liquidity risk but do not affirm that an operational secondary-market exit path exists for AUTO or specify its method, settlement timing, minimum, caps/ga | anthropic: confirmed — The archived Hastra Terms (Section 4A, Liquidity Risk) states verbatim: "There is no guarantee that a liquid secondary market will exist for PRIME or AUTO. You may be unable to sell or exchange PRIME

Exit paths

Holders burn wYLDS and submit a request; an operator completes USDC settlement after bridging, with timing and fees undisclosed.Disputed

Sources · 3

Drop the unsupported bridging assertion or ground it in verifiable evidence.

help.hastra.io ↗

“3. The Redemption Lifecycle: AUTO → wYLDS → USDC Phase 1: Redeem AUTO for wYLDS (vault-stake-auto) Phase 2: wYLDS → USDC (Operator-Mediated, vault-mint)”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source confirms that request_redeem burns the holder’s wYLDS and creates a RedemptionRequest PDA, after which an operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged through Circle | anthropic: confirmed — goal-fit: the claim answers the SLOT QUESTION for the wYLDS→USDC exit path (method, timing, fee). The source directly supports each element: requestRedeem 'Burns wYLDS from the user and creates a Rede

Exit paths

Holders burn AUTO and receive proportional wYLDS atomically without unbonding; no minimum, cap, or fee is disclosed.Disputed

Sources · 2

Re-anchor to 816994e9/27a358b8; the 031de0b2 citation is unverifiable.

help.hastra.io ↗

“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The on-chain unbonding_period field is permanently set to 0 and the unbond instruction no longer exists.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The guide supports atomic AUTO burning, proportional wYLDS transfer, and no unbonding or queue. It also discloses a material gate omitted from the claim: redemption fails when the Chainlink | anthropic: confirmed — The cited AUTO integration guide directly supports every element of the scoped claim for the AUTO→wYLDS leg (Phase 1). The source states verbatim: 'The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step

Admin powers

Program administrators maintain governance lists and freeze or thaw accounts. Operators control final USDC redemption transfers.Disputed

Sources · 3

Omits issuer-level seize/recover and reversal powers relevant to this slot: e3feadd0 (function for recovering and seizing assets) and 4f778751 (transfer agent can correct/reverse ownership). Also does not state whether upgrade power exists or what process (multisig per 5ef4af50) gates these actions.

hastra.io ↗

“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“// Operator-only: transfers USDC from the redeem vault to the user's wallet.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“To convert wYLDS back to USDC, the vault-mint program uses an admin-mediated two-step request_redeem / complete_redeem flow.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources confirm role-based freeze/thaw capabilities, administrator lists, and an operator-only complete_redeem transfer. However, they do not identify the persons or entities controlling | anthropic: confirmed — Both material claims are supported by the union of fetched sources and address the slot question of who holds freeze/governance powers. (1) 'Program administrators maintain governance lists and freeze

Bridge custody

A PDA-owned vault holds deposited USDC. An operator transfers bridged USDC from the redemption vault to the user.Unverified

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The operator calls complete_redeem once USDC has been bridged via Circle's CCTP. The RedemptionRequest PDA is closed and rent is returned to the user.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“// Operator-only: transfers USDC from the redeem vault to the user's wallet.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support that deposited USDC enters a program-controlled, PDA-owned vault and that an operator-only complete_redeem instruction transfers USDC from a redemption vault to the user | anthropic: confirmed — Both material claims answer the slot question (where bridge-locked collateral sits and who controls it) and are supported by the fetched sources. (1) 'A PDA-owned vault holds deposited USDC' is direct

Audits

Sherlock reviewed Ethereum and Solana vault implementations during March 4–13 and April 9–12, 2026.Unverified

Sources · 4

hastra.io ↗

“Sherlock performed independent security reviews of the Hastra protocol on behalf of Figure Technologies across two engagements in March and April 2026.”

hastra.io ↗

“1 Core vault implementation (EVM + SVM) March 4–13, 2026”

hastra.io ↗

“2 Chainlink NAV integration April 9–12, 2026”

hastra.io ↗

“Across two collaborative engagements in March and April 2026, Sherlock audited the Hastra protocol — Figure Technologies' institutional-grade tokenized vault system (USDC → wYLDS yield vault → PRIME staking vault) — covering both its Ethereum (Solidity) and Solana (Anchor/Rust) implementations.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent ab0c9c30-2541-4daa-906d-f1a9b61f4fc0: The incumbent directly states the fuller audit scope—Ethereum and Solana vaults plus the Chainlink NAV integration—and dates it to March and April 2026. Its own evidence supports both implementation coverage and the NAV integration, whereas the new claim's wording omits the NAV integration despite citing that second engagement.

Attestations

Hastra publishes a Proof of Reserves view but identifies no independent attestation provider in the supplied evidence.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“View Proof of Reserves”

hastra.io ↗

“Products wYLDS PRIME Reserves”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent a336d706-48df-41a0-9063-279c954470ad: The incumbent is more specific about where the proof-of-reserves information is published, identifying the exact JSON feed and the balances it contains. Its own evidence also directly supports the absence of an attestor, auditor, or signature field. The new claim cites only generic Proof of Reserves links and does not identify a provider.

Vehicle

RWA.xyz identifies AUTO's issuer domicile as the Cayman Islands. Provenance Blockchain Foundation operates the Figure-built Hastra protocol.Unverified

Sources · 2

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“Cayman Islands”

hastra.io ↗

“Hastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technologies, a fintech company focused on blockchain-based financial products and is operated by the Provenance Blockchain Fou ndation.”

Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic: confirmed — Both cited quotes are reproduced verbatim in the archived source content. The RWA.xyz AUTO page's Legal & Regulatory section lists Issuer: Hastra and Domicile: Cayman Islands, supporting the issuer-do | gpt: unsupported — evidence class mismatch

Incidents & track record

The exhaustive corpus reports no AUTO depeg, halt, enforcement action, lawsuit, or other notable incident through 2026-08-07.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit of the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs.”

hastra.io ↗

“Across two collaborative engagements in March and April 2026, Sherlock audited the Hastra protocol — Figure Technologies' institutional-grade tokenized vault system (USDC → wYLDS yield vault → PRIME staking vault) — covering both its Ethereum (Solidity) and Solana (Anchor/Rust) implementations.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited audit reports discuss Hastra smart-contract security reviews and vulnerabilities, not an exhaustive incident search concerning the issuer or AUTO. They neither state that no depeg, | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: Both claimed quotes verify verbatim against the archived sources — the Informal Systems line ('In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems...') and the Sherlock line ('Across two coll

Legal entity

Signum Ltd.Disputed

Sources · 5

Hastra properties identify Signum Ltd. as the sole associated legal entity.

RWA.xyz identifies Hastra as issuer but does not provide its legal name.

hastra.io ↗

“Signum Ltd. Copyright© 2026”

hastra.io ↗

“Signum Ltd. Copyright© 2026”

hastra.io ↗

“Signum Ltd. Copyright© 2026”

hastra.io ↗

“Signum Ltd. Copyright© 2026”

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“Issuer Hastra”

Verifier note: WARNING: evidence class mismatch; trusted tier 1 evidence requires substance and goal-fit review | panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The Hastra pages identify “Signum Ltd.” only in a copyright footer, not as AUTO’s legal issuer. RWA.xyz names the issuer as “Hastra,” but does not establish that Hastra is the legal name of | anthropic: confirmed — The claim asks for the LEGAL ENTITY NAME ONLY of the issuer. Four independent issuer-controlled pages (hastra.io, /auto, /milestones, www.hastra.io/privacy) all carry the identical footer copyright no

What the issuer does

Hastra provides tokenized DeFi vaults for real-world-asset yield and staking. Figure Technologies built the protocol, and Provenance Blockchain Foundation operates it.Disputed

AUTO added third-party-originated auto credit after Hastra’s home-equity-backed PRIME product.

Sources · 5

Soften to 'expanding beyond Hastra's prior home-equity yield source' without asserting PRIME's backing.

hastra.io ↗

“Hastra is a DeFi protocol built by Figure Technologies, a fintech company focused on blockchain-based financial products and is operated by the Provenance Blockchain Fou ndation.”

hastra.io ↗

“The Hastra protocol provides institutional-grade tokenized vaults for yield generation and staking.”

hastra.io ↗

“The first third-party originated asset on Hastra.”

hastra.io ↗

“The first third-party originated asset on Hastra. Auto loans flow through Figure's capital markets infrastructure and into Hastra's DeFi credit layer, expanding yield sources beyond home equity.”

hastra.io ↗

“Live on Solana and Ethereum Liquid Staking to earn against Figure HELOCs”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 97bd591b-6048-4c3a-b0bc-39e1a6d7c11d: Both claims directly identify Hastra’s builders/operator and its tokenized RWA-yield and staking business. The incumbent is better supported by its own evidence because its cited AUTO documentation explicitly establishes that AUTO provides consumer auto-loan yield, is the second Hastra asset, and follows PRIME (home equity). The new claim’s evidence supports third-party origination and expansion beyond home equity but does not itself explicitly substantiate that AUTO followed PRIME.

Structure & quality

Agora Data originates the consumer auto loans, and Figure structures them through Figure Forge. Third-party guarantors, servicers, or trusts may participate.Unverified

Disclosures provide no maturity, credit-quality, or concentration breakdown.

Sources · 2

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“which consists of a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge”

hastra.io ↗

“Hastra does not endorse, guarantee, or provide any assurances about any third-party originator of the loans underlying AUTO, any guarantor, servicer, or trust involved in those pools, Figure, or the legal, tax, or regulatory implications of holding AUTO.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The narrative includes structure and participant claims that do not answer the slot question about duration/maturity, credit quality, and concentration. Although the fetched disclosures prov | anthropic: confirmed — Every material claim is supported by the union of sources. The rwa.xyz page states AUTO 'consists of a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge,'

Composition

The disclosed Auto Pool contains consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured through Figure Forge. No instrument weights were disclosed.Unverified

Sources · 2

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“which consists of a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge”

hastra.io ↗

“Earn yield backed by consumer auto loans originated through Figure's marketplace by Agora.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support that AUTO represents exposure to a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge. However, they provide neither an instru | anthropic: confirmed — The claim identifies what backs the token (consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data, structured through Figure Forge) and this directly answers the slot question about the underlying composition.

Holder's claim

A redeemable share-based position in the AUTO pool, without a disclosed direct legal claim on individual auto loans.Unverified

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“AUTO represents a share-based position in the AUTO pool.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The vault-stake-auto program supports a single-step direct redemption. There is no unbonding period or queuing — redeem atomically burns the specified AUTO shares and transfers the proportional wYLDS from the stake vault to the user.”

hastra.io ↗

“Hastra does not endorse, guarantee, or provide any assurances about any third-party originator of the loans underlying AUTO, any guarantor, servicer, or trust involved in those pools, Figure, or the legal, tax, or regulatory implications of holding AUTO.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources establish that AUTO is technically a pool share token that can be burned for proportional wYLDS, but they do not state what enforceable legal interest the holder owns. The discla | anthropic: confirmed — goal-fit: the claim answers the slot question by characterizing what the holder legally owns — a redeemable, share-based position in the AUTO pool rather than a direct claim on the underlying loans. T

Category

Private-credit-rwaUnverified

Sources · 3

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“Asset-Backed Credit”

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“which consists of a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge”

app.rwa.xyz ↗

“which derives its yield from real borrower”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — The cited RWA.xyz page substantively identifies the underlying as a pool of consumer auto loans, which fits private-credit-rwa despite the liquid-staking wrapper. However, RWA.xyz is an aggregator, wh | anthropic: confirmed — The cited RWA.xyz page describes the underlying as 'a pool of consumer auto loans originated by Agora Data and structured by Figure via Figure Forge,' and states the yield 'derives its yield from real

Audits

A separate audit reviewed Solana vault-mint and vault-stake controls, including freeze functions, administrator lists, PDA derivation, and role-based access.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“Both programs include account freeze/thaw functionality for their respective tokens and maintain administrator lists for governance.”

hastra.io ↗

“The Hastra programs demonstrate solid engineering practices with well-structured code, comprehensive use of Anchor's constraint system, proper PDA derivation patterns, and robust role-based access control.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source supports the stated Solana audit scope, including freeze/thaw functions, administrator lists, PDA derivation, and role-based access control. However, the value does not answer the | anthropic: confirmed — The claim describes the scope of a separate (smart-contract) audit of the Hastra Solana vault-mint and vault-stake programs, and every listed control element is directly supported by verbatim text in

Monitoring and attestation

Hastra publishes a Proof of Reserves view, but the corpus does not identify its provider, scope, or update frequency.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“View Proof of Reserves”

hastra.io ↗

“Products wYLDS PRIME Reserves”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources show only a “View Proof of Reserves” link and a “Reserves” navigation item. They do not identify an actual monitoring feed, its provider, the assets or liabilities it attests, or | anthropic: confirmed — The claim has two parts, both borne out by the archived sources. (1) Hastra publishes a Proof of Reserves view: https://hastra.io/auto contains the link text 'View Proof of Reserves' and both pages' f

Key management

Hastra states that multisignature security protects AUTO. Anchor role-based controls govern privileged program operations.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“Secured by: Real asset backing • Multi-sig security”

hastra.io ↗

“The Hastra programs demonstrate solid engineering practices with well-structured code, comprehensive use of Anchor's constraint system, proper PDA derivation patterns, and robust role-based access control.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources support only a general marketing statement that AUTO uses “Multi-sig security” and an auditor’s broad assessment of role-based access control. They do not describe the multisig t | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The SLOT QUESTION demands specifics on multisig thresholds (M-of-N), signer identities and geographic/organizational distribution, key custody arrangements, and timelocks for privileged acti

Oracle dependencies

Chainlink Data Streams supplies AUTO's exchange rate through Ethereum NAV contracts and Solana price verification. Stale prices can block redemption.Disputed

Sources · 3

Remove the phantom 7cea8983 citation; either cite 6eecd9fa/9b5a8918 for the failure-mode claim or soften 'can block redemption' to what the audit findings actually establish.

hastra.io ↗

“The Chainlink Data Streams NAV integration , including the feed verifier and NAV engine on the Ethereum side and the corresponding price-verification path on the Solana side.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“accepts wYLDS and issues AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“The amount of wYLDS returned is calculated using the live Chainlink price at the time of the call: wYLDS_returned = auto_amount * price / price_scale . The call will fail if the stored Chainlink price is stale (past price_max_staleness ) or uninitialised.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt: unsupported — The sources confirm that Chainlink Data Streams maintains the Solana AUTO/wYLDS exchange rate through a price-verification path and that a stale or uninitialized stored price causes the direct AUTO-to | anthropic: confirmed — The claim answers the slot question directly: it names the oracle (Chainlink Data Streams) used for AUTO pricing/settlement and states the failure mode (stale price blocks redemption), so it is goal-f

Bridge provider

Hastra uses issuer-operated vault programs rather than an identified third-party token bridge on Solana.Unverified

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconnected Anchor programs:”

help.hastra.io ↗

“accepts USDC and issues wYLDS at a 1:1 ratio. Shared across all Hastra Solana pools.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The sources describe Hastra’s Solana vault programs for local USDC-to-wYLDS issuance, but they also explicitly identify Circle’s CCTP as the bridge used in the operator-mediated redemption flow. They | anthropic: confirmed — The slot asks for the bridge operator and mechanism for the Solana token. The cited archived content directly describes an issuer-operated model: 'The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconne

Canonical deployment

Solana hosts the native AUTO issue through vault-stake-auto. The corpus does not identify AUTO's token mint address.Unverified

Sources · 3

help.hastra.io ↗

“The Hastra Solana protocol consists of two interconnected Anchor programs:”

help.hastra.io ↗

“accepts wYLDS and issues AUTO shares based on a Chainlink-sourced exchange rate.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“vault-stake-auto ( 5uJgCDrQHfA58fPqLsuU14Srg9quxXNHz91cZ54cq4pK )”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — The issuer guide supports that a Solana Anchor program, vault-stake-auto, mints and burns AUTO share tokens, which supports treating this Solana instance as a native issue rather than a bridged AUTO r | anthropic: confirmed — goal-fit: the claim directly answers the slot question (canonical chain, native vs bridged, mint disclosure). The archived guide confirms all three parts. It describes 'The Hastra Solana protocol cons

Networks

AUTO is deployed on Solana. Hastra plans Ethereum mainnet and additional chains.Unverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“Yield from Democratized Prime flows through to Hastra and is distributed to AUTO token holders (minus the applicable Hastra Platform fee of 50bps) on Solana, with Ethereum mainnet and additional chains to follow.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Settlement Continuous (utilization-based) Continuous (utilization-based)”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: Issuer documentation supports that AUTO currently exists on Solana, including its identification as an SPL token and the table entry “Solana, Ethereum to follow.” However, planned Ethereum m | anthropic: confirmed — The cited source directly supports every item. AUTO is described as currently deployed on Solana ('fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana', 'Connect your Phantom or compatible Solana wallet', an

Operating history

Hastra operates on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet; Ethereum mainnet deployment remained pending security review.Unverified

Sources · 3

hastra.io ↗

“Hastra is currently deployed on Solana mainnet and Ethereum testnet, with mainnet Ethereum deployment pending audit and security review.”

hastra.io ↗

“Live on Solana. Coming soon to Ethereum”

hastra.io ↗

“Live on Solana. Coming soon to Ethereum”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The audit supports this deployment status as of its April 2026 review, but the later archived Hastra pages state that PRIME and wYLDS are live on both Solana and Ethereum. “Coming soon to Ethereum” ap | anthropic: contradicted — The claim asserts Ethereum deployment is limited to testnet with mainnet 'pending security review.' The audit PDF (audited April 2026) does contain that exact sentence, but the current hastra.io homep

Unilateral changes

FCC controls certificate transferee eligibility; vault administrators control withdrawal whitelists and account freezes without disclosed holder consent.Unverified

Sources · 2

sec.gov ↗

“The digital asset standard used on the Provenance Blockchain enables FCC to enforce transfer restrictions in connection with the Certificates.”

hastra.io ↗

“The protocol is designed with regulatory compliance in mind: vaults include account freeze/thaw controls, whitelisted withdrawals, and two-step redemption flows.”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:39:38.264Z from rejected status | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The SEC filing confirms that FCC and its transfer agent control certificate-transfer conditions and transferee eligibility, but it does not state that FCC may change those eligibility rules | anthropic: unsupported — Both claimed quotes are verbatim-accurate in the archived content, and the SEC S-1/A does support that FCC controls transferee eligibility — beyond the quoted sentence it states the standard 'enables

If the issuer fails

Originator default triggers a true sale of loans to the trust. An independent administrator liquidates assets and remits proceeds to lenders.Disputed

A reserve account absorbs realized losses before token holders. Figure seed capital provides first-loss protection. Agora owes repurchase obligations for ineligible loans. Recoveries ultimately depend on vehicle values and available credit protections.

Sources · 5

Incorporate ev:a5aa673a recourse/parent guarantee.

help.hastra.io ↗

“If the originator defaults under the MRA, the loans are sold in a true sale to the trust, which has an independent trust administator and liquidiaton, whose only non-discretionary powers are to sell the assets and remit the proceeds back to the Democratized Prime lenders in a default scenario.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Reserve account. A sinking fund that builds to 2.5 percent of outstanding principal over time. It absorbs realized credit losses before any loss reaches token holders.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Figure’s $25M commitment. Figure commits seed capital to the auto loan trust as first-loss protection. Figure’s money is at risk alongside yours.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Originator buyback. Agora must repurchase any loan that breaches its representations or eligibility criteria, at full principal plus accrued interest.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“Vehicle depreciation. Unlike real estate, cars lose value over time. In a default scenario, recovery depends on the vehicle's residual value. The advance rate cap (87 percent), insurance requirements, first-priority lien position, and the 60/90-day buyout mechanism are designed to limit this exposure.”

Key people

Michael S. Cagney leads Figure Certificate Company, an entity tied to the backing layer; no direct AUTO role is disclosed.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“Michael S. Cagney Chief Executive Officer Figure Certificate Company”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | anthropic-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch | kimi-family: unsupported — evidence class mismatch

Backers

No issuer equity investors are disclosed. Capital One provides Agora Data a $100 million warehouse facility.Disputed

Sources · 1

Either move the Capital One fact to underlying/originator context and mark issuer backers as undisclosed, or explicitly label it as Agora's (not the issuer's) financing.

help.hastra.io ↗

“Agora has an existing $100M warehouse facility with Capital One and a track record of public securitizations.”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1, disputed) | gpt-family: contradicted — The assigned issuer-docs source supports the $100 million Capital One warehouse facility, but it actively contradicts the statement that no issuer equity investors are disclosed: it says Agora is back | anthropic-family: contradicted — The claim has two components. Component two — that Capital One provides Agora Data a $100M warehouse facility — is directly supported: the Hastra issuer-docs page states 'Agora has an existing $100M w | kimi-family: contradicted — The second item is supported: the source states Agora has an existing $100M warehouse facility with Capital One. But the first item, 'No issuer equity investors are disclosed,' is actively contradicte

Custodians

The vault-mint program places deposited USDC in a PDA-owned program-controlled token account. The evidence identifies no regulated custodian.Disputed

Sources · 1

The PDA vault holds deposited USDC, but the underlying yield-generating assets are custodied off-chain on Provenance and wYLDS is a custodial wrapper over the SEC-registered YLDS.

help.hastra.io ↗

“Unlike a simple swap, this "Deposit" moves USDC into a program-controlled vault token account (PDA-owned), and the program mints wYLDS to the user.”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent 9ea769a2-7001-4f48-b13c-d3f411a469b6: The new claim more directly and specifically identifies the underlying asset custodian as UMB Bank, N.A., states its FDIC-member status, and distinguishes the wrapped-token layer. Its SEC filing evidence directly supports UMB Bank’s custodial role and chartered-bank identity. The incumbent only describes USDC held in a PDA-owned program-controlled account and expressly lacks a regulated custodian, so it answers less of the slot.

Upgradeability

Upgradeable Solana programs controlled by a program upgrade authority; no on-chain timelock or multisig disclosedUnverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“missing program update authority validation in the initialize instruction (creating a race condition where any account could front-run deployment)”

Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | gpt-family: unsupported — The report confirms that the audited code had an initialize-instruction flaw involving missing validation of the program update authority, but it does not establish the deployed programs' upgradeabili | anthropic-family: confirmed — The claimed quote appears verbatim in the archived audit report as a Medium-severity finding: 'missing program update authority validation in the initialize instruction (creating a race condition wher | gpt-family: unsupported — The claimed atomic value for upgradeability is blank. The source discusses missing validation of the program update authority during initialization and says the issue was later resolved, but it does n

Source documents

Hastra Terms of Use (hastra.io/terms).Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“The Terms of Use for Hastra's DeFi application are governed by Signum Ltd.”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:29:00.779Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The cited page is clearly a Terms of Use document at the original-source URL and states a last-updated date of August 3, 2026, but the atomic value supplies neither the required document typ | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit: The document identity is well-supported — the fetched page is titled "Terms of Use" at https://hastra.io/terms, last updated August 3, 2026, and confirms it is a Hastra document (Signum Ltd. | kimi: confirmed — The archived page at https://hastra.io/terms is titled 'Terms of Use', states 'Last updated: August 3, 2026', and governs use of Hastra's DeFi application provided by Signum Ltd. The claimed value (a

Exit paths

Multi-step, operator-mediated wYLDS→USDC redemption across the vault-mint and vault-stake programs; not instant.Unverified

Sources · 1

help.hastra.io ↗

“Returning to USDC is a multi-step process across both programs.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The source confirms that an AUTO→USDC exit is multi-step across both programs: AUTO is redeemed to wYLDS in vault-stake-auto, then wYLDS is converted to USDC through vault-mint’s operator-mediated req | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The source explicitly states 'Returning to USDC is a multi-step process across both programs' and details Phase 1 (redeem AUTO for wYLDS, single-step/atomic) and Phase 2 (wYLDS→USDC via vault-mint's a

Transfer restrictions

Freely transferable SPL token; program retains freeze/thaw authority via up to 5 administrators for compliance (account freeze/thaw, whitelisted withdrawals, two-step redemption); Terms bar U.S. persons and OFAC/OFSI-sanctioned persons/jurisdictions.Unverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“Yes, AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana.”

github.com ↗

“Designated administrators can freeze/thaw specific token accounts...Maximum 5 freeze administrators.”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched AUTO help page supports that AUTO is transferable (“Yes, AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on So[...lana]”). However, the supplied live content does not substantiate the asserted | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The live fetch of help.hastra.io/auto/what-is-auto confirms the transferability quote verbatim: 'Yes, AUTO is fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana.' However, the second cited source (github.co | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra help page states that AUTO is “fully transferable as an SPL token on Solana,” supporting the general characterization. However, the cited vault/staking repository states that designated adm

Tax treatment

No entity-level or pass-through tax structure disclosed; holders solely responsible for their own tax treatment; Hastra provides no tax advice.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“acquiring, staking, earning wYLDS on, and disposing of digital assets may have tax consequences in your jurisdiction”

Verifier note: lost head-to-head to incumbent b05c80d5-d6ab-4ccf-b5c3-ec18f8c5d46f: The claims are substantively similar, but the new claim is better supported by its own cited evidence: the quotation expressly states that holders are solely responsible for determining and satisfying tax obligations and that Hastra provides no tax advice. The incumbent’s excerpt mentions only possible tax consequences and does not support those additional assertions.

Bankruptcy remote

NoUnverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“This structure is designed to isolate the loan assets from the credit risk of any single party, including Figure.”

sec.gov ↗

“The Certificates are unsecured and backed solely by the assets of FCC.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra AUTO source expressly states that the auto loans sit in a “bankruptcy remote-trust” and labels this protection “Bankruptcy remoteness.” It further says the structure is designed to isolate | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The Hastra source explicitly and repeatedly states that the auto loan structure IS bankruptcy remote: it describes 'Bankruptcy remoteness' as one of the named structural protections, states the loans

Regime

AUTO/wYLDS protocol layer is unregistered, BVI-governed (Signum Ltd.), restricted to non-U.S. persons; underlying YLDS is an SEC-registered face-amount certificate (Figure Certificate Company) under the Investment Company Act of 1940.Unverified

Sources · 2

hastra.io ↗

“must not be a resident, citizen, or person located in the United States of America or any U.S. territory.”

sec.gov ↗

“face-amount certificate company registered with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission ('SEC') under the Investment Company Act of 1940”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:38:32.844Z from rejected status | panel 0/2 confirmed (sourceDomains=2) | gpt: unsupported — The sources confirm that Signum Ltd. is BVI-organized, the Hastra Protocol excludes U.S. residents, citizens, and persons located in the United States or its territories, and Figure Certificate Compan | anthropic: unsupported — goal-fit is satisfied (this describes the offering/regulatory regime, which is what the slot asks). However, precision fails on two elements. The quoted phrases themselves match the sources: the S-1/A

Source documents

Hastra Terms of Use, governing the AUTO/wYLDS protocol operated by Signum Ltd.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“The Terms of Use for Hastra's DeFi application are governed by Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ('Hastra')...”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:35:57.986Z from rejected status | panel 1/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The source confirms that this is Hastra’s Terms of Use, last updated August 3, 2026, at https://hastra.io/terms, and that it governs a DeFi protocol provided by Signum Ltd. that includes wYL | anthropic: unsupported — The document type (Terms of Use) and the source URL (https://hastra.io/terms) are confirmed, and the source does identify Signum Ltd. (a BVI company d/b/a 'Hastra') as the provider and confirms the AU | kimi: confirmed — The archived https://hastra.io/terms page is explicitly titled 'Terms of Use' (type: terms), states 'Last updated: August 3, 2026', and states the Terms govern the DeFi application and Protocol provid

Audits

Informal Systems conducted a security audit of Hastra's vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs between September and November 2025, ahead of the wYLDS/PRIME launch.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“In September 2025, Figure engaged Informal Systems to conduct a comprehensive security audit of the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs.”

Verifier note: panel 1/2 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The report directly supports that Figure engaged Informal Systems for a security audit of Hastra’s vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, conducted in two phases from September 24 to November 18, | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The cited PDF explicitly states that Figure engaged Informal Systems in September 2025 to conduct a comprehensive security audit of the Hastra vault-mint and vault-stake Solana programs, and details t

Source documents

Hastra Pulse proof-of-reserves live API endpoint.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“por”

Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited URL is a live JSON API endpoint and its path ends in `/por`, but the fetched content never expands “por” as “proof-of-reserves” or explicitly identifies the endpoint as a Hastra Pulse proof- | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The document asserts this URL is the 'Hastra Pulse proof-of-reserves live API endpoint' and cites the quote 'por.' However, the live JSON returned by the endpoint never contains the literal string 'po | google/gemini-3.6-flash: confirmed — The live API endpoint at https://hastra.io/hastra-pulse/public/api/v1/por returns JSON data detailing supply, vault balances, reserve ratios, and holder stats across various cards/tokens, confirming i

Source documents

Figure Certificate Co Form S-1/A registration statement amendment for FY2025.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“Figure Certificate Co - Form S-1/A - FY2025”

Verifier note: panel 1/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited SEC filing confirms that it is Figure Certificate Company’s Form S-1 registration statement, Amendment No. 6 (i.e., an S-1/A), filed February 18, 2025. However, the fetched content does not | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: confirmed — The fetched document is an SEC Form S-1/A (Amendment No. 6) filed by Figure Certificate Company on February 18, 2025, matching the claimed document type, issuer, and FY2025 filing date. The registrant | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited text does not contain the quoted string 'Figure Certificate Co - Form S-1/A - FY2025'. The registrant is listed as 'FIGURE CERTIFICATE COMPANY', the document is Amendment No. 6 to Form S-1 f

Source documents

Figure Certificate Co Form S-1 registration statement (YLDS), file 333-275154, initial filing 2023-10-24, amendment no. 6 on 2025-02-18, via SEC EDGAR CIK 1974395.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“Figure Certificate Co”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The fetched SEC EDGAR page does not identify CIK 0001974395 as “Figure Certificate Co” and states “There is no filings data for this organization” and “Please use the Company or Person Lookup to find | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The claim asserts that CIK 1974395 corresponds to 'Figure Certificate Co' and that this entity has an S-1 filing (333-275154) with an amendment no. 6 dated 2025-02-18. The cited quote 'Figure Certific | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The re-fetched EDGAR page for CIK 0001974395 returned an empty company landing page without entity details and does not contain the quoted text 'Figure Certificate Co'.

Source documents

Figure Technology Solutions SEC filing dated 2026-04-24, disclosing the Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra) software license agreement.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“Disclosures regarding a Software License Agreement entered into with Signum Ltd. (dba Hastra), granting Hastra a license to use proprietary software to support their protocol.”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The cited SEC document is a Figure Technology Solutions, Inc. definitive proxy statement (Schedule 14A) dated April 24, 2026. However, the fetched content contains no disclosure of a Software License | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: contradicted — The cited SEC filing at that URL/accession number is a DEF 14A (Definitive Proxy Statement) for Figure Technology Solutions' 2026 Annual Meeting of Stockholders, dated April 24, 2026. It covers direct | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided SEC filing text (DEF 14A Proxy Statement dated April 24, 2026) does not contain the quoted statement nor any references to Signum Ltd., Hastra, or a Software License Agreement.

Source documents

Figure Technology Solutions SEC Form 10-K, fiscal year ended 2025-12-31; relevant to Figure counterparty diligence.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“ANNUAL REPORT”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The fetched SEC content supports that the filing is tagged for FY 2025 and contains a 2025-12-31 reporting period, but the excerpt does not state “ANNUAL REPORT,” identify the issuer by its full legal | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC.gov URL consists entirely of XBRL/inline-XBRL data tags, entity identifiers, and context references (e.g., dei:DocumentFiscalYearFocus, us-gaap:CommonClassAMe | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The cited source text provided in the prompt does not contain the quoted phrase 'ANNUAL REPORT'.

Source documents

Hastra Terms of Use (Signum Ltd., BVI), governing the DeFi application; current as of 2026-07-30.Unverified

Sources · 1

hastra.io ↗

“These Terms of Use govern access to and use of the decentralized finance (DeFi) application and related services provided by Signum Ltd., a company organized under the laws of the British Virgin Islands ('Hastra').”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:32:36.204Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: contradicted — The source confirms that this is Hastra’s Terms of Use for the DeFi application, provided by Signum Ltd., a British Virgin Islands company, at https://hastra.io/terms. However, it states “Last updated | anthropic: contradicted — The slot question asks for document type, date, and source URL. Type (Terms of Use) and issuer (Signum Ltd., BVI) match, and the URL https://hastra.io/terms is correct. However, the date is wrong: the | kimi: contradicted — The document type (Terms of Use), governing entity (Signum Ltd., BVI), scope (DeFi application), and URL are all supported by the archived page, and the quoted sentence matches the source text. Howeve

Fee schedule

0Unverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“USDC and wYLDS convert at a 1:1 ratio.”

help.hastra.io ↗

“No fees or caps are explicitly specified in the document”

Verifier note: re-adjudicated 2026-08-05T15:38:13.681Z from rejected status | panel 0/3 confirmed (sourceDomains=1) | gpt: unsupported — goal-fit: The sources do not state that the mint/redeem fee rate is 0 or identify who charges such a fee. A 1:1 USDC-to-wYLDS conversion ratio does not prove zero fees, and the buying guide explicitly | anthropic: unsupported — The value asserts fee_mint_redeem = 0, but neither source states that mint/redeem fees are zero. The buying-wYLDS page says USDC and wYLDS convert at a 1:1 ratio, which describes the exchange rate, no | kimi: unsupported — The sources never state that mint or redeem fees are zero. The '1:1 ratio' describes the USDC↔wYLDS conversion rate, not an explicit zero-fee policy, and the panel's second quote concedes 'No fees or

Audits

Figure performs AI-enabled quality-control review of Agora's auto loans for underwriting-guideline compliance; this is a loan-level QC process, not a financial-statement audit.Unverified

Sources · 1

help.hastra.io ↗

“Loans tokenized on Figure Connect using DART registry; Figure Forge smart contract creates standardized fungible participation tokens”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The fetched page attributes AI-powered underwriting to Agora Data and states that “Agora handles origination, underwriting, and servicing.” It describes Figure’s role as sourcing and diligencing the t | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The fetched page describes Agora as the originator using its own 'AI-powered underwriting framework,' and states Figure's role is limited to structuring, credit enhancement, and capital markets infras | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided text mentions that Agora originates auto loans through an AI-powered underwriting framework and that Figure sources and diligences the originator. However, it does not state that Figure p

Audits

Figure Technology Solutions' consolidated 2025 financial statements were independently audited; this is a corporate audit and not an audit of AUTO, its trust, collateral, or contracts.Unverified

Sources · 1

sec.gov ↗

“We have audited the accompanying consolidated balance sheets”

Verifier note: panel 0/3 confirmed (agreement=1) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: unsupported — The re-fetched SEC content is an XBRL/metadata extract showing a FY 2025 filing, but it does not include the quoted auditor-report language or otherwise identify an independent auditor, the audited co | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The re-fetched content from the cited SEC filing URL consists entirely of raw XBRL context/tag metadata (entity identifiers, date contexts, unit definitions, etc.) and does not contain the claimed quo | google/gemini-3.6-flash: unsupported — The provided source snippet consists of XBRL data tags and financial line-item identifiers from Figure Technology Solutions' Form 10-K filing. It does not contain the auditor's report text, the quote

Holdings

The wYLDS staked to mint AUTO is backed 1:1 by YLDS, Figure Certificate Company's SEC-registered face-amount certificate, whose reserves are short-duration U.S. Treasuries and Treasury repos comparable to prime money-market fund holdings.Unverified

Sources · 2

help.hastra.io ↗

“Each wYLDS maintains a '1:1' backing with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve”

ylds.com ↗

“Reserve composition available on demand.”

Verifier note: panel 0/2 confirmed (agreement=2) | openai/gpt-5.6-terra: contradicted — The Hastra page supports that wYLDS is backed 1:1 by YLDS in Hastra’s reserve. However, it identifies YLDS as an SEC-registered yield-bearing stablecoin “minted by Figure Loans, LLC,” not as a face-am | anthropic/claude-sonnet-5: unsupported — The Hastra help-page does confirm the core 1:1 backing claim verbatim ('Each wYLDS is backed 1:1 with YLDS held in Hastra's reserve'), but the rest of the atomic claim is not substantiated by the fetc

Run operations

Issuer entity 6a26afc5-a511-480c-ac79-011328bae75f · last updated 2026-08-07T22:04:02.180Z

0 source channels auto-trusted this run (revocable in Autoresearch)

ingest · ingest · weak

plan · plan · ok

synthesize · synthesize · ok

Coverage

35 of 43 fields verified · 0 unverified · 3 not found

Run 2026-08-07T19:59:05.788Z · done · cost $0.00

Automated research, human-reviewed. Verify against source documents before credit decisions.

Hastra AUTO

Overview

Performance

Growth

Growth

Returns

The underlying

Portfolio overview

Portfolio composition

Issuer

Hastra

Structural credibility

Filings & disclosures

Legal & regulatory structure

Legal wrapper

Custodian

Independent validators

Opsec

Fees

Redemption

Wylds to USDC

Auto to wylds

Secondary market

Risks & protections

Onchain transparency

Token

Chain

Networks & bridges

Documents

Plan fulfillment

Evidence gaps

Rejected facts

Run operations

Coverage